Indonesia

- The flight crew was not aware of the mountainous area in the vicinity of the flight path due to various factors such as available charts, insufficient briefing and statements of the potential customer that resulted in inappropriate response to the TAWS warning. The impact could have been avoided by appropriate action of the pilot up to 24 seconds after the first TAWS warning.
- The Jakarta Radar service had not established the minimum vectoring altitudes and the Jakarta Radar system was not equipped with functioning MSAW for the particular area around Mount Salak.
- Distraction of the flight crew from prolonged conversation not related to the progress of the flight, resulted in the pilot flying not constantly changing the aircraft heading while in orbit. Consequently, the aircraft unintentionally exited the orbit.

The engine flamed out caused by lack of fuel supply from main fuel tank to the engine. The pilot likely fixated on the survey flight execution and lost awareness of his fuel situation. The transferring of fuel from the auxiliary tank was not performed during the flight as required. The combination of inexperience of the pilot related to survey flying, fatigue and the highly demanding survey operator contributed to this sequence of events.

Findings:
1. The aircraft was airworthy prior the accident. There was no evidence that the aircraft had malfunction during the flight.
2. The crew had valid license and medical certificate. There was no evidence of crew incapacitation.
3. In this flight Pilot in Command acted as Pilot Flying and Second In command acted as Pilot Monitoring.
4. The flight crew did not conduct approach crew briefing.
5. There was no checklist reading.
6. The PIC as Pilot Flying did not have the instrument approach procedure immediately available to review during approach.
7. During the approach, the PIC course indicator was set at 091 and the SIC was at 084.
8. The rate of descend recorded vary and up to 1920 ft per minute and below 500 ft AGL the rate of descend recorded up to 2040 ft per minute.
9. The approach did not meet the stabilize approach criteria as stated in the FCOM.
10. There were several GPWS warning of ‘sink rate’ and ‘pull up’ activated during approach.
11. The aircraft touched down at speed 156 Kt before bounced, instead of 138 Kt target landing speed.
12. The flap extended to 40 after the aircraft touch down.
13. The FDR recorded reduction in N1 during thrust reverser activation after landing.
14. The CRM was not well implemented.
Factors:
Unsuccessful to recognize the two critical elements, namely fixation and complacency affected pilot decision to land the aircraft while the approach was not meet the criteria of stabilized approach.

FINDINGS :
• The aircraft was airworthy prior the accident and there was no evidence of system malfunction during the flight.
• The crew had valid license and medical certificate.
• There were no fences at the airport perimeter.
• There was a local plantation area nearby the runway.
• Unauthorized person entering the shoulder of the runway 27.
• There was no warning signal to alert if unauthorized persons entering the runway, especially during any aircraft Takeoff and Landing.
• The valley (gap) on the south side of the runway was too narrow for successful go around manoeuvre by a caravan aircraft.
• The aircraft most probably stalled due to very high angle of attack, when the aircraft was manoeuvre to avoid the surrounding terrain and bank to the right.
• The communication of incoming and outgoing Susi Air aircraft from and to Bilogai was only to Susi Air ground handling Agent at Sugapa.
CAUSES :
The aircraft was executed a Go Around due to a unauthorized person entering the shoulder of the runway 27, after go around, crew tried to avoid terrain impact, increasing the aircraft attitude more pitching up caused the angle of attack was higher and beyond a stall margins , finally stall just before impact.

Factors:
1. The flight was in VFR however both pilots agreed to fly into the cloud, consequently, the flight crew had lack of situation awareness due to lost of visual references to the ground and no or late recovery action prior to impact due to low visibility.
2. There was lack of good crew coordination due to steep cockpit transition gradient.
3. There was no checklist reading and crew briefing.

The pilot decided to descend from the cruise altitude 10000 feet to penetrate the area of marginal weather was most likely not as what his perceive. The pilot avoided the cloud to the left of the VFR route guidance and most likely that the space available was less than the requirement stated for the Weather Minimum class F.

Factors that contributed to the accident are as follows:
a. The aircraft was loaded to a weight in excess of the maximum certificated takeoff weight.
b. The aircraft climb performance was adversely affected by the aircraft being operated above the certificated maximum takeoff weight.
c. The aircraft approached high terrain along the proposed route at an altitude which was below that specified in the operator's route guide.
d. The aircraft entered a high rate of descent during a terrain avoidance maneuver.
e. Recovery from the abnormal flight path was not achieved before the aircraft collided with terrain.

FINDINGS:
1. The aircraft was airworthy prior the accident. There is no evidence that the aircraft had malfunction during the flight.
2. The crew had valid flight license and medical certificate. There was no evidence of crew incapacitation.
3. In this flight the SIC acted as Pilot Flying until the PIC took control of the aircraft at the last part of the flight.
4. According to company operation manual (COM), in a VMC (Visual Meteorological Condition), a “minimum, minimum” EGPWS alert while the approach was not stabilized should be followed by the action of abandoning the approach.
5. The cockpit crew did not conduct any crew approach briefing and checklist reading.
6. As it was recorded in the CVR during the final segment of the flight, both crews member were looking out-side to look for the runway. It might reduce the situational awareness.
7. At the final segment of the flight, the FDR recorded as follows:
• The approach was discontinued started at 376 feet pressure altitude (250 feet radio altitude) and reached the highest altitude of 585 feet pressure altitude. While climbing the aircraft was banking to the left reaching a roll angle of 38 degree. The torque of both engines was increased reaching 70% and 82% for the left and right engine respectively.
• During the go-around, the flaps were retracted to 5 and subsequently to 0 position, and the landing gears were retracted. The aircraft started to descend, and the pitch angle reached 13 degree nose down.
• The rate of descend increased significantly reaching about 3000 feet per minute, and finally the aircraft crashed into the shallow sea.
8. The rapid descent was mainly a result of a combination of situations such as high bank angle (up to 38 deg to the left) and the flaps retracted to 5 and subsequently to 0 position, and also the combination of other situations: engine torque, airspeed, and nose-down pitch.
9. The ERS button was determined in the CRUISE mode instead of TOGA mode. This had led the torque reached 70% and 82% during discontinuing the approach.
10. The flaps were retracted to 5 and subsequently to 0, while the MA-60 standard go-around procedure is to set the flaps at 15.
11. There was limited communications between the crew along the flight. This type of interaction indicated that there was a steep trans-cockpit authority gradient.
12. The SIC was trained in the first three batches which was conducted by the aircraft manufacturer instructor and syllabus, while the PIC was trained by Merpati instructor using modified syllabus. Inadequacy/ineffectivity in the training program may lead to actions that deviated from the standard procedure and regression to the previous type.
13. The investigation found that the Flight Crew Operation Manual (FCOM) and Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) used non-standard English Aviation Language. This finding was supported by a review performed by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB).
OTHER FINDINGS:
1. The DFDR does not have the Lateral and Longitudinal acceleration. These two parameters which were non safety related items were mandatory according to the CASR parts 121.343 and 121.344, and at the time of the MA 60 certification, the CCAR 121 did not require those two parameters.
2. Due to impact forces and immersion in water, the Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) did not transmit any signal.
FACTORS:
Factors contributed to the accident are as follows:
1. The flight was conducted in VFR in condition that was not suitable for visual approach when the visibility was 2 km. In such a situation a visual approach should not have been attempted.
2. There was no checklist reading and crew briefing.
3. The flight crew had lack of situation awareness when tried to find the runway, and discontinued the approach.
4. The missed approach was initiated at altitude 376 feet pressure altitude (250 feet radio altitude), the pilot open power to 70% and 82% torque followed by flap retracted to 5 and subsequently to 0. The rapid descent was mainly caused by continuously increase of roll angle up to 38 degree to the left and the retraction of flaps from 15 to 0 position.
5. Both crew had low experience/flying time on type.
6. Inadequacy/ineffectivity in the training program may lead to actions that deviated from the standard procedure and regression to the previous type.