Dassault Falcon 20

Aircraft lost power on both engines while on approach to Moscow-Vnukovo airport. The crew decided to divert to Sheremetievo Airport when the undercarriage collapsed on landing. The aircraft veered off runway and slid in a grassy area before coming to rest. Nobody was injured but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Following an uneventful positioning flight from Porlamar, the aircraft landed at Oranjestad-Reina Beatrix Airport with its undercarriage retracted. The aircraft slid on ity belly for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The captain reported that he obtained weather briefings prior to and during the flight. The briefings did not include any NOTAMS indicating a contaminated runway at their destination airport. The captain obtained a report from the local fixed base operator that a Learjet had landed earlier and reported the runway as being okay. The tower was closed on their arrival, so they made a low pass over the airport to inspect the runways. Based on the runway and wind conditions, they decided their best choice for landing was on runway 08L. The captain said the landing was normal and the airplane initially decelerated with normal braking. As they encountered snow and ice patches, the captain said he elected to deploy the thrust reversers. The captain said that as the thrust reversers deployed, the airplane began to yaw to the left and differential braking failed to realign the airplane with the runway. The captain said the airplane departed the left side of the runway and rotated counter clockwise before coming to rest on a southwesterly heading. A witness on the airport said, "I watched them touch down. I heard the [thrust] reversers go on and then off, and then on again. As they came back on for the second time, that's when the plane started making full circles on the runway. This happened two, maybe three times before going off the side of the runway." The airplane's right main landing gear collapsed on departing the runway, causing substantial damage to the right wing, right main landing gear and aft pressure bulkhead. At the accident site, the right engine thrust reverser was partially deployed. The left engine thrust reverser was fully deployed with the blocker doors extended. An examination of the airplane revealed a stuck solenoid on the right engine thrust reverser. No other system anomalies were found. Approximately 33 minutes prior to the accident, the pilot requested from Denver Air Route Traffic Control Center, the weather for the airport. Denver Center reported the conditions as "winds calm, visibility 6 miles with light mist, 3,000 overcast, temperature zero degrees Centigrade (C) dew point -1 degree C, altimeter three zero 30.20, and there was at least a half inch of slush on all surfaces." The pilot acknowledged the information. The NOTAM log for the airport showed that at 2115, the airport issued a NOTAM stating there was "1/2 inch wet snow all surfaces." The airport operations manager reported that at the time of the accident the runway surface was covered with 3/4 inch of wet snow. The airport conducts a 24 hour, 7 days a week operation; however, operations support digresses to fire coverage only after 2300.

The twin engine turbofan powered airplane was ditched into a river after a complete loss of power from both engines. The airplane was on a second approach to land on runway 30R after having been instructed by air traffic control (ATC) to climb during the final approach segment of the first approach due to inadequate separation from another airplane. Subsequent to the first approach, the airplane was issued vectors for the second approach by ATC. Communications transcripts show that the flight crew asked ATC how far they would be vectored during the second approach, but the flight crew did not inform ATC of their low fuel state until the airplane was already on a "base turn...to join final." The airplane subsequently lost power from both engines. During interviews, both pilots stated that there were no problems with the airplane. The second-in-command (SIC) stated that the airplane "ran out of fuel" and that the fuel quantity indicators read 0 and 100 pounds when each respective engine stopped producing power. The SIC also stated that after being instructed to climb to 5,000 feet after their first approach, he questioned the pilot-in-command about landing at another airport located about 14 nautical miles west-southwest of the destination airport. The SIC said that the PIC elected to continue with the second approach to the original destination. Research indicated that the flight crew did not obtain a weather briefing prior to the accident flight. Additionally, the Terminal Aerodrome Forecast that was valid at the time the aircraft's flight plan was filed showed a forecast ceiling consisting of overcast clouds at 1,500 feet above ground level at the aircraft's arrival time at the destination. 14 CFR Part 91.169 requires that an alternate airport be listed in the flight plan when forecast ceilings are less than 2,000 feet. No alternate was listed in the flight plan for the accident flight. Additionally, 14 CFR Part 91.167 requires that aircraft operated in instrument meteorological conditions maintain fuel reserves that allow flight to the intended destination and then continued flight to the listed alternate, and an additional 45 minutes at normal cruise speed. In 1993, the FAA/industry advisory committee developed advisory material for fuel planning and management for 14 CFR Part 121 and 135 air carrier flight operations, but the material was never published.

The flight crew of the Fan Jet Falcon (DA-20) were practicing ILS approaches in instrument meteorological conditions with low clouds and rime ice. A first officer (FO) in training occupied the right seat, while the pilot-in-command (PIC), who was also the company chief pilot/check airman/designated flight instructor, occupied the left seat and was handling the radios. On the second approach, the airplane struck trees and burned, 1.57 nm from approach end of the runway. The landing gear was found extended, and the trailing edge and droop leading edge flaps were retracted. The wing and engine cowl anti-ice valves were found closed, consistent with it being off in the cockpit. Radar data revealed that on approach, the airspeed decreased from 188 knots to 141 knots at the outer marker, and continued to decrease down to 106 knots, when the airplane entered an abrupt descent and disappeared from radar. Simulator flights matched the radar profile with a flight idle approach, a power reduction inside the outer marker, and 1/4 inch of ice on the wings. In the simulator, the airplane stalled about 2 miles from the end of the runway with an airspeed of 103 kts. At flight idle, the engine power in the last 2 minutes of approach was below the recommended power setting for wing or engine anti-ice to be effective. Vref and stall speeds were computed to be 129 kts and 96 kts, with wing flaps and droop leading edges retracted. The PIC had about 1,100 hours in the make and model. The PIC did not have any documented previous flight instruction experience in make and model or any other multi-engine airplanes. The PIC had given 4 pilot proficiency checks in the DA-20 since receiving his check airman designation. The company Director of Operations reported that the accident FO was the first student the PIC had taken through the initial second-in-command course. The PIC and FO had received all of their turbojet experience with the operator.