code

SD

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-60 Marquise in Sioux Falls: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jun 7, 2020 at 0415 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N44MX
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Everett – Huron
MSN:
1526
YOM:
1981
Flight number:
MDS44
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The pilot departed Everett-Payne Field in the evening of June 6 on a cargo service to Huron, SD. En route, he was informed about the presence of thunderstorms in the Huron area and decided to divert to Sioux Falls Airport where he landed at 0140LT. Awaiting weather improvement, he left Sioux Falls around 0415LT to resume his flight to Huron. Upon takeoff, the twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances and was destroyed. The pilot was killed.

Crash of a Pilatus PC-12/47E near Chamberlain: 9 killed

Date & Time: Nov 30, 2019 at 1230 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N56KJ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Chamberlain – Idaho Falls
MSN:
1431
YOM:
2013
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
11
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Circumstances:
The single engine airplane departed Chamberlain Airport in marginal weather conditions. Few minutes later, while flying in snow falls, the airplane went out of control and crashed in a cornfield located about 30 miles west-southwest of Chamberlain. Three passengers aged 17, 27 and 28 were injured and evacuated to hospitals in Chamberlain, Mitchell and Sioux Falls while nine other occupants were killed. The pilot filed an instrument flight rules plan with the Federal Aviation Administration and received a clearance to fly direct from Chamberlain, a non-towered airport, to Idaho Falls, Idaho, with a planned departure time of 12:20 p.m. CST. The plane departed Chamberlain at 12:26 p.m. CST. When the pilot did not activate the flight plan after departure, the FAA issued an alert for a missing airplane. At 12:35 p.m. CST, an AWOS-3 automated weather observation station at the Chamberlain airport recorded weather as follows: winds from 020 degrees (north/northeast) at 6 knots (7 mph), ½ mile visibility with moderate snow and icing, low-level windshear, and clear air turbulence conditions with overcast skies. The base of the cloud layer was recorded at 500 feet above the ground. The airplane departed on runway 31 and crashed in a field about 1 mile north of the airport. The Pilatus PC-12 airplane is not required to be equipped with a cockpit voice recorder or a flight data recorder. Investigators will be looking for any avionics or engine monitoring equipment with non-volatile memory that could yield information relevant to the investigation. The airplane was equipped with an automated dependent surveillance broadcast system (ADS-B), which records parameters that will help investigators determine the performance of the airplane by evaluating the flight track, altitude and speed from takeoff to the end of the flight.

Crash of a Cessna T303 Crusader in Batesland

Date & Time: Apr 24, 2018 at 1000 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N9746C
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Aberdeen - Pine Ridge
MSN:
303-00210
YOM:
1983
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5655
Captain / Total hours on type:
4403.00
Aircraft flight hours:
8929
Circumstances:
Before the air taxi flight, the commercial pilot obtained a weather briefing via the company computer system and reviewed the weather information with the company chief pilot. The pilot stated that based on the computer briefing, which did not include icing conditions, he was aware of the forecasted weather conditions along the route of flight and at the intended destination. However, the briefing was incomplete as it did not contain any in-flight weather advisories, which would have alerted the pilot of moderate icing conditions expected over the flight route in the form of AIRMET Zulu. After takeoff and during the climb to 12,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the airplane encountered light rime ice, and the pilot activated the de-ice equipment with no issues noted. After hearing reports of better weather at a lower altitude, the pilot requested a descent to between 5,000 and 6,000 ft. During the descent to 6,000 ft msl and with the airplane clear of ice, the airplane encountered light to moderate icing conditions. The pilot considered turning back to another airport but could not get clearance until the airplane was closer to his destination. Shortly thereafter, the pilot stated that it felt “like a sheet of ice fell on us” as the airplane encountered severe icing conditions. The pilot applied full engine power in an attempt to maintain altitude. The airplane exited the overcast cloud layer about 500 ft above ground level. The pilot chose to execute an off-airport emergency landing because the airplane could not maintain altitude. During the landing, the landing gear separated; the airplane came to rest upright and sustained substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation and that the airplane was within its maximum gross weight. Structural icing was observed on the airframe after the landing. Based on the weather information, which indicated the probability of icing between 5,000 and 9,000 ft over the region and a high threat of supercooled large droplets between 5,000 and 7,000 ft, it is likely that the airplane, which was equipped for flight in icing conditions, inadvertently encountered severe icing conditions consistent with supercooled large droplets, which resulted in structural icing that exceeded the airplane’s capabilities to maintain altitude.
Probable cause:
The airplane’s inadvertent encounter with severe icing conditions during descent, which resulted in structural icing, the pilot’s inability to maintain altitude, and an emergency landing. Contributing to the accident was an incomplete preflight weather briefing.
Final Report:

