Crash of an Airbus A330-322 in Mactan

Date & Time: Oct 23, 2022 at 2308 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HL7525
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Seoul - Mactan
MSN:
219
YOM:
1998
Flight number:
KE631
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
11
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
165
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Seoul-Incheon Airport at 1920LT on a schedule service to Mactan, Philippines, carrying 165 passagers and a crew of 11. On approach to Mactan Airport Runway 22 at night, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity. Due to the presence of CB's at 1,800 feet, the captain decided to abort the approach and initiated a go around procedure. Fourteen minutes later, at 2226LT, on short final and after crossing the runway threshold, the airplane encountered windshear and apparently touched down hard. The crew aborted the landing procedure for a second time and initiated a second go around manoeuvre. The crew followed a holding pattern for about 30 minutes then was cleared for a third approach. After touchdown on a wet runway 22 (3,310 metres long), the airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance and overran at a speed of 80 knots. While contacting soft ground, the nose gear was torn off then the airplane collided with various equipment of the localizer antenna and came to rest 360 metres past the runway end. All 176 occupants evacuated safely.

Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-11F in Seoul

Date & Time: Jun 6, 2016 at 2243 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N277UP
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Seoul - Anchorage
MSN:
48578/588
YOM:
1995
Flight number:
UPS061
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7769
Captain / Total hours on type:
6152.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4236
Copilot / Total hours on type:
3491
Aircraft flight hours:
63195
Aircraft flight cycles:
11344
Circumstances:
The crew started the takeoff procedure from runway 33L at Seoul-Incheon Airport and reached V1 speed after a course of 6,413 feet. At a speed of 182 knots, the crew heard a noise corresponding to the failure of both tires n°9 and 10 located on the central landing gear. The captain decided to abandon the takeoff procedure and initiated an emergency braking maneuver. Unable to stop within the remaining distance of 4,635 feet (in relation with the total weight of 629,600 lbs), the airplane overran. While contacting a grassy area, the nose gear collapsed then the airplane struck various equipment of the localizer antenna and came to rest 485 meters past the runway end. All four crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The decision of the crew to abandon the takeoff procedure at a speed slightly above V1 due to the failure of both tyres n°9 & 10 located on the central landing gear. The aircraft then overran due to the combination of the following factors:
- Limited time and information available to the crew to evaluate the situation,
- Dynamic instability of the central landing gear caused by both tyres' failure,
- Decrease of 48% of the braking performances due to the rupture of a hydraulic pipe located on the primary braking system.
Final Report:

Crash of an Airbus A320-232 in Hiroshima

Date & Time: Apr 14, 2015 at 2005 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HL7762
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Seoul – Hiroshima
MSN:
3244
YOM:
2007
Flight number:
OZ162
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
74
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8242
Captain / Total hours on type:
1318.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1588
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1298
Aircraft flight hours:
23595
Circumstances:
The approach to Hiroshima Airport was completed in marginal weather conditions. The autopilot was disengaged at 2,100 feet MSL when the aircraft descended below the glide path and hit approach lights and the localiser antenna located 325 meters short of runway 28. The aircraft continued the descent, hit the soft ground short of runway. Then it rolled on runway for some 1,154 meters, veered to the left, went off runway and came to rest 130 meters to the left of the concrete runway, some 1,477 meters past the runway threshold. All 82 occupants were evacuated, among them 27 (25 passengers and 2 crew members) were injured. The aircraft was considered as written off due to severe damages on both engines, ailerons, wings and the bottom of the fuselage. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were difficult with visibility up to 4 km, RVR on runway 28 variable from 300 to 1,800 meters, light rain, partial fog, one octa cloud at 0 feet, 4 octas at 500 feet, 6 octas at 1,200 feet.
Probable cause:
It is certain that when landing on RWY 28 at the Airport, the Aircraft undershot and the PIC commenced executing a go-around; however, it collided with the Aeronautical Radio Navigation Aids located in front of RWY 28 threshold, just before turning to climb. Regarding the fact that the Aircraft undershot, it is probable that there might be following aspects in causes: The PIC continued approaching without executing a go around while the position of the Aircraft could not be identified by visual references which should have been in view and identified continuously at or below the approach height threshold (Decision Altitude: DA); and as well, the FO, as pilot-monitoring who should have monitored meteorological conditions and flight operations, did not make a call-out of go-around immediately when he could not see the runway at DA. Regarding the fact that the PIC continued approaching without executing a go around while the position of the Aircraft could not be identified by visual references which should have been in view and identified continuously at or below DA, he did not comply with the regulations and SOP, and it is probable that there was a background factor that the education and trainings for compliance of rules in the Company was insufficient. In addition, regarding the fact that the FO did not make an assertion of go around, it is probable that the CRM did not function appropriately.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 777-28E in San Francisco: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jul 6, 2013 at 1128 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HL7742
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Seoul - San Francisco
MSN:
29171/553
YOM:
2005
Flight number:
OZ214
Crew on board:
16
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
291
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
9684
Captain / Total hours on type:
33.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
12307
Copilot / Total hours on type:
3208
Aircraft flight hours:
37120
Aircraft flight cycles:
5388
Circumstances:
On July 6, 2013, about 1128 Pacific daylight time, a Boeing 777-200ER, Korean registration HL7742, operating as Asiana Airlines flight 214, was on approach to runway 28L when it struck a seawall at San Francisco International Airport (SFO), San Francisco, California. Three of the 291 passengers were fatally injured; 40 passengers, 8 of the 12 flight attendants, and 1 of the 4 flight crewmembers received serious injuries. The other 248 passengers, 4 flight attendants, and 3 flight crewmembers received minor injuries or were not injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 214 was a regularly scheduled international passenger flight from Incheon International Airport, Seoul, Korea, operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 129. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight was vectored for a visual approach to runway 28L and intercepted the final approach course about 14 nautical miles (nm) from the threshold at an altitude slightly above the desired 3° glidepath. This set the flight crew up for a straight-in visual approach; however, after the flight crew accepted an air traffic control instruction to maintain 180 knots to 5 nm from the runway, the flight crew mismanaged the airplane’s descent, which resulted in the airplane being well above the desired 3° glidepath when it reached the 5 nm point. The flight crew’s difficulty in managing the airplane’s descent continued as the approach continued. In an attempt to increase the airplane’s descent rate and capture the desired glidepath, the pilot flying (PF) selected an autopilot (A/P) mode (flight level change speed [FLCH SPD]) that instead resulted in the autoflight system initiating a climb because the airplane was below the selected altitude. The PF disconnected the A/P and moved the thrust levers to idle, which caused the autothrottle (A/T) to change to the HOLD mode, a mode in which the A/T does not control airspeed. The PF then pitched the airplane down and increased the descent rate. Neither the PF, the pilot monitoring (PM), nor the observer noted the change in A/T mode to HOLD. As the airplane reached 500 ft above airport elevation, the point at which Asiana’s procedures dictated that the approach must be stabilized, the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) would have shown the flight crew that the airplane was slightly above the desired glidepath. Also, the airspeed, which had been decreasing rapidly, had just reached the proper approach speed of 137 knots. However, the