Florida

The commercial pilot and three passengers departed on a cross-country flight in a twin-engine airplane. As the flight neared the destination airport, the pilot canceled his instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance. The approach controller transferred the flight to the tower controller, and the pilot reported to the tower controller that the airplane was about 2 miles from the airport. However, the approach controller contacted the tower controller to report that the airplane was 200 ft over a nearby joint military airport at the time. GPS data revealed that, when pilot reported that the airplane was 2 miles from the destination airport, the airplane's actual location was about 10 miles from the destination airport and 2 miles from the joint military airport. The airplane impacted a remote wooded area about 8 miles northwest of the destination airport. At the time of the accident, thunderstorm cells were in the area. A review of the weather information revealed that the pilot's view of the airport was likely obscured because the airplane was in an area of light precipitation, restricting the pilot's visibility. A review of airport information noted that the IFR approach course for the destination airport passes over the joint military airport. The Federal Aviation Administration chart supplement for the destination airport noted the airport's proximity to the other airport. However, it is likely that the pilot mistook the other airport for the destination airport due to reduced visibility because of weather. The accident circumstances were consistent with controlled flight into terrain. The ethanol detected in the pilot's blood specimens but not in his urine specimens was consistent with postmortem bacteria production. The carbon monoxide and cyanide detected in the pilot's blood specimens were consistent with inhalation after the postimpact fire.

The private pilot and pilot-rated passenger were returning to the airport in night visual meteorological conditions with a cloud ceiling about 1,500 ft above ground level. Radar data indicated that the airplane overflew the airport and completed a 360° descending right turn and overflew the airport again before entering an approximate 180° left climbing turn toward and over an unlighted area within a denselywooded national forest. The airplane continued the left turn and entered a descent to impact in a river about 1 mile from the airport. All major components of the airplane were recovered from the river except the outboard section of the left wing and the left aileron. An examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Because each of the two pilots onboard would have been capable of safely landing the airplane, it is unlikely that an acute event from either occupant's heart disease contributed to the accident. The night conditions, which included overcast clouds that would have obscured the nearly full moon, and the pilots' maneuvering for landing over an area devoid of cultural lighting provided conditions conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. It is likely that the pilots experienced a "black hole" illusion while maneuvering to align with the runway for landing, which resulted in an uncontrolled descent and impact with water.

The instrument-rated private pilot and four passengers boarded the multiengine airplane inside a hangar. The pilot then requested that the airplane be towed from the hangar to the ramp, since he did not want to hit anything on the ramp while taxiing in the dense fog. Witnesses heard the pre-takeoff engine run-up toward the end of the runway but could not see the airplane as it departed; the engines sounded normal during the run-up and takeoff. A witness video recorded the takeoff but the airplane was not visible due to the dense fog. During the takeoff roll the airplane's tires chirped, which is consistent with the wheels touching down on the runway with a side load. The video ended before the accident occurred. The witnesses stated that the takeoff continued and then they heard the airplane impact the ground and saw an explosion. The weather conditions at the time of the accident included visibility less than 1/4 mile in fog and an overcast ceiling at 300 ft above ground level. The airplane's weight at the time of the accident was about 105 lbs over the maximum takeoff weight, which exceeded the center of gravity moment envelope. The excess weight would have likely extended the takeoff roll, decreased the climb rate, and increased the amount of elevator pressure required to lift off of the runway. A majority of the airplane was consumed by postcrash fire. The ground impact marks and wreckage distribution were consistent with the airplane rolling left over the departure end of the runway and impacting the ground inverted in a nearly vertical, nose-low attitude. Examination of the engines revealed operating signatures consistent with takeoff power at the time of impact. The elevator trim tab and actuator were found beyond their full up travel limits and the trim cable exhibited tension overload separations near the actuator. It is likely that, when the cable separated in overload, the chain turned the sprocket and extended the actuator rod beyond full travel. No anomalies were observed with the airframe, engines, or cockpit instrumentation that would have precluded normal operation. The investigation was unable to determine the status of the autopilot during the accident takeoff. Based on the evidence it's likely that when the airplane entered instrument meteorological conditions the pilot experienced spatial disorientation, which resulted in a loss of control and descent into terrain.

Before departing on the flight, the private pilot, who did not hold a current medical certificate, fueled the multiengine airplane and was seen shortly thereafter attempting to repair a fuel leak of unknown origin. The pilot did not hold a mechanic certificate and review of the maintenance logbooks revealed that the most recent annual inspection was completed 2 years before the accident. After performing undetermined maintenance to the airplane, the pilot reported to a witness that he had fixed the fuel leak. The pilot then taxied to the runway for takeoff. Witnesses reported that a large fuel stain was present on the ramp where the airplane had been parked; however, the amount of fuel that leaked from the airplane could not be determined. The pilot aborted the first takeoff shortly after becoming airborne. Although he did not state why he aborted the takeoff, he told the tower controller that he did not need assistance; shortly thereafter, he requested and was cleared for a second takeoff. During the initial climb, the pilot declared an emergency and was cleared to land on any runway. Witnesses reported that the airplane was between 400 ft and 800 ft above the ground in a left bank and appeared to be turning back to land on an intersecting runway. They thought the airplane was going to make it back to the runway, but the airplane's bank angle increased past 90° and the nose suddenly dropped; the airplane subsequently impacted terrain. One of the pilots likened the maneuver to a stall/spin, Vmc roll, or snap roll. Examination of the flight controls and engines did not reveal any anomalies that would have prevented normal operation. The position of the fuel valves was consistent with the fuel being shut off to the left engine. The fuel valves, with the exception of the left main valve, functioned when power was applied. The left main valve was intact, but the motor was found to operate intermittently. The amount of fuel found in the left engine injection servo was less than that in the right engine; however, the cylinder head temperatures and exhaust gas temperatures were consistent between both engines for the duration of the flight, and whether or to what extent the left engine may have experienced a loss of power could not be determined. The available evidence was insufficient to determine why the pilot declared an emergency and elected to return to the airport; however, the airplane's increased left bank and nose-down attitude just before impact is consistent with a loss of control.

The flight instructor, commercial pilot receiving instruction, and commercial pilot-rated passenger were conducting an instructional flight in the multi-engine airplane during instrument meteorological conditions. After performing a practice instrument approach, the flight was cleared for a second approach; however, the landing runway changed, and the controller vectored the airplane for an approach to the new runway. The pilot was instructed to turn to a southwesterly heading and maintain 1,600 ft until established on the localizer. Radar information revealed that the airplane turned to a southwesterly heading on a course to intercept the localizer and remained at 1,600 ft for about 1 minute 39 seconds before beginning a descending right turn to 1,400 ft. The descent continued to 1,100 ft; at which time the air traffic control controller issued a low altitude alert. Over the following 10 seconds, the airplane continued to descend at a rate in excess of 4,800 ft per minute (fpm). The controller issued a second low altitude alert to the crew with instructions to climb to 1,600 ft immediately. The pilot responded about 5 seconds later, "yeah I am sir, I am, I am." The airplane then climbed 1,400 ft over 13 seconds, resulting in a climb rate in excess of 6,700 fpm, followed by a descent to 1,400 ft over 5 seconds, resulting in a 1,500-fpm descent before radar contact was lost in the vicinity of the accident site. Radar data following the initial instrument approach indicated that the airplane was flying a relatively smooth and consistent flightpath with altitude and heading changes that were indicative of autopilot use until the final turn to intercept the localizer course. Maneuvering the airplane in restricted visibility placed the pilot in conditions conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. The accident circumstances, including altitude and course deviations and the subsequent high-energy impact, are consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation. Additionally, examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of any preexisting anomalies that would have precludednormal operation. Therefore, it is likely that the pilot receiving instruction was experiencing the effects of spatial disorientation when the accident occurred. Toxicology testing of the flight instructor identified significant amounts of oxycodone as well as its active metabolite, oxymorphone, in liver tissue; oxycodone was also found in muscle. Oxycodone is an opioid pain medication available by prescription that may impair mental and/or physical ability required for the performance of potentially hazardous tasks. The flight instructor's tissue levels of oxycodone suggest that his blood level at the time of the accident was high enough to have had psychoactive effects, and his failure to recognize and mitigate the pilot's spatial disorientation and impending loss of control further suggest that the flight instructor was impaired by the effects of oxycodone. Toxicology testing of all three pilots identified ethanol in body tissues; however, given the varying amounts and distribution, it is likely that the identified ethanol was from postmortem production rather than ingestion.

The pilot performed a preflight inspection of the turboprop airplane and an engine run-up with no anomalies noted. The takeoff roll and lift off from the runway were normal; however, when the pilot initiated a landing gear retraction, the engine torque decreased, but the rpm did not change. The torque then surged back to full power and continued to surge as the pilot attempted to return to the runway. The left wing of the airplane struck the ground, and the airplane came to rest in the grass on the side of the runway. Examination of the engine, engine accessories, and propeller revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation before the accident. The reason for the partial loss of engine power could not be determined based on the available
information.

The pilot departed on the non-scheduled passenger flight with one passenger onboard; the flight was the 3rd leg of a 4-leg trip. About 13 minutes after departure, he advised air traffic control that the airplane was “fuel critical” and requested vectors to the nearest airport, which was about 7 miles away. Both engines subsequently lost total power and the pilot performed a forced landing on a street about 2 miles from the airport, during which the airplane collided with two vehicles. Examination of the airplane revealed substantial damage to the fuel tanks, with evidence of a small fire near the left wingtip fuel tank. Fuel consumption calculations revealed that the airplane would have used about 100 gallons of fuel since its most recent refueling, which was the capacity of the main (wingtip) tanks. Both fuel selectors were found in their respective main tank positions. Given the available information, it is likely that the pilot exhausted all the fuel in the main fuel tanks and starved the engines of fuel. Although the total amount of fuel on board at the start of the flight could not be determined, had all tanks been full, the airplane would have had about 63 gallons remaining in the two auxiliary tanks at the time of the accident. The auxiliary fuel tanks were breached during the accident and quantity of fuel they contained was not determined. Examination of the engines revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.