Crash of a Lockheed C-130H Hercules near Edgemont: 4 killed

Date & Time: Jul 1, 2012 at 1738 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
93-1458
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Colorado Springs - Colorado Springs
MSN:
5363
YOM:
1994
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total hours on type:
1966.00
Copilot / Total hours on type:
3647
Circumstances:
On 1 July 2012, at approximately 1738 Local time, a C-130H3, Tail Number 93-1458, assigned to the 145th Airlift Wing, North Carolina Air National Guard, Charlotte Douglas International Airport (KCLT), Charlotte, North Carolina, crashed on public land managed by the United States Forest Service (USFS), while conducting wildland firefighting operations near Edgemont, South Dakota. At the time of the mishap all members of the Mishap Crew (MC) were assigned or attached to the 156th Airlift Squadron, based at KCLT. The Mishap Crew (MC) consisted of Mishap Pilot 1 (MP1), Mishap Pilot 2 (MP2), Mishap Navigator (MN), Mishap Flight Engineer (ME), Mishap Loadmaster 1 (ML1) and Mishap Loadmaster 2 (ML2). For the mishap sortie, MP1 was the aircraft commander and pilot flying in the left seat. MP2 was in the right seat as the instructor pilot. MN occupied the navigator station on the right side of the flight deck behind MP2. ME was seated in the flight engineer seat located between MP1 and MP2, immediately aft of the center flight console. ML1 and ML2 were seated on the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS) unit, near the right paratroop door. ML1 occupied the aft MAFFS control station seat and ML2 occupied the forward MAFFS observer station seat. MP1, MP2, MN and ME died in the mishap. ML1 and ML2 survived the mishap, but suffered significant injuries. The mishap aircraft (MA) and a USFS-owned MAFFS unit were destroyed. The monetary loss is valued at $43,453,295, which includes an estimated $150,000 in post aircraft removal and site environmental cleanup costs. There were no additional fatalities, injuries or damage to other government or civilian property.
Probable cause:
The accident investigation report released by the Air Force Air Mobility Command said:
I developed my opinion by inspecting the mishap site and wreckage, as well as analyzing factual data from the following: historical records, Air Force directives and guidance, USFS and Interagency guidance, reconstructing the mishap sortie in a C-130H3 simulator, engineering analysis, witness testimony, flight data, weather radar data, computer animated reconstruction, consulting with subject matter experts and information provided by technical experts. The failure of the Digital Flight Data Recorder severely complicated the recreation of the mishap, and impacted my ability to determine facts in this investigation. I find by clear and convincing evidence the cause of the mishap was MPl, MP2, MN and ME's inadequate assessment of operational conditions, resulting in the MA impacting the ground after flying into a microburst. Additionally, I find by the preponderance of evidence, the failure of the White Draw Fire Lead Plane aircrew and Air Attack aircrew to communicate critical operational information; and conflicting operational guidance concerning thunderstorm avoidance, substantially contributed to the mishap.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 421C Golden Eagle III in Sioux Falls: 4 killed

Date & Time: Dec 9, 2011 at 1424 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N421SY
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Sioux Falls - Rapid City
MSN:
421C-0051
YOM:
1976
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
3848
Captain / Total hours on type:
357.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4882
Circumstances:
Shortly after the airplane lifted off, the tower controller informed the pilot that a plume of smoke was visible behind the airplane. No communications were received from the pilot after he acknowledged the takeoff clearance. Witnesses reported that white smoke appeared to be trailing from the area of the left engine during takeoff. The witnesses subsequently observed flames at the inboard side of the left engine. The airplane began a left turn. As the airplane continued the turn, the flames and trail of white smoke were no longer visible. When the airplane reached a southerly heading, the nose dropped abruptly, and the airplane descended to the ground. Witnesses stated that they heard an increase in engine sound before impact. A postimpact fire ensued. The accident site was located about 3/4 mile from the airport. A postaccident examination determined that the left engine fuel selector and fuel valve were in the OFF position, consistent with the pilot shutting down that engine after takeoff. However, the left engine propeller was not feathered. Extensive damage to the right engine propeller assembly was consistent with that engine producing power at the time of impact. The landing gear and wing flaps were extended at the time of impact. Teardown examinations of both engines did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a loss of engine power. The left engine oil cap was observed to be unsecured at the accident site; however, postaccident comparison of the left and right engine oil caps revealed disproportionate distortion of the left oil cap, likely due to the postimpact fire. As a result, no determination was made regarding the security of left engine oil cap before the accident. Emergency procedures outlined in the pilot’s operating handbook (POH) noted that when securing an engine, the propeller should be feathered. Performance data provided in the POH for single-engine operations were predicated on the propeller of the inoperative engine being feathered, and the wing flaps and landing gear retracted. Thus, the pilot did not follow the emergency procedures outlined in the POH for single-engine operation.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s failure to maintain adequate airspeed after shutting down one engine, which resulted in an inadvertent aerodynamic stall and impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure to follow the guidance contained in the pilot’s operating handbook, which advised feathering the propeller of the secured engine and retracting the flaps and landing gear.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 99 in Rapid City

Date & Time: Dec 29, 2006 at 0200 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N99TH
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Pierre - Rapid City
MSN:
U-155
YOM:
1974
Flight number:
AIP408
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3652
Captain / Total hours on type:
3069.00
Aircraft flight hours:
39795
Circumstances:
The airplane was on an instrument flight rules flight in night instrument meteorological conditions when the accident occurred. The airplane had been cleared for an ILS approach and the pilot elected to use a non-published procedure to intercept the final approach. After becoming established on the final approach, the airplane impacted the ground about 7 miles from the destination airport at an elevation approximately the same as the airport elevation. Flight inspections of the instrument approach performed prior to and subsequent to the accident revealed satisfactory performance of both the localizer and glideslope functions. The number one altimeter setting did not match the altimeter setting that was current at the time of the accident. Post accident examination of the altimeters revealed that the number one altimeter read 360 feet high. No determination was made as to whether the discrepancy existed prior to impact. However, the pilot did not report any pre-flight discrepancies with regard to the airplane's altimeters. No other anomalies were found or reported with regard to the airplane's structure or systems.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to follow the published instrument approach procedure which contributed to his failure to maintain altitude and clearance from terrain during the instrument approach. A factor was the night light condition.
Final Report:

Crash of a Learjet C-21A at Ellsworth AFB: 2 killed

Date & Time: Feb 2, 2002 at 1430 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
84-0097
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Ellsworth AFB - Ellsworth AFB
MSN:
35-543
YOM:
1984
Flight number:
Pacer 43
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
The mishap aircraft, call sign Pacer 43, was conducting pattern work operations during an off-station training mission at Ellsworth AFB, SD (RCA). Shortly before impact, the mishap crew was conducting a simulated single-engine approach to runway 31 at Ellsworth AFB. Subsequent analysis showed that there was a significantly greater amount of fuel in the left wing and left wing tip tank than the right. The gross fuel imbalance resulted from an unmonitored transfer of fuel from the right wing and right wing tip tank to the left that was initiated by the crew approximately nine and one-half minutes before impact. As the aircraft approached the point when it would normally transition to a flare, it leveled off and began a climbing turn to the west, toward the tower. It did not touch down prior to the turn, but veered left immediately during the flare, and then rolled back to wings level momentarily as it climbed. The heavier left wing, and application of power to the right engine for the go-around, caused the aircraft to roll back into a steeper left turn, stayed in a climbing left turn with the bank continuing to increase until il rolled through more than 90 degrees of bank. As the aircraft reached the highest point of the climb (approximately 450 feet), the bank angle was more than 90 degrees, and perhaps slightly inverted as the nose dropped and the aircraft began to descend. The aircraft impacted the ground in a grassy field.
Probable cause:
The crew's failure to follow flight manual procedures for fuel transfer. As a result, the mishap aircraft experienced a fuel imbalance significant enough to cause the aircraft to enter an unsafe roll to the left from which the pilot was not able to recover.

Crash of a Learjet 35A in Mina: 6 killed

Date & Time: Oct 25, 1999 at 1213 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N47BA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Orlando - Dallas
MSN:
35-060
YOM:
1976
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
4280
Captain / Total hours on type:
60.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1700
Copilot / Total hours on type:
200
Aircraft flight hours:
10506
Aircraft flight cycles:
7500
Circumstances:
On October 25, 1999, about 1213 central daylight time (CDT), a Learjet Model 35, N47BA, operated by Sunjet Aviation, Inc., of Sanford, Florida, crashed near Aberdeen, South Dakota. The airplane departed Orlando, Florida, for Dallas, Texas, about 0920 eastern daylight time (EDT). Radio contact with the flight was lost north of Gainesville, Florida, after air traffic control (ATC) cleared the airplane to flight level (FL) 390. The airplane was intercepted by several U.S. Air Force (USAF) and Air National Guard (ANG) aircraft as it proceeded northwestbound. The military pilots in a position to observe the accident airplane at close range stated (in interviews or via radio transmissions) that the forward windshields of the Learjet seemed to be frosted or covered with condensation. The military pilots could not see into the cabin. They did not observe any structural anomaly or other unusual condition. The military pilots observed the airplane depart controlled flight and spiral to the ground, impacting an open field. All occupants on board the airplane (the captain, first officer, and four passengers) were killed, and the airplane was destroyed.
Crew:
Michael Kling,
Stephanie Bellegarrigue.
Passengers:
Payne Stewart,
Van Ardan,
Bruce Borland,
Robert Fraley.
Probable cause:
Incapacitation of the flight crewmembers as a result of their failure to receive supplemental oxygen following a loss of cabin pressurization, for undetermined reasons.
Final Report:

Crash of a Socata TBM-700 in Spearfish: 4 killed

Date & Time: Aug 4, 1998 at 1345 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N69BS
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Lawrence – Madison – Spearfish
MSN:
10
YOM:
1991
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
3150
Aircraft flight hours:
1695
Circumstances:
Witnesses observed the flight enter downwind for runway 30, after it had completed a published approach to runway 12, with a circle to land on runway 30. The witnesses, one of which was a commercial pilot said that there were jagged ceilings at the time about 400 to 500 feet above the ground. He and two other men with him saw the airplane below the clouds. As the airplane proceeded downwind, it momentarily entered a cloud. As the airplane came out of the cloud, it turned left in about a 30 degree turn. The angle of bank increased to about 70 to 80 degrees, the tail of the airplane came up, and the airplane impacted the ground nose first. Several pilots at the airport heard someone from N69BS make a radio transmission on the UNICOM frequency. What was heard by several people was that N69BS had broken out at 2200 feet. They then heard, 'N69BS turning base,' immediately followed by 'lookout' and 'oh ....' All of the eye witnesses agreed that at no time did they see or hear any problems with the engine. They all said that the sounds coming from the engine never changed. The published approach in use at the time of the accident was the GPS (global positioning system) runway 12. The pilot made his initial approach to runway 12, broke off the approach to the right, entered a right downwind for a landing on runway 30. The published circling minimums for the approach were MDA (minimum descent altitude) 4,800 feet, HAT (height above terrain) 869 feet. Using an approach speed of 90 knots, the minimum visibility was 1 mile. Using an approach speed of 120 knots, the minimum visibility was 1 1/4 miles. The field elevation was 3,931 feet. The profile for the GPS runway 12 approach showed that after the IAF (Jesee way point), the course was 204 degrees, at 7,000 feet, to the Dezzi way point, from Dezzi the course was 114 degrees, descend to 5,600, to Sophi way point, after Sophi descend to 4,800 feet to the missed approach point at the Ruste way point. The distance from Dezzi to Ruste was 10 miles.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane while turning to base leg. Contributing factors were low ceilings, clouds, and the pilot's failure to adhere to both the published approach procedures and the published minimum descent altitude.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 402B in Watertown: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 30, 1997 at 1817 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N5087Q
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Watertown – Marshall
MSN:
402B-0565
YOM:
1974
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The pilot landed at Watertown, loaded and off-loaded cargo, and departed without getting out of the airplane. A witness reported seeing the airplane over the runway at an altitude of about 50 feet agl. The airplane was described to be bouncing and buffeting. Another witness reported the weather as overcast with occasional snow flakes. The airplane then descended, impacted the terrain and exploded. Post accident inspection revealed a 1/2 to 3/4 inch thick ridge of rime ice along the leading edge of the left horizontal stabilizer. Pieces of arc shaped ice were located along the wreckage path. Inspection of the wreckage failed to reveal any preimpact failure/malfunction of the engine or airframe which would have prevented flight.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to perform an aircraft preflight and to remove the ice which had accumulated on the airframe. A factor involved in the accident was the icing weather conditions which existed and the ice which accumulated on the airplane.
Final Report: