Socata TBM-850

On an ILS Z approach to Clermont-Ferrand-Auvergne Airport Runway 26 in IMC conditions, the pilot was instructed by ATC to climb to 6,000 feet to TIS VOR via a right turn because he failed to follow the published missed approach procedures. The single engine aircraft departed the approach path and control was lost after it completed several turns on climb and descent. It entered a high nose-down attitude and struck the ground at high speed about 6 km short of runway. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all three occupants aged respectively 70, 73 and 76 years old were killed. They were completing an intermediate stop at Clermont-Ferrand Airport to pick up two additional passengers before continuing to Biarritz.

The privately owned SOCATA TBM 700N (registration C-FBKK, serial number 621) departed from Ottawa/Carp Airport, Ontario, on an instrument flight rules flight plan to Goderich, Ontario. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot and sole occupant altered the destination to Wiarton, Ontario. Air traffic control cleared the aircraft to climb to flight level 260 (FL260). The aircraft continued climb through FL260 and entered a right hand turn, which quickly developed into a spiral dive. At approximately 1219 Eastern Daylight Time, the aircraft struck the ground and was destroyed. Small fires broke out and consumed some sections of the aircraft. The pilot was fatally injured. The 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter on board the aircraft was damaged and its signal was not sensed by the search and rescue satellite-aided tracking (SARSAT) system.

During cruise flight, the pilot reported to an air traffic controller that the airplane was having engine fuel pressure problems. The controller advised the pilot of available airports for landing if necessary and asked the pilot's intentions. The pilot chose to continue the flight. GPS data recorded by an onboard avionics system indicated that the engine had momentarily lost total power about 20 seconds before the pilot reported a problem to the controller. About 7 minutes later, when the airplane was about 7,000 feet above ground level, the engine lost total power again, and power was not restored for the remainder of the flight. The pilot attempted to glide to an airport about 10 miles away, but the airplane crashed in a field about 3 miles from the airport. GPS data showed a loss of fuel pressure before each of the engine power losses and prolonged lateral g forces consistent with a side-slip flight condition. The rudder trim tab was found displaced to the left about 3/8 inch. Flight testing and recorded flight data revealed that the rudder trim tab displacement was consistent with that required to achieve no side slip during a typical climb segment. The GPS and flight data indicated that the lateral g-forces increased as the airplane leveled off and accelerated, indicating that the automatic rudder trim feature of the yaw damper system was either not engaged or not operating. The recorded data indicated autopilot system engagement, which should have automatically engaged the yaw damper system. However, the data indicated the yaw damper was not engaged; the yaw damper could have subsequently been turned off by several means not recorded by the avionics system. Testing of the manual electric rudder (yaw) trim system revealed no anomalies, indicating that the pilot would have still been able to trim the airplane using the manual system. It is likely that the pilot's failure to properly trim the airplane's rudder led to a prolonged uncoordinated flight condition. Although the fuel tank system is designed to prevent unporting of the fuel lines during momentary periods of uncoordinated flight, it is not intended to do so for extended periods of uncoordinated flight. Therefore, the fuel tank feed line likely unported during the prolonged uncoordinated flight, which resulted in the subsequent loss of fuel pressure and engine power. The propeller and propeller controls were not in the feathered position, thus the windmilling propeller would have increased the airplane's descent rate during the glide portion of the flight. The glide airspeed used by the pilot was 20 knots below the airspeed recommended by the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH), and the reduced airspeed also would have increased the airplane's descent rate during the glide. The flight and GPS data indicated that the airplane had a gliding range of about 16 nautical miles from the altitude where the final loss of engine power occurred; however, the glide performance was dependent on several factors, including feathering the propeller and maintaining the proper airspeed, neither of which the pilot did. Although the POH did not contain maximum range glide performance data with a windmilling propeller, based on the available information, it is likely that the airplane could have glided to the alternate airport about 10 miles away if the pilot had followed the proper procedures.

The pilot reported that he flew an instrument approach and was clear of clouds about 650 feet above ground level when he proceeded visually to the airport. About 1/2 mile from the runway, he thought the airplane was too high, but a few seconds later the airplane felt like it had an excessive rate of descent. His attempts to arrest the rate of descent were unsuccessful, and the left main landing gear struck the ground about 120 feet prior to the runway threshold. The recorded data downloaded from the airplane's non-volatile memory showed that the airplane's airspeed varied from about 71 - 81 knots indicated airspeed (IAS) during the 10 seconds prior to ground impact. The data also indicated that there was about a 3 - 5 knot tailwind during the final landing approach. The airplane's stall speed with the airplane in the landing configuration with landing flaps was 64 knots IAS at maximum gross weight. The pilot reported that there was no mechanical malfunction or system failure of the airplane.

During the flight, the instrument-rated private pilot was monitoring the weather at his intended destination. He noted the weather and runway conditions and decided to conduct a global-positioning-system instrument approach to a known closed runway with the intention of circling to a different runway. As the airplane neared the missed approach point, the pilot established visual contact with the airport's runway environment and canceled his instrument flight rules clearance. As he entered the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern for his intended runway, the pilot noticed that the first part of the runway was covered in fog and that the visibility was 0.75 of a mile with light snow. With at least 5,000 feet of clear runway, he opted to land just beyond the fog. Prior to touchdown, the pilot concluded that there was not enough runway length left to make a landing and performed a go-around by applying power, pitching up, and retracting the landing gear. During the go-around, the pilot focused outside the airplane cockpit but had no horizon reference in the dark night conditions. He heard the stall warning and realized that the aircraft was not climbing. The pilot pitched the nose down and observed only snow and trees ahead. Not being able to climb over the trees, the airplane subsequently impacted trees and terrain, coming to rest upright in a wooded, snow-covered field. The pilot stated that there were no anomalies with the engine or airframe that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane.