Phoenix Air Group

The accident airplane took off as the lead airplane in formation with a second Lear Jet airplane flying as wingman in a close formation position. The purpose of the flight was to participate in an exercise with the United States Navy in an over-water training area. Shortly after entering the training area at 15,000 ft mean sea level (msl) the wingman positioned on the right side of the accident airplane, observed the flaps on the accident airplane were partially extended. They notified the pilot of the accident airplane who acknowledged the radio call. The wingman then observed the flaps retract and observed white or gray colored “smoke or gas” coming from the left aft side of the airplane. The pilot in the accident airplane then radioed that they detected an odor in the cabin. Seconds later, the wingman observed red fluid on the underside of the tail cone followed by flames coming from around the aft equipment bay (tail cone) access door. They informed the accident pilots that their airplane was on fire and the accident pilot declared an emergency along with their intentions to land at a nearby airfield on the island. The wingman took over leading the formation and maneuvered in front of the accident airplane. The wingman last observed and heard radio transmissions from the accident airplane a short time later as they descended through about 7000 ft msl. The flight was above an overcast cloud layer that obstructed the view of the island at that time. Recorded ADS-B data showed that the accident airplane subsequently made a series of descending turns before the data ended. The airplane wreckage was located underwater about 4 miles northwest of the last ADS-B data point. The wreckage was highly fragmented, and the debris field extended several hundred feet along the ocean floor. Salvage operations were able to recover about 40 percent of the airplane wreckage. Examination of the wreckage showed areas of smoke and fire damage in portions of the airplane from the center wing fuselage outboard through the left- and right-wing roots and aft throughout the empennage. The aft equipment bay forward bulkhead, which also served as the fuselage fuel tank aft bulkhead, exhibited damage on the upper left side consistent with exposure to a focused heat source such as a fire from a leak in a pressurized fuel or hydraulic line. Additional evidence of focused fire damage was identified in the left engine pylon, which was located outboard and adjacent to the aft equipment bay. The effected area of the pylon contained engine fire detection circuits. Examination of the hydraulic shutoff valves attached to the hydraulic reservoir found that the left hydraulic shutoff valve was closed and the right valve was in the open position. The position of the left hydraulic shutoff valve indicates the aircrew likely shut down the left engine due to a fire indication (A hydraulic valve will close if the FIRE PULL tee-handle switch is activated by the flight crew in the event an engine fire is detected). Investigators were unable to determine if the witnessed flap extension and retraction was initiated by activation of the flap selector switch or induced by fire damage. The aft equipment bay houses electrical equipment capable of providing an ignition source for a fire, and hydraulic and fuel system components capable of providing fuel for a fire in the event of a leak. The left fuel motive flow line was intact from the fuel pump up to the fuselage fitting, where the line passes through the fuselage skin into the aft equipment bay near the aft left engine mount. The fuselage fitting had the stainless-steel fuel line and b-nut attached on the outboard, engine side. The inboard, aft equipment bay side of the fitting did not have an aluminum b-nut attached or the line that connects the fitting to the motive flow valve. The left engine hydraulic pressure line and PT2 line, which pass through the fuselage into the aft equipment bay adjacent to the motive fuel line, each had aluminum b-nuts present on the interior side of their respective fuselage fittings and the interior lines for each was sheared at the fitting. The left fuel motive flow fuselage fitting and the hydraulic fluid return fitting were examined. No thermal damage was observed on the outboard nuts and attached portions of tubing. Examination of the threads on the inboard side of the motive flow fitting did not exhibit evidence of thread stripping and comparison between the two fittings did not reveal any physical differences to explain why one nut remained attached and the other did not. The reason the motive flow nut was missing from the fitting could not be determined. Observed fire and heat damage patterns indicate the fire likely started in proximity to the where the pressurized fuel motive flow line connected to the firewall fitting where the missing b-nut was located. A leak from the pressurized motive flow line would have sustained and allowed an uncontrollable fire to develop. The sustained fire likely affected controllability of the airplane and resulted in the pilots’ loss of control of the airplane.

The pilot (PIC) reported that during acceleration for takeoff (approximately V1 [takeoff decision speed]) the airplane collided with an elk. The PIC reported that after the collision, he applied wheel brakes and deployed the airplane's drag chute, however, the airplane continued off the departure end of the runway. The airplane came to rest in a marshy bog approximately 50 feet beyond the departure threshold. Currently, approximately 15,000 feet of the airport's perimeter is bordered with animal control fence. The airport recently received a FAA Aviation Improvement Program (AIP) Grant that will provide funding for an additional 9,000-feet of fence. Airport officials stated that the fencing project should be completed by summer of 2003. At the completion of the project, game control fencing will encompass the entire airport perimeter. The U.S. Government Airport/Facilities Directory (A/FD) contains the following remarks for the Astoria Regional Airport: "Herds of elk on and in the vicinity of airport..."

At about 1146 pst, Learjet 35A, N521PA, operating as a public use aircraft, crashed in Fresno, CA. Operating with call sign Dart 21, the flightcrew had declared an emergency inbound to Fresno Air Terminal due to engine fire indications. They flew the airplane toward a right base for their requested runway, but the airplane continued past the airport. The flightcrew was heard on tower frequency attempting to diagnose the emergency conditions and control the airplane until it crashed, with landing gear down, on an avenue in fresno. Both pilots were fatally injured. Twenty-one persons on the ground were injured, and 12 apartment units in 2 buildings were destroyed or substantially damaged by impact or fire. Investigation revealed that special mission wiring was not installed properly, leading to a lack of overload current protection. The in-flight fire most likely originated with a short of the special mission power supply wires in an area unprotected by current limiters. The fire resulted in false engine fire warning indications to the pilots that led them to a shutdown of the left engine. An intense fire burned through the aft engine support beam, damaging the airplane structure and systems in the aft fuselage and may have precluded a successful emergency landing.

The pilot stated that on initial climb, at about 400 feet agl, the crew smelled something burning, followed by light smoke in the cabin. Both engines appeared normal visually. The odor and smoke increased, and the left fire warning light illuminated. The left engine was shut down and the prop feathered. The pilot increased power on the right engine; however, the airplane would not climb or maintain airspeed. A gear and flaps up forced landing was made into a field. The pilot stated that he believed an exhaust clamp broke allowing a segment of exhaust to scorch cowling and activate the fire warning system. Examination of the left engine revealed that the lower fire detection elements were fused and broken free, and that the hydraulic lines were burned through.

The crew arrived at the airport about 20 minutes before the planned midnight takeoff time, after the pilot-in-command had spent the day moving furniture. A night watchman noted that the preflight inspection and takeoff roll to rotation/lift-off was normal. There was no post-takeoff radio call to either unicom or ATC, although the crew had filed an IFR flight plan. After taking off from runway 36, the aircraft crashed about 1.8 mile north of the runway. The wreckage was found after interruption of electrical power to a nearby city. Initial impact was with trees, while in a shallow/left/descending turn. An area of trees about 1/2 mile long was damaged by impact and fire. Before coming to rest, the aircraft hit a powerline support tower. There was evidence the aircraft was traveling at about 260 knots, when it crashed. No preimpact part failure or malfunction was found that would have resulted in the accident. Both pilots were killed.

The crew was executing the ILS approach and had turned back inbound on the procedure turn to the outer marker when the copilot stated they were 5.9 DME in a calm voice with no indication of a problem. Impact with the ground occurred at about 5.9 DME, approximately 10 statute miles from the airport, while the aircraft was in a slight nose up, slight right wing down attitude, with a high vertical rate of descent, and a high forward speed. The aircraft was demolished. No evidence of a pre-impact failure or malfunction of the aircraft or its systems could be found. The copilot was not rated in the aircraft and had logged a total of 7.9 hours of jet time in his personal logbook.

The flight had not yet been scheduled when the pilot retired for the evening at 2230 to 2300 est. At 0230, he was awoken and notified to make a night cargo flight. The owner obtained a weather briefing and filed a flight plan, then briefed the pilot later. The pilot arrived at the airport at 0430. He preflighted the aircraft while the owner updated the weather briefing. The aircraft was cleared as filed with a clearance void time of 0500; the clearance was radioed to the pilot by unicom. During takeoff, at 0510, the aircraft was observed climbing northbound to aprx 800 feet agl in moderate snowfall with the landing light on. A short time later, the aircraft crashed approximately one mile northeast of the airport while in a steep nose down, right wing low attitude. No pre- impact part failure/malfunction was found. Reportedly, when the pilot 1st hired on, he exaggerated his flight experience; he had problems with instrument flying and was not scheduled for flights in marginal weather; and he was given extra help. At the time of the accident, snow was falling, mixed icing was forecast in clouds and there was a sigmet for moderate to severe turbulences below 8,000 feet. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.