BAe Jetstream 31

The company chief pilot/check pilot was giving a check flight to a company first officer (f/o). An FAA inspector was aboard to observe the check pilot's ability to give proficiency check flights. Soon after liftoff on the 2nd takeoff, the check pilot simulated an engine failure. The f/o, who was wearing a vision limiting device, allowed the airplane to drift to the left, but the FAA inspector noted that the f/o successfully regained directional control. The inspector then looked away from the cockpit, and when he looked back, the airplane was descending. Moments later, it collided with the ground. The FAA inspector reported that the check pilot was looking to the left, outside of the aircraft, and did not have his hand near the power quadrant. Review of the CVR tape revealed that, from the time the f/o was given the simulated left engine failure until impact, the check pilot did not say anything to the f/o. No maintenance discrepancy or material deficiency was noted during the investigation. The f/o had 3925 hours in this make/model of aircraft.

The crew departed Prestwick Airport on a training flight to East Midlands Airport. Shortly after takeoff, while in initial climb, the crew simulated an engine failure. The aircraft nosed up and adopted a high angle of attack with the gear still down. Ten seconds after liftoff, the copilot was still attempting to determine which engine failed and the pilot/instructor reminded him that the gear were still down. When the stall warning sounded, the pilot took over control within 2 seconds and increased engine power but the aircraft rolled to the right and crashed inverted. Both occupants were killed.

After a series of instrument procedures, the flight returned to Knoxville and landed. On the next takeoff, the first officer dropped the airplane's checklist and the check airman elected to continue the flight without using the checklist. On the next visual approach, the check airman and first officer attempted a landing without lowering the landing gear. The airplane touched down and both propeller assemblies struck the concrete runway surface. The pilot reported the gearup touchdown to the control tower and elected to go around. During the climbout the check airman lowered the landing gear, established a teardrop pattern for the opposite runway and feathered the right propeller. Crash fire rescue (cfr) equipment was alerted and was in position for the second landing attempt. While on short final, the check airman called for max power, a reduction in the flap setting, and initiated a single engine go-around below 200 feet. There is no operational procedure for a single engine go-around below 200 feet. The airplane climbed briefly and crashed inverted about 7,500 feet from the approach end of the runway. Both pilots were killed.

Aircraft was dispatched with inoperative airframe deice system, tho an operational deice system was required for flight in known icing conditions. During descent to land, aircraft encountered light icing conditions. Capt believed aircraft could 'handle it' and continued descent. As he began ILS final approach, he noted significant increase of ice accumulation and used higher than normal approach speed. As full (50°) flaps were set, aircraft began buffet and pitched nose down. Capt corrected with full back pressure on control column, but aircraft landed hard, gear collapsed and aircraft slid about 3,600 feet to a stop. No preimpact mechanical anomaly was found, except for inoperative deice system. Investigation revealed pilots had received printout of weather from company computer system with surface observation and terminal forecast, but no area forecast (FA). Pilots and ground personnel were not aware that FA was available at company weather terminal. FA forecasted light and occasional moderate rime and mixed icing in clouds and precipitation above freezing level. Weather deteriorated, but pilots did not require inflight weather info or pireps. Flight mnl noted tailplane ice may cause nose down trim change with flap extension. There was evidence of tail plane stall, lack of company training in cold weather operations, deficiencies in use of deicing systems, and lack of FAA surveillance.

During arrival for an ILS runway 21R approach, the aircraft encountered icing conditions for about 9-1/2 minutes. As the aircraft was vectored for the approach, the Seattle ARTCC controller used an expanded radar range and did not provide precise positioning of the aircraft to the final approach course. The flight crew attempted to continue on a steep, unstabilized approach for a landing. Recorded radar data showed that the aircraft was well to the right of the ILS course line and well above the glide slope as it passed the outer marker/final approach fix (faf). It did not intercept the localizer course until it was about 1.5 mile inside the faf. Also, it was still well above the ILS glide slope were recorded altitude data was lost when the aircraft was abt 2.5 miles from the airport. The tower had closed, but the controller saw the aircraft in a higher than normal rate of descent in a wings level attitude. Before reaching the runway, the aircraft nosed over and crashed in a steep descent. There was evidence that ice had accumulated on the airframe, including the horizontal stabilizers, which may have resulted in a tail plane stall. All six occupants were killed.

On final approach to Dhahran Airport, the twin engine aircraft lost height and crashed on the top of a hill located few km from the airfield. The aircraft was destroyed and all five occupants were killed.

The copilot was flying the aircraft as it was being ferried after minor maintenance. As they were in a descent and were approaching the destination airport, the captain noted a left engine torque fluctuation of 20% to 30% and elected to secure the engine, although no yawing was noticed. During shutdown, the left propeller did not feather and drag increased until the aircraft would not sustain level flight. An attempted restart of the left engine was unsuccessful, so the captain tried to feather it again. However, the left propeller still did not feather. Subsequently, the pilots were forced to land in an open field on uneven terrain and the aircraft was damaged. An extensive investigation was made, but no cause could be found for the torque fluctuation, nor could the condition be duplicated, however, the investigation did note that the air and ground procedures for engine shutdown were similar. A variation in the ground shutdown procedures allowed for engagement of the start latches.

A company designated instructor and two f/o trainees were conducting a far 135 training flight. The third approach was terminated with a go-around initiated over the runway threshold at about 50 feet. After climbing to about 150 feet, the aircraft was observed to oscillate in yaw, followed by pitch, and then roll to the right. The aircraft impacted in a near-vertical descent attitude. The investigation revealed that the right engine was operating, but at reduced power. The left engine was at full power. There was no indication of aircraft system malfunction or failure. Company pilots indicated that the captain had a history of demeaning cockpit behavior and roughness with students. The f/o, was small in stature and had 100 hours of multi-engine time and no turboprop time. Company pilots reported the f/o trainee was consistently behind the aircraft in prior flights. Examination of the aircraft revealed the flaps in the retracted position contrary to aircraft handbook. Company pilots further indicated the captain had history of requiring low altitude 1-engine go arounds and delaying offers of assistance to students. All three crew members were killed.

The captain stated that he had planned the approach at a higher-than-normal airspeed and altitude due to a reported low level windshear. At 400 feet agl the aircraft entered a light downdraft but the crew corrected the descent profile with power. At 200 feet agl the aircraft suddenly, according to the captain, pitched down before impacting the runway. Witnesses stated that the aircraft pitched down on short final, leveled off, then slammed onto the runway on all wheels. It then bounced, pitched down again and impacted the runway nose-first. A subsequent inspection, operational test, and teardown of the airplane's stall protection system found it to be functioning satisfactorily. The two powerplants also tested within normal parameters.

Taxi clearance was received at 16:35 and the flight left gate 14B for runway 19. The airplane was cleared for takeoff at 16:44. Shortly after lifting off, at 200 feet above the ground, the engine torque gauges began to fluctuate erratically and the plane began to yaw back and forth. The captain believed the TTL (Torque Temperature Limiting) system may have been bypassing fuel to the engines (a situation that could occur when power levers are advanced too far forward). He then slightly decreased the power settings which resulted in even greater torque oscillations and greater yawing. The captain believed both engines were malfunctioning for some unknown reason and landed back on runway 19, because a 90° turn for runway 28 seemed impossible. The aircraft overran the runway, struck a 6 feet high chain link fence, struck a concrete barrier and skidded across the Route 61 highway before coming to rest on a parking lot.