Dyess AFB

Shortly after liftoff from runway 16 at Dyess AFB, while climbing to a height of about 60-100 feet, the aircraft banked right, causing the right wing to struck the ground. Out of control, the aircraft crashed in a huge explosion and was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. All 19 occupants were killed, among them army officer and family members including spouses and children.

The four engine aircraft was completing a training mission from Dyess AFB (Abilene) to the Gray AAF near Killeen, carrying eight crew members. En route, while flying at low height and dropping sand bags, the airplane went out of control and crashed near Fort Hood. All eight crew members were killed.

The crew was engaged in a night training flight out from Dyess AFB, Abilene. In flight, control was lost and the airplane crashed in unknown circumstances in an uninhabited area located in the region of Aspermont. A crew member was rescued while five others were killed.

En route from Dyess AFB to Fort Sam AFB in Houston, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls and turbulences. Control was lost and the airplane crashed in Boerne, killing all four occupants.

The aircraft crashed on runway 16 at Dyess AFB, Abilene, Texas. The crash occurred while the pilots were attempting to land the aircraft with the elevator controls inoperative. The captain and copilot, the only persons aboard, were killed. The aircraft was demolished. Examination of the longitudinal control system of the aircraft disclosed that the aft end of the aft link assembly was disconnected from the clevis in the elevator control horn assembly. This condition would render the elevator control inoperative. From irrefutable physical evidence the Board concludes that the bolt which normally secures the link assembly-clevis attachment was not in place at impact. It concludes that the bolt worked out following departure from Dyess AFB, resulting in the loss of control which caused the accident. The Board further concludes that the bolt worked out because it was improperly secured, a condition which should have been detected during a No. 2 maintenance inspection completed just prior to the origination of Trip 7002. The inspection was performed by Associated Airmotive., Inc., a certificated repair station which performed under contract the maintenance work for AAXICO.