Country
Crash of an Antonov AN-124-100 in Irkutsk: 68 killed
Date & Time:
Dec 6, 1997 at 1442 LT
Operator:
Registration:
08 black
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Irkutsk – Vladivostok – Cam Ranh Bay
MSN:
4516003
YOM:
1992
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
15
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
68
Aircraft flight hours:
1034
Aircraft flight cycles:
576
Circumstances:
The four engine aircraft departed Irkutsk-2 Airport on a cargo flight to Cam Ranh Bay, with an intermediate stop in Vladivostok, carrying 15 passengers, eight crew members and a load consisting of two Sukhoi SU-27UB fighters to be delivered to the Vietnam Air Force. Three seconds after takeoff from runway 14 at Irkutsk-2 Airport, at a height of 5 metres, the engine n°3 failed. Six seconds later, at a height of 22 metres, both left engines n°1 and 2 also failed. The aircraft pitched up and entered a high angle of attack, climbed to a maximum height of about 66 metres then rolled to the left and crashed onto several buildings located 1,600 metres from the runway end. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire as well as several buildings. All 23 occupants and 45 people on the ground were killed. Hundred other people on the ground were injured, some seriously.
Probable cause:
The exact cause of the engine failure could not be determined with certainty. It is known that engines of this series had problems with gas-dynamic stability, especially at high angle of attack.
Crash of an Antonov AN-124-100 in Torino: 4 killed
Date & Time:
Oct 8, 1996 at 1050 LT
Operator:
Registration:
RA-82069
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Moscow - Torino - Abu Dhabi - Bandar Seri Begawan
MSN:
977305591
YOM:
1993
Flight number:
SU9981
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
19
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total hours on type:
431.00
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Moscow-Chkalovsky Airport bound for Torino, carrying 19 passengers and four crew members. The aircraft should be loaded with Ferrari cars to be delivered in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, following a fuel stop at Abu Dhabi Airport. While descending to Torino-Caselle Airport, the crew was informed about the weather conditions at destination: wind variable at 3 knots, visibility 2,000 metres, RVR runway 36 more than 1,500 metres, light rain, scattered at 1,500 feet, scattered at 3,500 feet, broken at 7,000 feet, OAT and dew point 13°C, QNH 1012. On final approach to runway 36, the crew was unable to establish a visual contact with the runway and the captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure. Unfortunately, this decision was taken too late. While climbing, the aircraft struck trees and crashed onto houses located in the village of San Francesco al Campo, about one km from the runway end. The aircraft, a house and a barn were destroyed. Both pilots, two people on the ground and 20 cows in the barn were killed.
Probable cause:
The following findings were reported:
- Weather conditions were marginal,
- At the time of the accident, the runway length was 2,350 metres instead of 3,300 metres due to work in progress,
- The ILS CAT III system was inoperative during work in progress,
- The pilots were warned that the crew of an aircraft that landed on the same runway 36 about 11 minutes earlier established a visual contact with the runway at an altitude of 200 feet only,
- The crew continued the approach below MDA without establishing visual contact with the runway,
- Poor crew coordination,
- Poor approach planning,
- The crew failed to follow the approach checklist,
- The crew did not divide up the tasks in a correct manner,
- The crew did not prepare for a possible go-around procedure,
- The decision of the captain to initiate a go-around procedure was taken too late,
- The crew encountered engine trouble after the power levers were suddenly moved,
- The relative low experience of the captain on this type of aircraft.
- Weather conditions were marginal,
- At the time of the accident, the runway length was 2,350 metres instead of 3,300 metres due to work in progress,
- The ILS CAT III system was inoperative during work in progress,
- The pilots were warned that the crew of an aircraft that landed on the same runway 36 about 11 minutes earlier established a visual contact with the runway at an altitude of 200 feet only,
- The crew continued the approach below MDA without establishing visual contact with the runway,
- Poor crew coordination,
- Poor approach planning,
- The crew failed to follow the approach checklist,
- The crew did not divide up the tasks in a correct manner,
- The crew did not prepare for a possible go-around procedure,
- The decision of the captain to initiate a go-around procedure was taken too late,
- The crew encountered engine trouble after the power levers were suddenly moved,
- The relative low experience of the captain on this type of aircraft.
Crash of an Antonov AN-124-100 near Kerman: 17 killed
Date & Time:
Nov 15, 1993 at 1907 LT
Operator:
Registration:
RA-82071
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Dubai - Kerman - Tashkent
MSN:
435913
YOM:
1993
Flight number:
ATL051
Crew on board:
14
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
17
Aircraft flight hours:
116
Circumstances:
Completing its first commercial flight, the aircraft was returning to Tashkent on a ferry flight from Dubai with three passengers and 14 crew members on board. A fuel stop at Kerman was scheduled. On approach to Kerman, while in the holding pattern, the crew transmitted to ATC conflicting information about their position. In the meantime, he failed to follow the flight track in the holding pattern, causing a deviation from the prescribed route of 47 km to the north. After being cleared to descend to runway 34 from 8,200 metres to 5,200 metres in limited visibility, the crew followed an opposite route. After passing over the airfield, the crew started the descent from 3,300 metres, but failed to complete a standard turn and departed the approach path, flying towards the mountains up to 4,100 metres, with a deviation to the south of the airport by 43.5 km. Four minutes later, while completing a left turn to join the approach path at an unsafe altitude, the radio altimeter sounded in the cockpit. At a speed of about 385 km/h, the aircraft collided with Mt Jupar (3,400 metres high) located about 37 km southeast of the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 17 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The Commission found that during the descent from the flight level for the approach, the crew incorrectly made the decision to approach according to the ALMEK-1A scheme (erroneously proposed by the controller of the Kerman aerodrome with violation of the meteorological minimum); making a mistake in determining his position during the approach (report 'following on the VOR Kerman', while the aircraft was actually moving away from the VOR); could not withstand the speed and flight time established for this scheme. Presumably, the crew did not use the airborne radar in the 'mountain' mode, made a mistake in determining their location due to the 180° pointer indication of the current value of the VOR beacon bearing on the PNP, as well as the large (more than a year) interruption in flights on the MVL on the plane An-124-100. ATC based at Kerman Airport did not respond to conflicting messages from the crew, transmitted at an interval of 9 seconds ('our distance is 20 miles' and 'standing in the area above Kerman') and offered the crew an approach pattern with a violation of the minimum.
Crash of an Antonov AN-124-100 in Kodra: 8 killed
Date & Time:
Oct 13, 1992
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-82002
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kiev - Kiev
MSN:
19530501003
YOM:
1984
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Kiev-Gostomel Airport on a test flight part of a certification programme, carrying nine crew members. While cruising at an altitude of 19,000 feet and at a speed of 614 km/h, the radome disintegrated. This caused the front cargo door to open and to detach. Debris struck the engine n°3 that stopped automatically. The aircraft suffered strong vibrations and oscillations then the 3rd hydraulic system failed as well as the flight management system. In such conditions, the crew was unable to get valid data about speed, altitude or the angle of attack. The aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent during which flaps were selected down to reduce the speed, but due to an asymmetrical release of flaps, the descent rate increased until the aircraft crashed in a wooded area located 1,5 km south of Korda and 43 km west of Gostomel Airport. The aircraft was destroyed and eight occupants were killed. The engineer survived after he bailed out during the descent but was seriously injured.
Probable cause:
Loss of control following the in-flight disintegration of the radome and the subsequent failure and detachment of the front cargo door. The exact cause of the radome disintegration could not be determined but the assumption of a bird strike could not be ruled out.
