Omaha-Eppley

According to the operator's director of safety, during landing in gusty crosswind conditions, the multi-engine, turbine-powered airplane bounced. The airplane then touched down a second time left of the runway centerline. "Recognizing their position was too far left," the flight crew attempted a go-around. However, both engines were almost at idle and "took time to spool back up." Without the appropriate airspeed, the airplane continued to veer to the left. A gust under the right wing "drove" the left wing into the ground. The airplane continued across a grass field, the nose landing gear collapsed, and the airplane slid to a stop. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and left wing. The director of safety reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The automated weather observation system located at the accident airport reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 110° at 21 knots, gusting to 35 knots. The pilot landed on runway 04. The Beechcraft airplane flight manual states the max demonstrated crosswind is 25 knots. Based on the stated wind conditions, the calculated crosswind component was 19 to 33 knots.

The private pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot told the air traffic controller that he needed to return to the airport due to an attitude heading reference system (AHRS) "miscommunication." Air traffic control radar data indicated that, at that time, the airplane was about 1.75 miles north of the airport on a southeasterly course about 2,000 ft. mean sea level. About 20 seconds after the pilot requested to return to the airport, the airplane began to descend. The airplane subsequently entered a right turn, which appeared to continue until the final radar data point. The airplane struck power lines about 3/4 of a mile from the airport while maneuvering within the traffic pattern. The power lines were about 75 ft. above ground level. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Although the pilot reported a flight instrumentation issue to air traffic control, the investigation was unable to confirm whether such an anomaly occurred based on component testing and available information. Examination of the standby airspeed indicator revealed that the link arm had separated from the pin on the rocking shaft assembly; however, it likely separated during the accident sequence. No other anomalies were observed. Functional testing indicated that the standby airspeed indicator was likely functional and providing accurate airspeed information to the pilot throughout the flight. Finally, examination of the left and right annunciator panel bulb filaments associated with the left fuel pump advisory revealed that they were stretched, indicating that the left fuel pump advisory indication annunciated at the time of the accident; however, this likely occurred during the accident sequence as a result of an automatic attempt to activate the left fuel pump due to the loss of fuel pressure immediately after the left wing separated. Toxicology testing of the pilot detected low levels of three different sedating antihistamines; however, antemortem levels could not be determined nor could the underlying reason(s) for the pilot's use of these medications. As a result, it could not be determined whether pilot impairment occurred due to the use of the medications or the underlying condition(s) themselves. Although the pilot reported a flight instrumentation issue, this problem would not have affected his ability to control the airplane. Further, the pilot should have been able to see the power lines given the day/visual weather conditions. It is possible that the pilot become distracted by the noncritical anomaly, which resulted in his failure to maintain clearance from the power lines.

The aircraft impacted terrain following an in-flight breakup near Shaver Lake, California. The private pilot/registered owner was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The pilot and passenger sustained fatal injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage during the accident sequence, and was partially consumed by postimpact fire. The cross-country flight departed Salinas Municipal Airport, Salinas, California, at 1837, with a planned destination of Eppley Airfield, Omaha, Nebraska. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed. The pilot was the son of the passenger. Both had spent the weekend attending a driving academy at the Laguna Seca Raceway, having arrived in the accident airplane earlier in the week. According to the pilot's wife, they had encountered strong headwinds during the outbound flight from Omaha, and had decided to take advantage of tailwinds for the return flight that night, rather than stay in a hotel. The pilot planned to return his father to Omaha, and then fly to his residence in Missouri the following day. Radar and voice communication data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that prior to departure, the pilot was given an IFR clearance to Omaha, and that during his interaction with clearance delivery personnel he read back the clearance correctly. A few minutes after departing Salinas the airplane was cleared to fly direct to the Panoche VORTAC (co-located very high frequency omnidirectional range (VOR) beacon and tactical air navigation system). The airplane followed a direct course of 60 degrees; reaching Panoche at a mode C reported altitude of 17,200 feet, about 14 minutes later. The airplane continued on that course, reaching the Clovis VOR at 1912, coincident to attaining the pilots stated cruise altitude of 27,000 feet. The pilot reported leveling for cruise, and flying direct to Omaha. The sector controller reported that the pilot should fly direct to the Coaldale VOR and then to Omaha, and the pilot responded, acknowledging the correction. For the next 5 minutes, the airplane continued at the same altitude and heading, with no further transmissions from the pilot. The airplane then began a descending turn to the right, with a final mode C reported radar target recorded 60 seconds later. During that period, it descended to 22,600 feet, with an accompanying increase in ground speed from about 190 to 375 knots. For the remaining 6 minutes, a 6.5-mile-long cluster of primary targets (no altitude information) was observed emanating from the airplane's last location, on a heading of about 150 degrees. Following the initial route deviation, the air traffic controller made five attempts to make contact with the pilot with no success. Throughout the climb and cruise portion of the flight, the airplane flew directly to the assigned waypoints with minimal course variation, in a manner consistent with the pilot utilizing the autopilot.

The pilot was dispatched on a nonscheduled cargo flight to an airport other than his usual destination because it had a precision instrument approach, while his usual destination airport did not. The pilot elected to fly to his usual airport, and attempted a non precision instrument approach. The airport had both a VOR and an NDB approach. The NDB approach was noted as being out of service, although there was still a radio signal coming from the navigation aid. The pilot was cleared for the VOR approach, although instrumentation inside the cockpit was found set for the NDB approach, and radar track data disclosed that the flight path was consistent with the NDB approach path, not the VOR's. The airport's reported weather was 1.25 miles visibility, with a 200-foot overcast in mist. The airport's minimum NDB approach altitude is 652 feet above touchdown height. The airplane did not reach the runway, and collided with a pole and a building. Inspection of the airplane disclosed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions.

After extending the gear for landing, the down-and-locked indication (green light) for the left main gear was not illuminated. The crew performed the emergency checklist procedures for abnormal gear extension with no success. The aircraft subsequently landed with the left main landing gear retracted. Inspection of the landing gear revealed that the pin (part number MY20248-001), which is part of the forward gear door lock, was corroded and cracked at the point of rotation, preventing proper movement of the gear door uplock.

The aircraft was on an ILS approach at dusk in IMC and icing conditions with the alternate air on. According to the pilot, he had just descended below an overcast, on final approach, when the engine lost power and would not respond to throttle application. A forced landing was made in a wooded area short of the runway and the aircraft was extensively damaged. During an exam of the engine, the turbocharger and wastegate transition pipes were found separated at the flange. Carbonaceous residue was found in the area of separation, but no heat damage was noted. The gasket, bolts, washers and self-locking nuts (for holding the pipes together) were not found. Later, the engine ran successfully during an operational check. During the investigation, 3 similar cases of pipe separation were identified, which involved another aircraft; these resulted in only partial losses of power. The right front seat passenger reported seeing a trace of ice on the wings as the aircraft was descending thru clouds. The pitot heat, stall warning heat, and ice light switch were fnd in the 'off' position. At 1650 cst, the temperature and dew point at the surface were 36° and 35° respectively. All three occupants were seriously injured.

The twin engine aircraft crashed and burned 4 miles north of the airport while on an instrument approach. The pilot had transmitted that he had an engine problem. The #5 cylinder was found detached from the left engine but the left propeller was not feathered. An engine teardown revealed evidence to indicate the #5 cylinder attachments were not properly torqued. No preimpact failure could be found with the right engine. The right propeller was found in feathered position. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The airplane departed on runway 31 with a low ceiling and visibility variable from 1/4 mile to 1/16 mile and winds from 290° at 38 knots, gusting to 47 knots. A witness stated that the airplane was airborne no more than two minutes after the engines were started. The airplane was heard and observed 1/4 of a mile northeast of the airport at low altitude. It climbed into the clouds and impacted the terrain in an almost flat attitude, 1/8 of a mile beyond and was demolished by impact and post-impact fire. All five occupants were killed.

Shortly after takeoff from Omaha-Eppley Airport, while climbing, the airplane suffered an engine fire. It stalled and crashed in a huge explosion on a dyke located near the runway end. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all seven occupants were killed. The airplane was en route to Mexico following maintenance at Omaha facilities.

While in cruising altitude, the pilot encountered problems with the left propeller and lost control of the airplane that dove into the ground and crashed in Roosevelt. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were killed.