Zone

Crash of a Piper PA-31-310 Navajo C near Colton: 1 killed

Date & Time: May 3, 2017 at 2030 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GQAM
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Quebec - Montreal
MSN:
31-7912093
YOM:
1979
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
5250
Captain / Total hours on type:
1187.00
Circumstances:
The commercial pilot departed on a planned 1-hour cargo cross-country flight in the autopilot-equipped airplane. About 3 minutes after departure, the controller instructed the pilot to fly direct to the destination airport at 2,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The pilot acknowledged the clearance, and there were no further radio transmissions from the airplane. The airplane continued flying past the destination airport in straight-and-level flight at 2,100 ft msl, consistent with the airplane operating under autopilot control, until it was about 100 miles beyond the destination airport. A witness near the accident site watched the airplane fly over at a low altitude, heard three "pops" come from the airplane, and then saw it bank to the left and begin to descend. The airplane continued in the descending left turn until he lost sight of it as it dropped below the horizon. The airplane impacted trees in about a 45° left bank and a level pitch attitude and came to rest in a heavily wooded area. The airplane sustained extensive thermal damage from a postcrash fire; however, examination of the remaining portions of the airframe, flight controls, engines, and engine accessories revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The fuel selector valves were found on the outboard tanks, which was in accordance with the normal cruise procedures in the pilot's operating handbook. Calculations based on the airplane's flight records and the fuel consumption information in the engine manual indicated that, at departure, the outboard tanks of the airplane contained sufficient fuel for about 1 hour 10 minutes of flight. The airplane had been flying for about 1 hour 15 minutes when the accident occurred. Therefore, it is likely that the fuel in the outboard tanks was exhausted; without pilot action to switch fuel tanks, the engines lost power as a result of fuel starvation, and the airplane descended and impacted trees and terrain. The overflight of the intended destination and the subsequent loss of engine power due to fuel starvation are indicative of pilot incapacitation. The pilot's autopsy identified no significant natural disease:however, the examination was limited by the severity of damage to the body. Further, there are a number of conditions, including cardiac arrhythmias, seizures, or other causes of loss of consciousness, that could incapacitate a pilot and leave no evidence at autopsy. The pilot's toxicology results indicated that the pilot had used marijuana/tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) at some point before the accident. THC can impair judgment, but it does not cause incapacitation; therefore, the circumstances of this accident are not consistent with impairment from THC, and, the pilot's THC use likely did not contribute to this accident. The reason for the pilot's incapacitation could not be determined.
Probable cause:
The pilot's incapacitation for unknown reasons, which resulted in an overflight of his destination, a subsequent loss of engine power due to fuel starvation, and collision with terrain.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft A100 King Air in Saint-Frédéric

Date & Time: Dec 12, 2016 at 0730 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FONY
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Saint-Frédéric - Quebec
MSN:
B-154
YOM:
1973
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
During the takeoff roll from runway 05 at Saint-Frédéric Airport, the twin engine deviated to the left. The pilot-in-command elected to correct the deviation and to maintain the airplane on the runway centerline but it veered off runway to the left and came to rest in the snow. Both pilots evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Beechcraft A100 King Air in Québec: 7 killed

