Wichita-Dwight D. Eisenhower (Mid-Continent)

During a landing approach, the pilot noted that the right engine remained at a high power setting, when he moved the power levers to reduce power. He executed a missed approach and had difficulty keeping the airplane straight and level. The pilot maneuvered for a second approach to land. After landing, he could not maintain directional control of the airplane and tried to go around, but the airplane went off the end of the runway and impacted the localizer antenna. The pilot did not advise ATC of the problem nor did he declare an emergency. The Pilot's Operating Handbook stated that for a power plant control malfunction, the affected engine should be shut down, and a single engine landing should be made. The power control cable was found disconnected from the anchoring point. A safety tab was broken off the housing, allowing it to unscrew. About one month before the accident, maintenance had been performed on the right engine to correct a discrepancy about the right engine power lever being stiff. The mechanic re-rigged the right engine power cable.

The crew was performing a lateral and directional stability test. Changes from earlier tests combined new leading edge fairing, new flap setting, lower reference airspeed, and trial settings for the stall protection system (shaker and pusher). Engineers had briefed the crew data would be sufficient if the steady heading sideslip (shss) maneuver ended at a 15° sideslip, or at onset of stall warning; crew agreed to end at stall warning. During the test the capt continued past stall warning to 21° sideslip at full rudder. The airplane rolled rapidly through 360 deg° and entered a deep stall. The copilot attempted to deploy the anti-spin chute. However, all the chute system cockpit switches were not properly preset; instead of assisting recovery, the chute parted from the airplane. Full control was not regained before impact. The chute system design allowed deployment of the chute even when the hyd lock switch was in the unlocked position and the hooks clasping the chute shackle to the airframe were open. System tested ok before flight. All three crew members were killed.

The pilot and his wife departed Wichita, Kansas with a destination of Phoenix, Arizona. Eight minutes after takeoff, while in a climb to 15,000 feet, the passenger contacted departure control and communicated that she thought that her husband might be dead. While departure control was getting a pilot to assist in the situation, the passenger, who was not a pilot attempted to fly the aircraft. A witness reported a rapid series of climbs and descents just before both horizontal stabilizers and the rudder separated from the aircraft. The aircraft then entered a spin terminating with ground impact. The aircraft was consumed by a post-crash fire. Both occupants were killed.

Buffalo Airways flight 721, a regularly scheduled cargo flight, was operating between Oklahoma City, OK, and Fort Wayne, IN (FWA), with en route stops at Wichita, KS (ICT), and Kansas City, MO (MCI). The flight to Wichita was routine. En route to Kansas City, the crew deviated from course to avoid thunderstorms, but the descent into the terminal area was routine. At 21:42 flight 721 contacted the TRACON arrival radar controller. The controller directed the flight to turn to 060 degrees and told the flightcrew that they were being vectored to the ILS localizer for the ILS approach to runway 1. About 21:47 while the airplane was descending through about 6,500 feet, the first officer, who had been flying the airplane, turned the controls over to the captain. Buffalo Airways' regulations required captains to make all the approaches and landings whenever the ceilings and visibilities were less than 400 feet and 1 mile, respectively. At 21:50, after several intermediate descent clearances, flight 721 was cleared to descend to 2,400 feet. At 21:51, the controller told flight 721 that it was "five miles from DOTTE (the LOM), turn left zero four zero, maintain two thousand four hundred until established, cleared ILS runway one approach." The crew had completed the before-landing checklist, the landing gear was down and locked, and the flaps had been extended to 25 degrees, as required, for landing. At 21:52:40, the local controller advised flight 721 that it was No. 2 to land and that the winds were zero four zero at eight knots, and that the RVR on runway 1 was more than 6,000 feet. At 21:52:47, the first officer stated, "Localizer alive." The first office reported the airplane's altitude during the descent in 100-foot increments above "minimums (DH)" until the airplane reached the decision height. At 21:53:07, the first officer called, "Marker inbound." The flightcrew then received ATIS information "Sierra" which stated that the weather at the airport was in part: ceiling--100 feet, overcast; visibility 1/2 mile, fog; wind 40° at 8 knots. At 21:53:24, the captain remarked, "Already started the approach." At 21:53:32, 4 seconds after reporting that the airplane was 200 feet above minimums, the first officer told the local controller that, "Seven twenty-one is the marker inbound." The local controller acknowledged receipt of the message. At 21:53:41, after receiving a low-altitude alert generated by the Automated Radar Tracking System III (ARTS III) computer's Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) function, the local controller warned flight 721 to "check altitude immediately should be two thousand four hundred, altimeter two nine six one." Flight 721 did not respond. However, the captain said "Call the radar (radio) altimeter please." At 21:53:46, the first officer responded, "Okay, there's twelve hundred on the (radio) altimeter." At 21:53:50, the local controller again called the flight and warned, "I have a low altitude alert, climb and maintain two thousand four hundred." Again, the flightcrew did not acknowledge receipt of the warning. At 21:53:51, a crewmember called out "pull it up," and at 2153:52, the captain applied power followed almost simultaneously by sounds of initial impact. Flight 721 struck the tops of trees on a 950-foot-high ridge about 3 nmi short of the approach end of runway 1. The airplane cut a relatively level 750- to 800-foot-long swath through the tree tops about 20 to 30 feet above the ground. The swath ended as the ridge and tree tops sloped downward. The airplane then rolled and turned to the right as it descended into the main impact area 2,000 feet beyond the initial impact site. All four occupants were killed.

The aircraft collided with the ground during takeoff. The fuel tank in the right wing ruptured and the aircraft burned while sliding to a stop. The day before the accident the aircraft was washed and the thrust reverser doors were polished. After the service, the reverser doors circuit breakers which had been pulled were not reset. It was company policy to leave circuit breakers out that were pulled during servicing. Prior to flight, the aircraft was loaded and the engines started. The reversed unlock lights on both reverser annunciator panels illuminated. The pilot discussed the situation with the copilot and elected to go. He pushed the light assemblies which unlatched the light housing and put out the 'unlock' lights. After takeoff while the gear was retracting the aircraft yawed right and impacted the ground. All occupants evacuated and after the fire was put out a Cessna Aircraft investigator observed the two thrust reverser circuit breakers in the 'out', open position and partially covered by a flight chart. Both thrust reversers were deployed.

A non-pilot mechanic employed at the manufacturer's facility took off in the aircraft. The aircraft was observed entering a very steep climb and appeared to stall. The nose was lowered and the aircraft turned left and entered a downwind leg to runway 01R. It then turned onto a low base leg and continued to a very low final. After several oscillations in roll the aircraft touched down 557 feet short of the runway and collided with approach light stanchions. The mechanic had been and was, at the time of the accident, under psychiatric care (schizophrenia).