thrust levers were still at idle, and the descent rate was about 1,200 ft per minute, well above the descent rate of about 700 fpm needed to maintain the desired glidepath; these were two indications that the approach was not stabilized. Based on these two indications, the flight crew should have determined that the approach was unstabilized and initiated a go-around, but they did not do so. As the approach continued, it became increasingly unstabilized as the airplane descended below the desired glidepath; the PAPI displayed three and then four red lights, indicating the continuing descent below the glidepath. The decreasing trend in airspeed continued, and about 200 ft, the flight crew became aware of the low airspeed and low path conditions but did not initiate a go-around until the airplane was below 100 ft, at which point the airplane did not have the performance capability to accomplish a go-around. The flight crew’s insufficient monitoring of airspeed indications during the approach resulted from expectancy, increased workload, fatigue, and automation reliance. When the main landing gear and the aft fuselage struck the seawall, the tail of the airplane broke off at the aft pressure bulkhead. The airplane slid along the runway, lifted partially into the air, spun about 330°, and impacted the ground a final time. The impact forces, which exceeded certification limits, resulted in the inflation of two slide/rafts within the cabin, injuring and temporarily trapping two flight attendants. Six occupants were ejected from the airplane during the impact sequence: two of the three fatally injured passengers and four of the seriously injured flight attendants. The four flight attendants were wearing their restraints but were ejected due to the destruction of the aft galley where they were seated. The two ejected passengers (one of whom was later rolled over by two firefighting vehicles) were not wearing their seatbelts and would likely have remained in the cabin and survived if they had been wearing their seatbelts. After the airplane came to a stop, a fire initiated within the separated right engine, which came to rest adjacent to the right side of the fuselage. When one of the flight attendants became aware of the fire, he initiated an evacuation, and 98% of the passengers successfully self-evacuated. As the fire spread into the fuselage, firefighters entered the airplane and extricated five passengers (one of whom later died) who were injured and unable to evacuate. Overall, 99% of the airplane’s occupants survived.
Probable cause:
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crew’s mismanagement of the airplane’s descent during the visual approach, the pilot flying’s unintended deactivation of automatic airspeed control, the flight crew’s inadequate monitoring of airspeed, and the flight crew’s delayed execution of a go-around after they became aware that the airplane was below acceptable glidepath and airspeed tolerances.
Contributing to the accident were:
(1) the complexities of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems that were inadequately described in Boeing’s documentation and Asiana’s pilot training, which increased the likelihood of mode error;
(2) the flight crew’s nonstandard communication and coordination regarding the use of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems;
(3) the pilot flying’s inadequate training on the planning and executing of visual approaches;
(4) the pilot monitoring/instructor pilot’s inadequate supervision of the pilot flying; and (5) flight crew fatigue, which likely degraded their performance.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 747-48EF in the East China Sea: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jul 28, 2011 at 0411 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HL7604
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Seoul - Shanghai
MSN:
29907/1370
YOM:
2006
Flight number:
OZ991
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
14123
Captain / Total hours on type:
6896.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5211
Copilot / Total hours on type:
492
Aircraft flight hours:
28752
Aircraft flight cycles:
4799
Circumstances:
On 28 July 2011, about 04:11 Korean Standard Time), Asiana Airlines flight 991, a B747-400F airplane, HL7604 (hereafter referred to as AAR991), a scheduled cargo flight from Incheon, Republic of Korea, to Shanghai, China, crashed into the international waters about 130 km west of Jeju International Airport (hereafter referred to as Jeju Airport after the flight crew reported a cargo fire to SHI ACC near a reporting point SADLI on airway A593 about 03:54 and attempted to divert to Jeju Airport. Due to the crash impact and fire, the captain and the first officer (FO) were fatally injured, the aircraft was destroyed, and the cargo shipments were damaged, incapable of being recovered, or washed away. AAR991 was a scheduled international cargo flight operated at night under the instrument flight rule in accordance with the Aviation Act of the Republic of Korea and the Convention on International Civil Aviation. The captain and the FO showed up at the flight crew ready room of Asiana Airlines in Incheon International Airport (hereafter referred to as Incheon Airport) an hour before the scheduled time of departure) and signed the "show-up log," respectively. The line mechanic stated that on 28 July, about 02:00, the flight crew arrived at the airplane and that the captain performed the ramp inspection. The loadmaster stated that about 02:15, under the guidance with him, the captain inspected the loaded status of dangerous goods and other shipments in the main deck cargo compartment. The transcript) of ATC radio communications shows that at 03:04:28, AAR991 took off from runway 15L in Incheon Airport. From this moment, the captain) took control of radio communications. At 03:05:48, AAR991 made initial contact with Seoul Area Control Center (SEL ACC) after takeoff and was instructed to climb to 34,000 ft and fly direct to MALPA. At 03:12:19, the flight crew were advised to contact Incheon Area Control Center (ICN ACC). At 03:12:35, AAR991 was climbing to 34,000 ft on a permitted route when it made initial contact with ICN ACC, and at 03:13:05, was allowed to fly direct to NIRAT. At 03:26:05, ICN ACC instructed AAR991 to change its radio frequency to 124.52 MHz. From this moment, the FO mainly assumed control of radio communications, but the captain also occasionally made communication. At 03:26:21, the crew were instructed to fly direct to SADLI, and at 03:50:46, ICN ACC advised AAR991 to contact SHI ACC on frequency 134.0 MHz. At 03:51:15, AAR991 stated that it was maintaining at 34,000 ft and flying direct to SADLI when it made initial contact with SHI ACC. At 03:52:39, SHI ACC instructed AAR991, "AAR991 radar contact, off-set 5 miles right of track," and the flight crew carried out this instruction at 03:52:51. The Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) messages) received by the ground station were as follows: about 03:53, "EQUIPMENT SMOKE," "EQUIP COOLING," and "CGO DET 11 MN DK"; and about 03:54, "CGO DET 6 MN DK" and "CGO DET 10 MN DK." At 03:54:23, the FO stated, "Shanghai control, Shanghai control, AAR991 request emergency descent, emergency, declare emergency due to fire main deck. Request descent, and descent to one-zero thousand." At 03:54:37, SHI ACC gave AAR991 a descent clearance and instructed it to turn at its discretion, and the FO acknowledged this instruction. The radar data of ICN ACC shows that AAR991 started descending at 03:54:59. At 03:55:08, the FO requested a diversion to Jeju Airport, stating "We have fire main deck, AAR991, return to Jeju AAR991," and SHI ACC approved the request. At 03:58:03, SHI ACC instructed AAR991 to maintain 10,000 ft, however, followed by no response from AAR991. At 03:58:25, SHI ACC requested KAL886 flying near AAR991 to relay any information from AAR991 to SHI ACC. KAL886 stated that AAR991 was descending to 10,000 ft and flying direct to Jeju. According to the radar data of ICN ACC, AAR991 was flying at 16,000 ft at a ground speed of 452 kt on a heading of 345°. At 03:59:13, AAR991 requested a radar vector to Jeju. At 03:59:50, SHI ACC instructed AAR991 to fly heading 045, and AAR991 acknowledged this instruction. At 03:59:26, according to the ATC transcript, the sound of the FO's breathing through an oxygen mask was recorded four times when he communicated with SHI ACC. The last ACARS messages received by the ground station about 04:00 are as follows: "YAW DAMPER UPR," "RUD RATIO DUAL," and "FLAPS CONTROL." At 04:00:23, SHI ACC instructed AAR991 to contact ICN ACC on 124.52 MHz for a radar vector to Jeju, however, AAR991 stated that it was unable to contact on this frequency. Consequently, SHI ACC instructed the crew to monitor frequency 134.0 MHz. The radar data of ICN ACC shows that at 04:01:43, AAR991 was flying at 8,200 ft at a ground speed of 404 kt on a heading of 033°, and after this, AAR991's altitude, ground speed, and heading changed inconsistently. At 04:02:00, SHI ACC instructed AAR991 to contact Fukuoka Area Control Center (FUK ACC) on 133.6 MHz. At 04:02:10, the FO stated, "AAR991" and 12 seconds later, added, "Fukuoka AAR991 mayday mayday mayday, we have cargo fire, request direct to Jeju please," followed by no response from FUK ACC. At 04:03:01, the FO called SHI ACC and stated that it was unable to contact FUK ACC. Consequently, SHI ACC instructed AAR991 to pass information to KAL886 and let KAL886 relay the information to FUK ACC and ICN ACC. At 04:03:01, the flight track data of the Incheon radar shows that AAR991's transponder code in Mode 3/A was set to 7700 from 6353 when the aircraft was flying at 8,500 ft at a ground speed of 410 kt on a heading of 027°. At 04:03:24, KAL886 advised AAR991 that it would relay its message to ICN ACC, and the FO stated, "Yes, now direct Jeju heading 030." KAL886 informed AAR991 that SHI ACC gave it heading 045, and the FO acknowledged this instruction. At 04:04:14, SHI ACC instructed KAL886 to use another transmitter to contact ICN ACC on 124.52 MHz, to request heading to Jeju from its present position, and to report back to SHI ACC. Regarding this, KAL886 gave an affirmative response. At 04:05:30, the captain called KAL886, and KAL886 responded, "Relay from Incheon Control, from Incheon Control, maintain heading 060, radar vector for final, and you may descend to 7,000 ft." At 04:05:52, KAL886 again relayed the message, "Maintain heading 060, radar vector for final, and descend to 7,000 ft," followed by the captain's response, "Descend 7,000 ft." Beginning 04:06:25, the captain called "Korean Air" twice. At 04:06:30, KAL886 responded, "Stand by, stand by," followed by the captain's statement at 04:06:32, "Ah… we are now that rudder control is not working and seems to be fired… (jamming)." At 04:06:41, SHI ACC instructed KAL886 to contact ICN ACC on 124.52 MHz, and at 04:07:16, instructed AAR991 to try contacting KAL886 on 124.52 MHz, followed by the captain's acknowledgement. At 04:07:34, the captain stated, "We have to open the hatch, hatch." Subsequently, KAL886 instructed AAR991 to change its frequency to ICN ACC frequency 124.52 MHz. At 04:08:52, ICN ACC instructed KAL886 to relay the message to AAR991 that JEJ APP established radar contact with AAR991 and that AAR991 should contact JEJ APP on 121.2 MHz. At 04:09:08, KAL886 relayed this message to AAR991. At 04:09:47, the captain said to JEJ ACC, "Rudder control… flight control, all are not working." The FO said to JEJ ACC, "Did you contact? Uh… do you contact us?" and JEJ ACC responded, "AAR991… yes, I can hear you." At 04:10:06, the FO stated, "We have heavy vibration on the airplane, may need to make an emergency landing, emergency ditching," and JEJ ACC responded, "Yes, say again, please." He stated, "Altitude control is not available due to heavy vibration, going to ditch… ah." At 04:10:26, JEJ ACC asked AAR991, "Can you make approach to Jeju?" and subsequently, tried to contact AAR991 three times, however, followed by no response from AAR991. The aircraft crashed in the East China Sea and both pilots were killed. Debris were found about 130 km west of Jeju.
Probable cause:
The Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Board (ARAIB) determines the cause of this accident as follows:
A fire developed on or near the pallets containing dangerous goods but no physical evidence of the cause of the fire was found. The fire rapidly escalated into a large uncontained fire, and this caused some portions of the fuselage to separate from the aircraft in midair, thereby resulting in the crash.
Contributing Factors:
1. Flammable materials like photo-resist (Class 3) were loaded in position ML, and flammable materials like paint, photo-resist, corrosive liquid, and lithium-ion batteries (Class 9) were loaded on one pallet in position PR.
2. It was difficult to contain a large scale of fire only by the fire suppression system of a Class E cargo compartment that was not equipped with an active fire suppression system.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas C-47A-80-DL off Incheon: 8 killed

Date & Time: Apr 29, 1952
Operator:
Registration:
43-15379
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Seoul - Ch'o-do Island
MSN:
19845
YOM:
1944
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Circumstances:
Crashed in unknown circumstances off Incheon, South Korea, killing all eight crew members. They were taking part to the evacuation of US wounded soldiers.
Crew:
1st Lt Francis P. Burns,
1st Lt Donn H. Haugen,
Cpt Richard E. Hines,
Cpt Frederick S. Kelley,
S/Sgt Albert C. May,
A1C Calvin G. Sandrock Jr.,
1st Lt Frank F. Sherman,
1st Lt Benjamin H. Woodruff Jr.