Crash of a Fokker F27 in Sligo

Date & Time: Nov 2, 2002 at 1702 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-ECAT
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Dublin-Sligo
MSN:
10672
YOM:
1984
Flight number:
ECY406
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
36
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
27452

Crash of a Beechcraft Super King Air 200 in Georgia

Date & Time: Aug 9, 2001 at 0948 LT
Registration:
N899RW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Dublin-Sandersville
MSN:
BB-1637
YOM:
1998
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4900
Captain / Total hours on type:
978.00
Aircraft flight hours:
996

Crash of a Short 360 in Sheffield, UK

Date & Time: Feb 4, 2001 at 1921 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EI-BPD
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Dublin-Sheffield
MSN:
3656
YOM:
1984
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
25
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4484
Captain / Total hours on type:
1392.00

Crash of a Lockheed L-188 Electra in Shannon

Date & Time: Mar 1, 1999 at 0846 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N285F
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Dublin-Shannon
MSN:
1107
YOM:
1959
Flight number:
EXS6526
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5000
Captain / Total hours on type:
3200.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
760
Aircraft flight hours:
65000

Crash of a Short 360-100 in East Midlands

Date & Time: Jan 31, 1986 at 1851 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EI-BEM
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Dublin - East Midlands
MSN:
3642
YOM:
1984
Flight number:
EI328
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
33
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7528
Captain / Total hours on type:
123.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4299
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1240
Aircraft flight hours:
3226
Circumstances:
The Shorts 360 aircraft was scheduled to fly from Dublin (DUB) to East Midlands Airport (EMA) as Aer Lingus flight 328. During the pre-flight briefing the crew learned that at East Midlands the precision radar was unserviceable and that, although the visual approach slope indicators (VASI) had been withdrawn, the precision approach path indicators (PAPI) were operational. The en-route weather was reported as being overcast for the whole journey, with cloud tops at FL70 and a probability of icing when flying in the cloud. There had also been a pilot's report of severe icing between FL30 and FL70 in the Birmingham area, some 30 nm south-west of East Midlands Airport. The terminal area forecast for East Midlands suggested a brisk north-easterly wind and a cloud base of 1200 feet. The aircraft took off at 17:25. The crew report that they exercised the wing and tail de-icing system during the climb to FL 90, the level which had been assigned for the flight, and that at that level they were above the layers of stratiform cloud. Following an uneventful flight, via Wallasey, to the NDB at Whitegate, they were taken under radar control directly towards the airport and given descent clearance, eventually to 3000 feet, to intercept the ILS approach path for runway 09. During the descent and before entering the cloud tops at about FL60, the crew switched on the aircraft's anti-ice system, which heats the windscreen, engine air intakes, propellers, static air vents and pitot probes but, in accordance with normal operating procedure, they did not use the wing and tail de-icing system. At this time, the freezing level (0°C isotherm) was at 1000 feet, the temperature at FL 60 was minus 6°C and the air was saturated. Whilst in the cloud, which according to the non-handling pilot was particularly dense, ice thrown from the propellers was heard striking the side of the aircraft fuselage, and it was suggested that the propeller rpm be increased to expedite the removal of the ice. Both pilots state that, at some time during the descent, they visually checked the aircraft for ice but saw none. Nevertheless, several other flights during that evening have since reported the occurrence of severe icing. Having levelled at 3000 feet, still in and out of cloud, the aircraft was directed by radar to intercept the ILS and was fully established on the glideslope and centreline by 10 nm, at which point the final descent was initiated. A normal approach was established and continued, past the outer marker beacon situated at 3.9 nm from touchdown, down to around 1000 feet above the runway threshold height. The crew state that up to this point they had neither experienced any significant turbulence nor observed any ice forming on the aircraft. The last meteorological information passed to the crew gave the wind as 060 degrees /15 kt, however, over the previous hour the wind speed in the area, although not automatically recorded at the airport, is reported as gusting up to 30 kt. As the aircraft descended through about 1000 feet, it suddenly rolled very sharply to the left without apparent cause. With the application of corrective aileron and rudder the aircraft rolled rapidly right, well beyond the wings level position. This alternate left and right rolling motion continued with the angles of bank increasing for some 30 seconds, causing the commander to believe that the aircraft might roll right over onto its back. The angles of bank then gradually decreased. During this period and the subsequent few seconds the aircraft established a very high descent rate approaching 3000 feet/min. Subsequently, with the aid of full engine power, the airspeed increased and the rate of descent was arrested just as the aircraft struck an 11 KV power cable. It continued through another similar cable, two of the supporting wooden poles and the tops of two trees, before coming to rest nose into a small wood edging a field of barley, some 460 metres from the impact with the first power cable. The cockpit and passenger cabin were relatively undamaged and there was no fire. The aircraft came to rest lying virtually upright and the passengers, and subsequently the crew, successfully evacuated from the front and rear emergency exits.
Probable cause:
The accident most probably occurred as a result of the effects of a significant accumulation of airframe ice degrading the aircraft's stability and control characteristics, such that the crew were unable to maintain control. Turbulence and or downdraught may have contributed to the accident. Other contributory factors were the difficulty in detecting clear ice at night on the SD3-60 which resulted in the airframe de-icing system not being used. The delay in application of go-around power may have also contributed to the accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell Grand Commander 690B in Eastbourne: 9 killed

Date & Time: Nov 13, 1984 at 1841 LT
Registration:
EI-BGL
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Dublin - Paris
MSN:
690-11507
YOM:
1977
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Captain / Total flying hours:
10256
Captain / Total hours on type:
150.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2390
Circumstances:
The aircraft was flying from Dublin to Paris (Le Bourget) at a height of 25,000 feet. In the area of Petersfield, Hampshire, the aircraft began a gentle turn to the left from a south easterly heading. After the radar controller queried the departure from the expected heading the commander reported that the autopilot had 'dropped out', and the south easterly heading was resumed. Approximately 7 minutes later, the radar recording shows that the aircraft again began to turn left and started to lose height. After the aircraft had reached a northerly heading it began to lose height rapidly following which secondary radar returns were lost and the primary returns became fragmented before they also disappeared. The aircraft suffered an in-flight disintegration at approximately 19,000 feet and all 9 occupants were killed. A positive cause of the accident was not determined but there was evidence that a part of the aircraft's electrical supply had been lost. This would have caused the autopilot to disengage and also have resulted in the failure of the commander's flight director indicator. It was concluded that, following the disengagement of the autopilot, the aircraft probably entered a steep spiral dive and that the disintegration of the aircraft occurred as recovery was attempted.
Probable cause:
The in-flight disintegration of the aircraft was probably caused by over-stressing during an attempted recovery from an extreme attitude in a spiral dive. A probable contributory factor was the commander's lack of awareness of the loss of the 26 volt AC supply to the autopilot and flight director system.
Final Report:

Crash of a Partenavia P.68B near Lydd: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jan 22, 1979
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
G-BEUT
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Dublin - Lydd
MSN:
97
YOM:
1977
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
While approaching Lydd Airport in poor weather conditions, the pilot lost control of the airplane that crashed six miles southwest of the airfield. The aircraft was destroyed and all three occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Loss of control while conducting a non precision approach in a snowstorm.

Crash of a Douglas DC-7CF in Luton

Date & Time: Mar 3, 1974 at 0108 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EI-AWG
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Dublin - Luton
MSN:
45471/965
YOM:
1958
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3334
Captain / Total hours on type:
1185.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1537
Copilot / Total hours on type:
144
Aircraft flight hours:
27838
Circumstances:
The aircraft was operating a charter flight from Dublin to Luton, loaded with newspapers and equipment necessary for the conveyance of horses back to Dublin. The passengers were six grooms who were intended to accompany the horses on the return flight. During the uneventful flight from Dublin to the Luton area the pilot received a surface wind forecast for Luton of 300/06 knots. At midnight contact was established with Luton Approach. The pilot was given the Luton landing conditions as: 'QNH 1013.5, CAVOK, (ceiling and visibility OK) surface wind practically calm' and asked if he would accept radar positioning for a visual approach to runway 08, to which he agreed. The radar positioning was terminated at 00.04 hrs when the aircraft was cleared to Luton tower frequency with 'Six track miles to run' and the runway in sight. When the pilot contacted Luton Tower at 00.05 hrs, he was cleared to land on runway 08 and given the surface wind as 300 degrees 04 knots. He acknowledged this last transmission and there was no further communication with the aircraft. The evidence indicates that the approach path and speed were normal. The commander did not notice the Indicated Air Speed (IAS) immediately before touchdown but recalled that the initial approach was made at approximately 130 knots IAS reducing to the target threshold speed of 115 knots as the flaps extended. The aircraft touched down at an IAS of 105 knots. The commander was of the opinion that, despite a tendency to float, the aircraft touched down at the correct distance down the runway, and, as soon as it had done so, he called for reverse thrust immediately the aircraft was on the runway. On receiving the commander's order, the engineer selected reverse thrust on numbers 2 and 3 engines followed by numbers 1 and 4 whilst monitoring the engine instruments. The commander was familiar with this method of selecting reverse which was the technique normally used in the company. The flight engineer did not see the blue warning lights illuminate to indicate that the propellers were moving into reverse pitch, he therefore selected Nos 1 and 4 propellers to forward pitch, with throttles closed, in case the reason for the malfunction was an electrical overload due to operation of all four feathering/reversing pumps at low engine rpm. The commander had also noticed that the blue lights had not illuminated and, seeing that Nos 1 and 4 propellers were selected to forward pitch, called 'reverse all engines'. In response to his order the engineer made the required selection and all four throttle levers were seen to be in the reverse quadrant by the operating crew, although no blue lights were noted. The aircraft was not decelerating during this period and that no reverse thrust was achieved. The commander ordered the engineer to 'put them in the middle', thus to cancel the reverse thrust selections. There were two short periods of engine acceleration during the landing roll. The commander assisted by the first officer applied the toe brakes, assessed them to be ineffective and, as the aircraft was still not decelerating, applied the emergency pneumatic brakes by turning the operating handle to 'on'. The commander did not notice any deceleration and, consequently, did not follow the procedure of selecting them alternatively to 'hold' and to 'on'. All four main wheels locked, the tyres burst and further retardation from the brakes was lost. Sparks and smoke were seen emanating from the area of the undercarriage when the aircraft approached the end of the runway. When it became apparent that the aircraft would overrun the runway the commander called to have the 'switches' put to 'OFF'. The flight engineer selected the ignition switches off before the aircraft left the end of the runway and ploughed across the overrun area. It was still travelling fast enough to follow a trajectory off the top of the bank at the end of the runway leaving no wheel marks down the slope. The aircraft stopped in soft ground 90 metres from the end of the runway at the foot of the bank having demolished part of the aerodrome fence and some of the approach lights. All persons on board abandoned the aircraft without delay. As the flight engineer was leaving via the right hand side crew door, he noticed a small fire under the number 3 engine. He returned to the cockpit, pulled the firewall shut-off controls and discharged a fire extinguisher to all four engines.
Probable cause:
Failure to achieve reverse thrust after touchdown and an inadvertent application of forward thrust during the landing roll. The resulting overrun was aggravated by the operation of the emergency pneumatic brakes which resulted in the bursting of all four main wheel tires with consequent loss of braking capacity.
Final Report: