Ohio

The flight crew of the Fan Jet Falcon (DA-20) were practicing ILS approaches in instrument meteorological conditions with low clouds and rime ice. A first officer (FO) in training occupied the right seat, while the pilot-in-command (PIC), who was also the company chief pilot/check airman/designated flight instructor, occupied the left seat and was handling the radios. On the second approach, the airplane struck trees and burned, 1.57 nm from approach end of the runway. The landing gear was found extended, and the trailing edge and droop leading edge flaps were retracted. The wing and engine cowl anti-ice valves were found closed, consistent with it being off in the cockpit. Radar data revealed that on approach, the airspeed decreased from 188 knots to 141 knots at the outer marker, and continued to decrease down to 106 knots, when the airplane entered an abrupt descent and disappeared from radar. Simulator flights matched the radar profile with a flight idle approach, a power reduction inside the outer marker, and 1/4 inch of ice on the wings. In the simulator, the airplane stalled about 2 miles from the end of the runway with an airspeed of 103 kts. At flight idle, the engine power in the last 2 minutes of approach was below the recommended power setting for wing or engine anti-ice to be effective. Vref and stall speeds were computed to be 129 kts and 96 kts, with wing flaps and droop leading edges retracted. The PIC had about 1,100 hours in the make and model. The PIC did not have any documented previous flight instruction experience in make and model or any other multi-engine airplanes. The PIC had given 4 pilot proficiency checks in the DA-20 since receiving his check airman designation. The company Director of Operations reported that the accident FO was the first student the PIC had taken through the initial second-in-command course. The PIC and FO had received all of their turbojet experience with the operator.

Shortly after takeoff, about 300 feet agl, the engine lost all power. The pilot activated the electric fuel pump, and moved the fuel selector several times. However, the engine did not regain power, and the pilot performed a forced landing into trees. After the accident, the pilot stated to a police officer that he might have departed with the fuel selector positioned to an empty tank. The pilot subsequently stated that both fuel gauges indicated "1/4" full, and he could not remember which tank was selected during the takeoff. Additionally, a passenger stated that he did not smell or observe fuel when he exited the airplane. The passenger added that in the past, the pilot had exhausted one fuel tank, then switched to the other tank and the engine re-started. Examination of the wreckage by an FAA inspector revealed that fuel selector was positioned to the right tank. The right fuel tank contained some fuel, and left fuel tank had ruptured. Following the accident, a successful engine test-run was performed.

The aircraft was under maintenance test at Columbus-John Glenn Airport (Port Columbus) and under the control of three technicians. While performing an engine run, the aircraft collided with a hangar and was damaged beyond repair. All three technicians escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

As the airplane was descending to the airport, the pilot-in-command (PIC) calculated that the required distance to land on a dry runway would be 2,720 feet. The second-in-command (SIC) stated to the PIC, "all right if I touch down and there's no brakes I'm going around." The ILS Runway 23 approach was in use, and the braking action was reported "poor" by a Hawker Jet, which had landed prior to the accident flight. All runway surfaces were covered with a thin layer of snow. The airplane touched down with about 2,233 feet of runway remaining, of the 5,101-foot long runway. The airplane departed the end of the runway, and proceeded into an overrun grassy area, where the nose landing gear assembly collapsed. The tower controller advised the flightcrew prior to landing that the wind conditions were from 330 degrees at 18 knots. According to the airplane's Pilot's Operating Manual, the estimated landing distance on a dry runway, for the conditions at the time of the accident, was about 2,750 feet. No charts were available in the FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual, to compute a landing distance incorporating a contaminated runway. Review of 14 CFR Part 25.1, which prescribed airworthiness standards for the issue of type certificates, and changes to those certificates, for transport category airplanes, revealed, "For landplanes and amphibians, the landing distance on land must be determined on a level, smooth, dry, hard-surfaced runway." There were no requirements for the applicant to determine landing distances on a wet or contaminated runway. The latest weather recorded at the airport, included winds from 330 degrees at 12 knots, gusts to 22 knots; visibility 3/4 statute mile, light snow; and overcast clouds at 300 feet.

The airline transport rated pilot was attempting to land under visual flight rules for a scheduled passenger pick-up and subsequent charter flight. The pilot was communicating with a pilot at the airport, who was utilizing a hand held radio. The accident pilot reported he was not able to see the runway lights due to ground fog and continued to circle the airport for about 20 minutes. The pilot on the ground stated the airplane appeared to be about 1,500 feet above the ground when it circled, and then entered a downwind for runway 26. He was not able to hear or see the airplane as it flew away from the airport. He then began to hear the airplane during its final approach. The airplane's engines sounded normal. He then heard a "terrible sound of impact," followed by silence. When he arrived at the accident site, the airplane was fully engulfed in flames. The airplane impacted trees about 80-feet tall, located about 2,000 feet from, and on a 240 degree course to the approach end of runway 26. Several freshly broken tree limbs and trunks, up to 15-inches in diameter, were observed strewn along a debris path, which measured 370 feet. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any pre-impact malfunctions. The weather reported at an airport about 19 miles south-southeast of the accident site, included a visibility of 1 3/4 miles, in mist, with clear skies and a temperature and dew point of 17 degrees Celsius. Witnesses in the area of the accident site generally described conditions of "thick fog" and a resident who lived across from the accident site stated visibility was "near zero" and he could barely see across the road.

The airplane was observed to depart normally for a positioning flight conducted during night visual meteorological conditions. In addition, the landing gear was observed to retract after takeoff. A witness who lived near the accident site heard a "loud" engine noise and observed the airplane just above the trees. The airplane then pitched down, impacted the ground, and exploded. The airplane impacted in a soybean field about a 1/2 mile from the departure end of the runway. Two pairs of ground scars were observed at the beginning of the debris path. The initial pair of ground scars were about 2 to 3 feet in length and were located about 380 feet south of the main wreckage. A pair of 10 to 12 foot long ground scars were located about 10 feet forward of the initial ground scars and they contained portions of the left and right engines; respectively. There was no impact damage observed to the portion of the soy bean field located in-between the second ground scar and the main wreckage. Prior to the flight, maintenance personnel replaced a frayed elevator trim cable. The work was supervised and checked by the accident pilot. Examination of the airplane did not reveal any evidence of a preimpact failure; however, a significant portion of the airplane was consumed in a post crash fire. Examination of the propellers revealed damage consistent with engine operation at the time of impact. The pilot reported 22,500 hours of total flight experience, with over 17,00 flight hours in make and model.

The pilot departed on a night multiple-leg flight series with full tanks. On approach for the second landing, the green landing gear lights extinguished. The pilot discovered that if the landing gear was extended the circuit breaker would stay in and if the landing gear was retracted the circuit breaker would pop. The circuit breaker controlled the landing gear lights, the engine oil pressure, and both fuel quantity gauges. The pilot continued on four additional flights in that condition. The fourth flight terminated 5 miles from the runway with a double power loss. Examination revealed the fuel tanks were empty. The pilot had flown the airplane 4.3 hours including 6 takeoffs, one missed approach, and a 20 minute ground run prior to departure with both engines running on the final flight.

Witnesses observed the airplane overfly their homes at low altitude in a tight circular pattern. A witness about 1/2 mile from the airport '. . . watched the plane try to make a turn to the left trying to go back west to the Highland County Airport. The plane made a sharp turn, seemed to be having difficulty stabilizing the airplane . . . .' Also, a witness reported that she heard a loud noise, and then she observed an airplane just barely above the trees. The landing gear was down, and the airplane 'kept dipping up and down.' Another witness reported the airplane was 'wobbling left to right,' and then it descended into trees, struck vehicles, came to rest against a tree, and was destroyed by a post crash fire. A person, who flew with the pilot as a safety pilot on several occasions, reported that the pilot had a habit of making steep close-in turns, from downwind to base, to final; and he noticed 'lack in airspeed management during approach.' Examination of the wreckage did not disclose any preimpact failure of the airplane or engine.

After 2 previous attempts, the pilot was cleared for a third VOR Runway 14 Approach. He was issued landing information, and he reported the airport in sight. The minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the approach was 1,620 ft msl. The airport elevation was 1297 ft. The airplane was observed by an ATC controller to descend, and the controller's Brite scope (radar) displayed 1,400 ft. The controller observed the airplane's landing light bob up and down, followed by the nose pitching up. At about the same time, a ground witness in the area saw the airplane at low altitude; according to this witness, the pilot tried to 'pull the plane up' just before it collided with the static cable of a power line. The cable was about 85 feet above ground level (1,382 feet MSL) and approximately 2 miles from the approach end of the runway. No preimpact malfunction of the airplane, engine, or VOR was found.

The pilot said that after climbing about 500 feet after takeoff, at 120 knots with the gear retracted, the left engine lost power. He feathered the propeller, lowered the nose to the horizon, and began a shallow left turn back to the airport. He left the flaps at 20° and noted a descent of 200 feet to 300 feet per minute in the turn. After clearing trees, the pilot extended the landing gear, banked the aircraft to the right to align it with the runway and lowered flaps to 40°. After touchdown, he applied single engine reversing. The aircraft went off right side of runway and into a ditch, collapsing the right main and nose gear. Examination of the engine revealed the torque sensor housing had failed, resulting in loss of drive to the fuel pump. Metallurgical exam of the housing arm of the torque sensor revealed it had failed from fatigue. On 9/14/79, a service bulletin (SB) was issued for replacement of the torque sensor housing with an improved housing. The manufacturer overhauled the engine on 12/1979, but SB was not complied with. SB indicated a history of resonant vibration causing cracks in the housing arm of original torque sensor and gear assemblies, and that the housing should be replaced, no later than during next part exposure. Investigation revealed pilot did not comply with engine failure procedures and airspeeds. Flight manual cautioned not to use 40° of flaps during single engine landings.