Date & Time: Jun 23, 2010 at 0559 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FGIN
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Québec - Seven Islands - Natashquan
MSN:
B-164
YOM:
1973
Flight number:
APO201
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Captain / Total flying hours:
3046
Captain / Total hours on type:
372.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2335
Copilot / Total hours on type:
455
Aircraft flight hours:
19665
Aircraft flight cycles:
16800
Circumstances:
Aircraft was making an instrument flight rules flight from Québec to Sept-Îles, Quebec. At 0557 Eastern Daylight Time, the crew started its take-off run on Runway 30 at the Québec/Jean Lesage International Airport; 68 seconds later, the co-pilot informed the airport controller that there was a problem with the right engine and that they would be returning to land on Runway 30. Shortly thereafter, the co-pilot requested aircraft rescue and fire-fighting (ARFF) services and informed the tower that the aircraft could no longer climb. A few seconds later, the aircraft struck the ground 1.5 nautical miles from the end of Runway 30. The aircraft continued its travel for 115 feet before striking a berm. The aircraft broke up and caught fire, coming to rest on its back 58 feet further on. The 2 crew members and 5 passengers died in the accident. No signal was received from the emergency locator transmitter (ELT).
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. After the take-off at reduced power, the aircraft performance during the initial climb was lower than that established at certification.
2. The right engine experienced a problem in flight that led to a substantial loss of thrust.
3. The right propeller was not feathered; therefore, the rate of climb was compromised by excessive drag.
4. The absence of written directives specifying which pilot was to perform which tasks may have led to errors in execution, omissions, and confusion in the cockpit.
5. Although the crew had the training required by regulation, they were not prepared to manage the emergency in a coordinated, effective manner.
6. The priority given to ATC communications indicates that the crew did not fully understand the situation and were not coordinating their tasks effectively.
7. The impact with the berm caused worse damage to the aircraft.
8. The aircraft’s upside-down position and the damage it sustained prevented the occupants from evacuating, causing them to succumb to the smoke and the rapid, intense fire.
9. The poor safety culture at Aéropro contributed to the acceptance of unsafe practices.
10. The significant measures taken by TC did not have the expected results to ensure compliance with the regulations, and consequently unsafe practices persisted.
Findings as to Risk:
1. Deactivating the flight low pitch stop system warning light or any other warning system contravenes the regulations and poses significant risks to flight safety.
2. The maintenance procedures and operating practices did not permit the determination of whether the engines could produce the maximum power of 1628 ft-lb required at take-off and during emergency procedures, posing major risks to flight safety.
3. Besides being a breach of regulations, a lack of rigour in documenting maintenance work makes it impossible to determine the exact condition of the aircraft and poses major risks to flight safety.
4. The non-compliant practice of not recording all defects in the aircraft journey log poses a safety risk because crews are unable to determine the actual condition of the aircraft at all times, and as a result could be deprived of information that may be critical in an emergency.
5. The lack of an in-depth review by TC of SOPs and checklists of 703 operators poses a safety risk because deviations from aircraft manuals are not detected.
6. Conditions of employment, such as flight hours–based remuneration, can influence pilots’ decisions, creating a safety risk.
7. The absence of an effective non-punitive and confidential voluntary reporting system means that hazards in the transportation system may not be identified.
8. The lack of recorded information significantly impedes the TSB’s ability to investigate accidents in a timely manner, which may prevent or delay the identification and communication of safety deficiencies intended to advance transportation safety.
Final Report:

Crash of a Fairchild F27 in Quebec: 17 killed

Date & Time: Mar 29, 1979 at 1845 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FQBL
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Quebec - Montreal
MSN:
47
YOM:
1959
Flight number:
QB255
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
21
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
17
Circumstances:
Shortly after liftoff from Quebec-Ancienne Lorette Airport, en route to Montreal-Dorval Airport, the right engine caught fire. The captain contacted ATC, declared an emergency and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. He initiated a turn to the right when the airplane lost height, struck the ground and crashed in flames about 1,300 meters short of runway. Seven passengers were seriously injured while 17 other occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that during initial climb, the low pressure impeller from the right (n°2) engine burst, causing the forward part of the engine to separate. The gear couldn't be raised because of engine debris damage to the electronic gear selection circuitry. This, including the exposed engine and lower cowl, increased the drag. In this configuration the aircraft wasn't capable of out-climbing obstacles straight ahead nor capable of maintaining altitude during the right hand turn. Engine separation and passenger movement resulted in the center of gravity shifting beyond its aft limit. The airspeed then decreased until the aircraft struck the ground at or below the minimum control speed (Vmc). Investigations revealed that the low pressure impeller burst due to the presence of fatigue cracks that had not been detected by the technicians in charge of the aircraft's maintenance.

Crash of a Beechcraft 18A in Quebec

Date & Time: Jan 29, 1952
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
CF-BQG
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
A-291
YOM:
1946
Country:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Crash landed at Quebec-Ancienne Lorette Airport. There were no casualties but the aircraft was written off.