Destin-Executive

The commercial pilot and three passengers departed on a cross-country flight in a twin-engine airplane. As the flight neared the destination airport, the pilot canceled his instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance. The approach controller transferred the flight to the tower controller, and the pilot reported to the tower controller that the airplane was about 2 miles from the airport. However, the approach controller contacted the tower controller to report that the airplane was 200 ft over a nearby joint military airport at the time. GPS data revealed that, when pilot reported that the airplane was 2 miles from the destination airport, the airplane's actual location was about 10 miles from the destination airport and 2 miles from the joint military airport. The airplane impacted a remote wooded area about 8 miles northwest of the destination airport. At the time of the accident, thunderstorm cells were in the area. A review of the weather information revealed that the pilot's view of the airport was likely obscured because the airplane was in an area of light precipitation, restricting the pilot's visibility. A review of airport information noted that the IFR approach course for the destination airport passes over the joint military airport. The Federal Aviation Administration chart supplement for the destination airport noted the airport's proximity to the other airport. However, it is likely that the pilot mistook the other airport for the destination airport due to reduced visibility because of weather. The accident circumstances were consistent with controlled flight into terrain. The ethanol detected in the pilot's blood specimens but not in his urine specimens was consistent with postmortem bacteria production. The carbon monoxide and cyanide detected in the pilot's blood specimens were consistent with inhalation after the postimpact fire.

The instrument-rated commercial pilot departed from an airport adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico with an instrument flight rules clearance for a cross-country flight in dark night, visual
meteorological conditions. The flight continued in a south-southwesterly direction, climbing to about 900 ft over the gulf, where it entered a steep right turn. The airplane then descended at a steep rate and impacted the water in a nose-low attitude. Post accident examination of the recovered wreckage, including flight controls, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. While the outlet fuel line from the left auxiliary fuel pump was found separated and there was evidence that the B-nut was loose and had been only secured by the first 2 threads, recorded data from the engine monitor for the flight revealed no loss of power from either engine. Therefore, the final separation likely occurred during the impact sequence. Although the accident pilot was instrument rated and had recently completed instrument currency training, the dark night conditions present at the time of the accident combined with a further lack of visual references due to the airplane's location over a large body of water, presented a situation conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. The pilot had been instructed by air traffic control to turn southwest after takeoff; however, the continuation of the turn past the intended course and the airplane's steep bank angle and excessive rate of descent are consistent with a loss of control due to spatial disorientation.

The instrument-rated private pilot was executing a non precision instrument approach procedure at night in deteriorating weather conditions. According to GPS track data, the pilot executed the approach as published but descended below the missed approach point's minimum altitude before executing a climbing right turn. This turn was not consistent with the published missed approach procedure. The airplane then began a series of left and right ascending and descending turns to various altitudes. The last few seconds of recorded data indicated that the airplane entered a descending left turn. Two witnesses heard the airplane fly overhead at a low altitude and described the weather as foggy. Reported weather at a nearby airport about 26 minutes before the accident was visibility less than 2 miles in mist and an overcast ceiling of 300 feet. A friend of the pilot flew the same route in a similarly equipped airplane and arrived about 30 minutes before the accident airplane. He said he performed the same approach to the missed approach point but never broke out of the clouds, so he executed a missed approach and diverted to an alternate airport. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Federal Aviation Administration Flight Training Handbook Advisory Circular 61-21A cautions that pilots are particularly vulnerable to spatial disorientation during periods of low visibility due to conflicts between what they see and what their supporting senses, such as the inner ear and muscle sense, communicate. The accident airplane's maneuvering flightpath, as recorded by the GPS track data, in night instrument meteorological conditions is consistent with the pilot's loss of airplane control due to spatial disorientation.

Prior to takeoff, the pilot contacted Eglin Clearance Delivery for a weather briefing. He was informed of severe thunderstorms in the area and worked out a plan with the Clearance Delivery operator to avoid them. The flight originated from Destin Florida Airport, Destin, Florida about 0832 central standard time en route to Marsh Harbor, Bahamas. Eglin South Approach Control provided vectors to steer the flight around the weather. At 0841:30, the flight was handed off to Tyndall Approach Control. The flight was informed that it was entering "a line of weather that's going to continue for the next 15 miles." At 0844:10, Tyndall Approach Control alerted all aircraft of "hazardous weather." Tyndall Approach Control also informed the flight that their station was not equipped with the same detailed weather radar that Eglin had, and instructed the flight to continue on its current vector, which was provided by Eglin. About 4 minutes later, the pilot contacted ATC to request a block altitude clearance because he was "up and down here quite a bit." The controller provided a clearance for 4,000 through 6,000 feet. The pilot acknowledged the clearance, and there were no further communications with the flight. The pilot and four passengers were fatally injured, and the aircraft was destroyed after impacting the ground near Greenhead, Florida. According to the Sheriff, the property owner who initially located the wreckage, said that there was heavy rain, thunder, lightning and wind in the area at the time of the accident. The NTSB conducted a meteorological study and weather data along with the airplane's track and found it to be consistent with the airplane encountering a level 5 thunderstorm.

On April 20, 1996, about 1215 Atlantic standard time, N441W, a Cessna 441, crashed on landing in Walkers Cay, Bahamas, while on a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and a VFR flight plan had been filed. The airplane was substantially damaged and the private pilot and three passengers reported no injuries. The flight originated from Destin, Florida, about 2 hours 30 minutes earlier. The pilot stated that on final approach he landed short of the runway. The main landing gear sheared off the airplane and the nose gear collapsed.