Homer

The airline transport pilot and nine passengers were departing in a twin-engine airplane on a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 air taxi flight from a runway adjacent to an ocean bay. According to the air traffic control tower specialist on duty, the airplane became airborne about midway down the runway. As it approached the end of the runway, the pilot said he needed to return to the airport, but gave no reason. The specialist cleared the airplane to land on any runway. As the airplane began a right turn, it rolled sharply to the right and began a rapid, nose- and right-wing-low descent. The airplane crashed about 200 yards offshore and the fragmented wreckage sank in the 10-foot-deep water. Survivors were rescued by a private float plane. A passenger reported that the airplane's nose baggage door partially opened just after takeoff, and fully opened into a locked position when the pilot initiated a right turn towards the airport. The nose baggage door is mounted on the left side of the nose, just forward of the pilot's windscreen. When the door is opened, it swings upward, and is held open by a latching device. To lock the baggage door, the handle is placed in the closed position and the handle is then locked by rotating a key lock, engaging a locking cam. With the locking cam in the locked position, removal of the key prevents the locking cam from moving. The original equipment key lock is designed so the key can only be removed when the locking cam is engaged. Investigation revealed that the original key lock on the airplane's forward baggage door had been replaced with an unapproved thumb-latch device. A Safety Board materials engineer's examination revealed evidence that a plastic guard inside the baggage compartment, which is designed to protect the door's locking mechanism from baggage/cargo, appeared not to be installed at the time of the accident. The airplane manufacturer's only required inspection of the latching system was a visual inspection every 100 hours of service. Additionally, the mechanical components of the forward baggage door latch mechanism were considered "on condition" items, with no predetermined life-limit. On May 29, 2008, the Federal Aviation Administration issued a safety alert for operators (SAFO 08013), recommending a visual inspection of the baggage door latches and locks, additional training of flight and ground crews, and the removal of unapproved lock devices. In July 2008, Piper Aircraft issued a mandatory service bulletin (SB 1194, later 1194A), requiring the installation of a key lock device, mandatory recurring inspection intervals, life-limits on safety-critical parts of forward baggage door components, and the installation of a placard on the forward baggage door with instructions for closing and locking the door to preclude an in-flight opening. Post accident inspection discovered no mechanical discrepancies with the airplane other than the baggage door latch. The airplane manufacturer's pilot operating handbook did not contain emergency procedures for an in-flight opening of the nose baggage door, nor did the operator's pilot training program include instruction on the proper operation of the nose baggage door or procedures to follow in case of an in-flight opening of the door. Absent findings of any other mechanical issues, it is likely the door locking mechanism was not fully engaged and/or the baggage shifted during takeoff, and contacted the exposed internal latching mechanism, allowing the cargo door to open. With the airplane operating at a low airspeed and altitude, the open baggage door would have incurred additional aerodynamic drag and further reduced the airspeed. The pilot's immediate turn towards the airport, with the now fully open baggage door, likely resulted in a sudden increase in drag, with a substantive decrease in airspeed, and an aerodynamic stall.

The airline transport certificated pilot and the two pilot-rated passengers traveled to Alaska for a Title 14, CFR Part 91 personal flying vacation. The pilot received a VFR check-out in a rented airplane, and was the only person authorized by its owner to fly it. The pilot obtained a weather briefing for the day of the accident flight, and queried an FAA automated flight service station (AFSS) specialist about VFR conditions for a sightseeing flight. The FSS specialist stated, in part, "Well, it doesn't really look good probably anywhere today..." The area forecast included areas of marginal VFR and IFR conditions, and an AIRMET for mountain obscuration. The cloud and sky conditions included scattered clouds at 1,500 feet in light rain showers, with areas of isolated ceilings below 1,000 feet, and visibility below 3 statute miles in rain showers and mist. The weather briefing included a report from a pilot who was about 23 miles north of the accident scene about 2 hours before the accident airplane departed. The pilot reported fog and mist to the water, and said he was unable to maintain VFR. Five minutes after receiving the weather briefing, the accident pilot again called the AFSS and requested the telephone number to an automated weather observing system, located south of the point of departure, where VFR conditions were forecast. Local fishing charter captains reported fog in the area of the islands where the accident occurred. One vessel captain reported hearing an airplane in the vicinity of the islands, but could not see it because of the fog. The pilot did not file a flight plan, nor did he indicate any planned itinerary. The airplane was reported overdue two days after departure. The accident wreckage was located an additional two days later on the north cliff face of a remote island. The airplane had collided with the island at high speed, about 800 feet mean sea level, and a post crash fire had incinerated the cockpit and cabin area.

The commercial certificated pilot, with six passengers, was departing from a remote beach in a twin-engine airplane on an on-demand air taxi flight. The beach was oriented north/south, and was utilized by airplanes transporting guests to and from a remote wilderness lodge. Weather conditions at the beach were reported to air taxi operators via satellite phone. The pilot reported that as he was departing toward the north, the wind was from the west about 30 knots, with gusts to 50 knots. About 20 feet agl, a strong gust of wind, or a downdraft, hit the airplane. The airplane descended and the left wing collided with the beach, which spun the airplane 180 degrees. The airplane came to rest in about 2 1/2 feet of water.

The pilot departed from an intersection 2,100 feet from the approach end of the 6,700 feet long runway. Immediately after takeoff the right engine failed. The pilot told the NTSB investigator-in-charge that he feathered the right propeller, and began a wide right turn away from terrain in an attempt to return to the airport. He stated the airspeed did not reach 90 knots, the airspeed and altitude slowly decayed, and the airplane was ditched into smooth water. After recovery, the cowl flaps were found in the 50% open position. No anomalies were found with the fuel system. The airplane departed with full fuel tanks, at a takeoff weight estimated at 6,606 pounds. The right engine was disassembled and no mechanical anomalies were noted. The best single engine rate of climb airspeed is 106 knots, based on cowl flaps closed, and a five degree bank into the operating engine.

The certificated commercial pilot was departing on a 14 CFR 135 cargo flight. The airplane lifted off and climbed to about 200 feet. Instead of turning right toward the intended destination, the airplane began a left turn toward the runway. The angle of bank increased to about 45 degrees. The airplane then nosed down, and descended into snow covered terrain, about 200 yards north of the runway. Examination of the engine revealed the number six cylinder head was fractured, and slightly separated from the cylinder barrel. The area around the point of separation was blackened and oily. Similar discoloration was noted on the inside of the engine cowl. A metallurgical examination of the cylinder head revealed a fatigue fracture along a large segment of the thread root radius between the 5th and 6th threads. The engine's cylinder compression is part of the operator's approved airworthiness inspection program. The number six cylinder compression, recorded 121 hours before the accident, was noted as 60 PSI. The last engine inspection, 27 hours before the accident, did not include a record of the engine compression.