Region

Crash of an Airbus A330-243 in Jeddah

Date & Time: May 21, 2018 at 2150 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
TC-OCH
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Madinah - Dhaka
MSN:
437
YOM:
2001
Flight number:
SV3818
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
142
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Madinah-Mohammad Bin Abdulazziz Airport at 1724LT on a schedule service to Dhaka with 142 passengers and 10 crew members on board. At 1746LT, while cruising at FL370, the crew informed ATC about a malfunction of the green hydraulic system followed by a 'green hydraulic system reservoir low level' warning. The crew decided to return to Madinah but this was not possible due to deteriorating weather conditions, so it was decided to divert to Jeddah-King Abdulazziz Airport. Several attempts to lower the nose gear were unsuccessful and only both main landing gear seemed to be down. After a circuit to burn fuel, the crew was cleared to descent and expected to make a low pass over runway 16C but neither the control tower nor ground staff were able to confirm the nose gear extension. Eventually, the crew was cleared to land on runway 34R with the nose gear retracted. The aircraft landed 700 metres past the runway threshold and the nose landed 1,350 metres further, causing both engine nacelles to hit the runway surface. The airplane slid for few hundred metres and came to rest 700 metres from the runway end. All 152 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Cessna 340 in Riyadh

Date & Time: Dec 3, 2014 at 1757 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N340JC
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Heraklion – Hurghada – Riyadh
MSN:
340-0162
YOM:
1972
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a ferry flight from Heraklion to Riyadh with an intermediate stop in Hurghada, Egypt. On final approach to Riyadh-King Khaled Airport, at an altitude of about 600 feet, the left engine lost power and failed, followed 10 seconds later by the right engine. The crew reported his situation to ATC when the aircraft lost height, impacted ground and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest against a pile of rocks. One of the pilot suffered a broken wrist while the second pilot escaped uninjured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Double engine failure on approach due to fuel exhaustion. It was determined that the crew miscalculated the fuel consumption for the flight from Hurghada to Riyadh.

Crash of an Airbus A300B4-605R in Jeddah

Date & Time: May 1, 2012 at 1449 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
TC-OAG
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Madinah - Jeddah
MSN:
747
YOM:
1994
Flight number:
SV2865
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
9200
Copilot / Total flying hours:
15957
Aircraft flight hours:
54832
Aircraft flight cycles:
18308
Circumstances:
On 1 May 2012, aircraft TC-OAG, an Airbus A300-605R was performing a commercial flight for Saudi Arabian Airlines (SVA) as SVA2865. SVA 2865 departed from Prince Mohammed Bin Abdulaziz International Airport (PMAI) Madinah at 08h50 en-route to the King Abdulaziz International Airport (KAIA) Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. SVA 2865 was on a positioning flight with 10 crew members and no passengers. No discrepancies were noted on this aircraft prior to departure from Madinah. The visibility at Jeddah was good with a few clouds present. During the initial ILS approach to runway 16 Right (16R), while at 8 nautical miles (nm) and 2600 feet (ft), the landing gear handle was lowered. Both main landing gear extended and locked down and, the nose gear doors opened but the nose landing gear did not lower. The Captain who was then the Pilot Monitoring (PM) took over the controls and carried out a missed approach. The First Officer (FO) became the Pilot Monitoring (PM). SVA 2865 was then given an area to the northeast of Jeddah to carry out attempts at lowering the nose gear. The flight crew attempted to manually free fall the nose landing gear at least ten (10) times. The nose landing gear would not lower into the locked position, but the nose gear doors remained open during all those attempts. As a precautionary measure, SVA 2865 performed a fly-by of runway 16R at 500 ft. The air traffic controller confirmed that the nose landing gear (NLG) was not down. SVA 2865 was vectored over the Red Sea to lower the fuel load, thus reducing the landing weight. During this period, the Fire & Rescue Services (FRS) at Jeddah foamed a portion of runway 16 Left (16L) between taxiway Kilo 5 (K5) and K2. The majority of the FRS vehicles were standing by at the junction of taxiways K4 and K3. SVA 2865 was vectored for an instrument approach for Runway 16L. The Auto Pilot and the Auto Throttle Systems were OFF. The surface winds were from 220° at 12 knots (kt), gusting to 19 kt and the temperature was + 37 Celsius (°C). The flight crew used the "Landing with Nose Landing Gear Abnormal" checklist ensuring the aircraft was properly prepared and configured for the approach, the before landing, the flare and the touchdown sequences, including when the aircraft stopped and the necessary procedures to secure the aircraft before evacuation. The aircraft landed on its main landing gear 4000 ft past the threshold of runway 16L. The nose of the aircraft was slowly lowered to the runway with the nose landing gear doors touching the runway within the foamed area 4500 ft from the end of runway 16L. The front of the fuselage then touched the runway within the last portion of foam, 3500 ft from the end of runway 16L. The nose area of the aircraft slid on the runway, where sparks were present until the aircraft came to a full stop 1500 ft prior to the end of runway 16L. As soon as the aircraft passed by the position of the FRS vehicles, the FRS vehicles gave chase to the aircraft and reached it within 30 seconds after it came to a full stop. Although there was no post-crash fire, the FRS personnel applied water and foam to the nose area of the aircraft. All of the crew members were evacuated from the aircraft by ladder provided by the FRS. The crew was taken to the airport clinic as a precautionary measure. All were released the same day. The accident occurred at 14h49 on runway 16L at the KAIA - Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Probable cause:
Cause related findings:
- The NLG up-lock contained a spring, Part Number GA71102 that was broken as a result of fatigue initiated at the third coil of the spring.
- The spring had been broken for a prolonged period of time, as noted by the spring linear wear marks on the outside area of the spring coils.
- Damage observed on the NLG up-lock resulted from hard contact with the broken spring during normal NLG operation.
- The fracture process of the spring was initiated at the third coil level. At least 6000 cycles of fatigue (number of striations) have been estimated by fatigue striation measurements. The crack on the spring started on the internal surface of the spring which was not shot peened.
- The normal and free fall extensions of the NLG failed due to a mechanical blockage created by the broken spring jammed against the cam.
Final Report:

Ground accident of a Boeing 747-368 in Madinah

Date & Time: Feb 16, 2011
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HZ-AIS
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Riyadh - Madinah
MSN:
23270/645
YOM:
1986
Flight number:
SV817
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
17
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
260
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
After landing at Madinah-Mohammad Bin Abdulaziz Airport runway 17, the crew completed the braking procedure and vacated via taxiway B. For unknown reasons, the aircraft departed the concrete zone and entered a sandy area, causing the left main gear to dug in and both left engines n°1 and 2 to struck the ground. All 277 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-11F in Riyadh

Date & Time: Jul 27, 2010 at 1138 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
D-ALCQ
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Frankfurt - Riyadh
MSN:
48431/534
YOM:
1993
Flight number:
LH8460
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8270
Captain / Total hours on type:
4466.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3444
Copilot / Total hours on type:
219
Aircraft flight hours:
73247
Aircraft flight cycles:
10073
Circumstances:
The airplane operated on Flight LH8460, a scheduled cargo service operating from Frankfurt (FRA) to Riyadh (RUH). It carried 80 tons of cargo. The accident flight departed Frankfurt about 05:16 local time (03:16 UTC), 2.5 hours later than originally scheduled due to minor maintenance issues. The accident flight was the first time the captain and first officer had flown together. The captain decided that the first officer, who had been employed with Lufthansa Cargo for 7 months and had not flown into Riyadh before, would fly the leg because he believed it would be an easy leg appropriate for the first officer. Cruise flight and approach to Riyadh were uneventful. The first officer indicated that he completed the approach briefing about 25 minutes before landing, calculating that he would use a flap setting of 35°, target 72 percent N1 rpm on final approach, expect a pitch attitude of about 4.5° on final approach, and commence the flare about 40 feet above ground level (agl). The flight was radar vectored to the instrument landing system of runway 33L, and the first officer flew the approach with a planned Vref of 158 knots. Convective conditions prevailed, with a temperature of 39°C and winds at 15 to 25 knots on a heading closely aligned with the landing runway. The aircraft was centered on the glide slope and localizer during the approach, until 25 seconds before touchdown when it dipped by half a dot below the glide slope. During that period, the indicated airspeed oscillated between 160 and 170 kt, centered about 166 kt. The ground speed was 164 kt until 20 sec. prior to touchdown, when it began to increase and reached 176 kt at touchdown. The flare was initiated by the first officer between 1.7 and 2.0 sec. before touchdown, that is: 23 to 31 feet above the runway. The main gear touchdown took place at 945 ft from the runway threshold at a descent rate of -13 ft/sec. (780 ft/min) resulting in a normal load factor of 2.1g. The aircraft bounced with the main gear reaching a maximum height of 4ft above the runway with the spoilers deployed to 30 degrees following main-wheel spin up. During this bounce, the captain who was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) pushed on the control column resulting in an unloading of the aircraft. The aircraft touched down a second time in a flat pitch attitude with both the main gear and nose gear contacting the runway, at a descent rate of -11 ft/sec. (660 ft/min), achieving a load factor of 3.0g. Just prior to this second touchdown, both pilots pulled on the control column, which combined with the rebound of the nose gear from the runway, resulted in a 14° pitch angle during the second bounce. Additionally, the spoilers reached their full extension of 60° following the compression of the nose gear strut during the second touchdown. During this second bounce, the main gear reached a height of 12 ft above the runway. Early in this second bounce, the captain pushed the control column to its forward limit and the elevators responded accordingly. Prior to the third and final touchdown, both pilots pulled back on the control column at slightly different times. Although the elevators responded accordingly and started to reduce the nose-down pitch rate, the aircraft was still pitching down at the third touchdown. During this third touchdown, the aircraft contacted the runway at a descent rate of -17 ft/sec (1020 ft/min), thus achieving a load factor of 4.4g. At this point, the aft fuselage ruptured behind the wing trailing edge. Two fuel lines were severed and fuel spilled within the left hand wheel well. A fire ignited and travelled to the upper cargo area. The captain attempted to maintain control of the aircraft within the runway boundaries. Not knowing about the aft fuselage being ruptured and dragging on the runway, the captain deployed the engine thrust reversers, but only the no. 1 and the no. 3 engines responded. The captain maintained directional control of the aircraft as best he could and requested the First Officer to declare a Mayday. The aircraft then went towards the left side of the runway as the captain attempted, without success, to maintain the aircraft on the runway. As the aircraft departed the runway, the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft came to a full stop 8800 ft from the threshold of the runway and 300 ft left from the runway centerline. The fuel to the engines was cut off and both pilots evacuated the aircraft by using the slide at the Left One (L1) door. The mid portion of the aircraft was on fire.
Probable cause:
Cause Related Findings:
1. The flight crew did not recognize the increasing sink rate on short final.
2. The First officer delayed the flare prior to the initial touchdown, thus resulting in a bounce.
3. The flight crew did not recognize the bounce.
4. The Captain attempted to take control of the aircraft without alerting the First Officer resulting in both flight crews acting simultaneously on the control column.
5. During the first bounce, the captain made an inappropriate, large nose-down column input that resulted in the second bounce and a hard landing in a flat pitch attitude.
6. The flight crew responded to the bounces by using exaggerated control inputs.
7. The company bounced-landing procedure was not applied by the flight crew.
Final Report:

Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-90-30 in Riyadh

Date & Time: May 8, 2009 at 1558 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HZ-APW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jeddah - Riyadh
MSN:
53513/2257
YOM:
1999
Flight number:
SVA9061
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
A Saudi Arabian Airlines MD-90 was substantially damaged during a runway excursion accident Riyadh (RUH). The seven crew members escaped unhurt. The airplane operated on a repositioning flight from Jeddah. During the flight, the captain discussed the use of manual spoilers during landing with the first officer. He further stated that; as he "had only around 400 hours in the aircraft" as a captain, he wanted to "see the effect' of landing with manual spoilers. He further explained that the flight provided an opportunity to "do it manually" (use manual spoilers) as it was a repositioning flight and, the weather and dry runway conditions were ideal. As such, he discussed the procedure with the first officer and elected to land with the auto ground spoiler system unarmed. The flight was uneventful. During the approach to Riyadh the Landing Checklist was completed, which included the arming of the auto ground spoiler system for landing. After the Landing Checklist was completed, the captain disarmed the auto ground spoiler system with the intention of applying manual ground spoilers after landing. The auto braking system was also not armed prior to landing. The final approach and touchdown to runway 15 Left at Riyadh were uneventful. The touchdown airspeed was 135 knots calibrated air speed (CAS). On touchdown, the captain manually extended the spoiler/speed brake lever, but did not latch it in the fully extended (EXT) position (fully aft and latched upwards). The captain then removed his right hand from the speed brake lever in order to deploy the thrust reversers. The first officer noted the movement of the spoiler/speed brake lever and called "Spoilers Deployed". Since the spoiler/speed brake lever was not fully pulled aft and latched upwards, the lever automatically returned to the forward retracted (RET) position. This movement of the spoiler/speed brake lever was not noticed by the captain and the first officer. In response, the ground spoilers re-stowed before being fully deployed and, a speed brake/flap configuration (SPD BRK/FLP CONFIG) Level 1 Amber Alert occurred. This alert occurred as the aircraft was not yet fully weight on wheels (WOW) and the aircraft still sensed a flight condition with speed brakes deployed and flaps extended beyond six degrees. Six seconds after touchdown on the right main landing gear, the nose gear touched down and the aircraft transferred to a ground condition (WOW on nose gear and main wheel spin up). The SPD BRK/FLP CONFIG alert extinguished when the nose gear oleo actuated ground shift on landing. After touchdown, the aircraft banked to the right and began to drift right of the runway centerline. In response, he applied left rudder, deployed the thrust reversers and applied left aileron. But this did not have any noticeable effect. The captain saw the approaching G4 taxiway exit and in an attempt to keep the aircraft from leaving the runway surface beyond the G4 taxiway exit, he decided to direct the aircraft towards the taxiway. He then applied a right rudder input which caused the aircraft to commence a rapid sweeping turn to the right towards the G4 taxiway exit. The aircraft left the runway at high speed, traversed the full width of the G4 taxiway, and exited the surface at its southern edge. The aircraft then entered a sand section and travelled the distance infield between the edge of the G4 taxiway and the adjacent section of taxiway GOLF. The left main landing gear collapsed during this time. The aircraft came to rest on taxiway GOLF. There was no post impact fire.
Probable cause:
Cause Related Findings
1. The Captain decided to land with manual ground spoilers when the auto ground spoiler system was fully operational.
2. The initiative by the Captain to conduct this improvised exercise contravened the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and the Flight Operations Policy Manual (FOPM).
3. The auto ground spoiler system was disarmed prior to landing.
4. The spoiler/speed brake lever was partially applied manually after landing.
5. The spoiler/speed brake lever was released before it was fully extended and latched.
6. The spoiler/speed brake lever automatically retracted as per design.
7. The ground spoilers never fully deployed.
8. The loss of lift and aircraft deceleration were greatly reduced by the lack of ground spoiler deployment.
9. Brakes were not used in an attempt to control or slowdown the aircraft.
10. The Captain applied a large right rudder input with the intention of directing the aircraft onto the G4 taxiway exit.
11. The aircraft exited the runway at high speed and was travelling too fast to successfully negotiate the right turn onto the G4 taxiway.

Crash of an Airbus A300B4-203 in Jeddah

Date & Time: Mar 1, 2004 at 0140 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
AP-BBA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jeddah - Quetta
MSN:
114
YOM:
1980
Flight number:
PK2002
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
12
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
261
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
During the takeoff roll on runway 34 at Jeddah-King Abdulaziz Airport, ATC informed the crew about a fire on the left main gear. The captain rejected takeoff and was able to stop the aircraft within the remaining distance. All 273 occupants evacuated safely but the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
It was determined that both tyres on the left main gear burst during the takeoff roll. Debris punctured a fuel tank in the left wing and other parts were ingested by the left engine.

Crash of a Boeing 737-268A in Najran

Date & Time: Sep 6, 1997 at 0945 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HZ-AGM
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Riyadh – Najran – Sharurah
MSN:
21282
YOM:
1976
Flight number:
SV1861
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
79
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
During the takeoff roll from Najran Airport runway 06/24, at a speed of 95 knots, the right engine thrust suddenly increased. Few seconds later, at a speed of 120 knots, the exhaust gas temperature warning came on in the cockpit panel. The captain decided to abort and initiated an emergency landing procedure. Speed brakes were deployed but the thrust reversers could not be activated. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, lost its undercarriage and right engine before coming to rest. All 85 occupants evacuated safely.

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-61 in Jeddah: 261 killed

Date & Time: Jul 11, 1991 at 0838 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GMXQ
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Jeddah - Sokoto
MSN:
45982
YOM:
1968
Flight number:
WT2120
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
14
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
247
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
261
Aircraft flight hours:
49318
Aircraft flight cycles:
30173
Circumstances:
A McDonnell Douglas DC-8-61 passenger plane, registered C-GMXQ was destroyed in an accident near Jeddah-King Abdulaziz International Airport (JED), Saudi Arabia. All 261 on board were killed. The DC-8 jetliner was owned by Canadian airline Nationair which operated the plane on behalf of Nigeria Airways to fly hajj pilgrims between Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. Nigeria Airways flight 2120 took off from Jeddah's runway 34L at 08:28, bound for Sokoto (SKO), Nigeria. About 15 seconds after brake release an oscillating sound was heard in the cockpit. Within two seconds, the flight engineer said: "What's that?" The first officer replied: "We gotta flat tire, you figure?" Two seconds later, an oscillating sound was again heard. The captain asked the first officer: "You're not leaning on the brakes, eh?" The first officer responded: "No, I 'm not, I got my feet on the bottom of the rudder." By this time, the aircraft had accelerated to about 80 knots. Marks on the runway showed that the No.1 wheel started to break up at about this time. In addition, the left and right flanges of No.2 wheel began to trace on the runway; rubber deposit from No.2 tire continued which appeared to be from a deflated tire between the flanges. At 28 seconds after brake release, a speed of 90 knots was called by the captain and acknowledged by the first officer. The captain called V1 about 45 seconds after brake release. Two seconds later, the first officer noted "sort of a shimmy like if you're riding on one of those ah thingamajigs." The captain called "rotate" 51 seconds after brake release and the airplane lifted off the runway. Witnesses noticed flames in the area of the left main landing gear. The flames disappeared when the undercarriage was retracted. During the next three minutes several indications of system anomalies occurred, which included a pressurization system failure, a gear unsafe light and a loss of hydraulics. The captain requested a level-off at 2000 feet because of the pressurization problem. In his radio call the captain used the callsign "Nationair 2120" instead of "Nigerian 2120" and the controller mistook the transmission to be from a Saudi flight returning to Jeddah and cleared The Jeddah bound aircraft to 3000 feet. The captain of the accident aircraft, however, acknowledged the ATC transmission without a call sign, saying "understand you want us up to 3000 feet." This misunderstanding continued for the next three minutes with ATC assuming that all calls were from the Saudi flight, not from the accident aircraft. About four minutes after brake release the captain called ATC and reported that the aircraft was leveling at 3000 feet. The first officer then interrupted with " ... declaring an emergency. We 're declaring an emergency at this time. We believe we have ah, blown tires." As the aircraft continued on the downwind heading, a flight attendant came into the cockpit and reported "smoke in the back ... real bad." A few moments later, the first officer said "I've got no ailerons." The captain responded: "OK, hang on, I've got it." It was the last record on the CVR, which failed (along with the flight data recorder [FDR]) at 08:33:33. The ATC controller gave a heading to intercept the final approach and thereafter continued to give heading information. Meanwhile, during the downwind and base legs, the fire had consumed the cabin floor above the wheel wells , permitting cabin furnishing to sag into the wheel wells. When the gear was probably extended at 11 miles on the final approach, the first body fell out because fire had burned through the seat harness. Subsequently, with the gear down and a forceful air supply through the open gear doors, rapid destruction of more floor structure permitted the loss of more bodies and seat assemblies. Despite the considerable destruction to the airframe, the aircraft appeared to be controllable. Eight minutes after brake release and 10 miles from the runway, the captain declared an emergency for the third time, saying, "Nigeria 2120 declaring an emergency, we are on fire, we are on fire, we are returning to base immediately." The aircraft came in nose down and crashed 9,433 feet (2,875 meters) short of the runway at 08:38.
Probable cause:
The following findings were reported:
1. The organisational structure for the deployment team was ill-defined and fragmented.
2. Deployment maintenance personnel were not qualified or authorised to perform the function of releasing the aircraft as being fit to fly.
3. The release of the aircraft as being fit to fly was delegated to non-practising Aircraft Maintenance Engineers whose primary function was to operate the aircraft as flight crew members.
4. The aircraft was signed-off as fit for flight, in an unairworthy condition, by the operating flight engineer who had no involvement in the aircraft servicing.
5. The #2 and #4 tyre pressures were below the minimum for flight dispatch. Other tyres may also have been below minimum pressures.
6. Maintenance personnel were aware of the low tyre pressures but failed to rectify the faults.
7. The mechanic altered the only record of the actual low pressures, measured by the avionics specialist on 7 July, four days before the accident.
8. There was no evidence that the tyre pressures had been checked, using a tyre pressure gauge, after 7 July.
9. The lead mechanic was aware of the low tyre pressures.
10. The persons who were aware of the low pressures had insufficient knowledge of the hazards of operating at low tyre pressures.
11. The project manager was aware of a low tyre pressure but was not qualified to assess its importance.
12. The project manager was responsible for the aircraft schedule and directed that the aircraft depart without servicing the tyre.
13. The lead mechanic who was aware of the requirement for, and had requested nitrogen for tyre servicing, did not countermand the decision of the project manager.
14. There was no evidence to indicate that this flight crew were ever informed of the low tyre pressures.
15. The aircraft departed the ramp in an unairworthy condition.
16. During the taxi from the ramp to the runway, the transfer of the load from the under-inflated #2 tyre to #1 tyre on the same axle, resulted in over deflection, over-heating and structural weakening of the #1 tyre.
17. The #1 tyre failed very early on the take-off roll due to degeneration of the structure, caused by over-deflection.
18. The #2 tyre failed almost immediately after #1 due to over-deflection and rapid overheating when the load was transferred from the #1 tyre.
19. The #2 wheel stopped rotating for reasons not established. Friction between the wheel/brake assembly and the runway generated sufficient heat to raise the temperature of tyre remnants above that required for a tyre fire to be self-sustaining. Rubber remnants ignited during the take-off roll.
20. Numbers 1 and 2 wheels were severely damaged and at least one piece of #1 wheel rim struck the airframe, becoming embedded in the left flap.
21. The crew were aware of unusual symptoms early and throughout the takeoff roll; the captain continued the take-off.
22. The aircraft was not equipped with warning systems which would have provided the flight crew with adequate information on which to make a decision to reject the take-off after tyre(s) failure.
23. The captain did not receive sufficient cues to convince him that a rejected take-off was warranted.
24. The crew retracted the gear, consistent with company procedures, and burning rubber was brought into close proximity with hydraulic and electrical system components.
25. The evidence indicates that the wheel well fire involved tyres, hydraulic fluid, magnesium alloy and fuel. The fuel was probably introduced as a result of "burn through" of the centre fuel tank.
26. Fire within the wheel wells spread and intensified until the cabin floor was breached and control systems were disabled.
27. The fuel increased the intensity of the fire until, shortly before impact, airframe structural integrity was lost.
28. Tyre characteristics and performance are not adequately addressed during training and licensing of both flight crews and technical personnel.
29. The aircraft operator's tyre inflation pressures did not accurately reflect what was contained in the aircraft manufacturer's maintenance manual.
30. The operator's maintenance and operating documentation for the DC-8 does not contain adequate information for the proper maintenance and operation of aircraft tyres.

Crash of a Lockheed C-130H Hercules in Ras al-Mishab: 98 killed

Date & Time: Mar 21, 1991
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
469
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kuwait City - Ras al-Mishab - Dakar
MSN:
4754
YOM:
1977
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
95
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
98
Circumstances:
The four engine aircraft was completing the transfer of 95 Senegalese soldiers engaged in the Gulf War. While approaching Ras al-Mishab Airport, the crew encountered poor visibility due to heavy black smoke coming from the oil wells set on fire. The crew descended too low when the airplane struck the ground and crashed few km from the airfield. Three passengers were injured while 98 other occupants were killed.