Crash of an Antonov AN-12BK in Lviv: 5 killed

Date & Time: Oct 4, 2019 at 0648 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UR-CAH
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Vigo - Lviv - Bursa
MSN:
8345604
YOM:
1968
Flight number:
UKL4050
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
6750
Captain / Total hours on type:
6570.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
14670
Copilot / Total hours on type:
9620
Aircraft flight hours:
12922
Aircraft flight cycles:
6616
Circumstances:
On 03.10.2019, the crew of An-12BK UR-CAH aircraft operated by PJSC «AIRLINE «UKRAINE-AIR ALLIANCE», consisting of flight crew members and two aircraft technicians, performed flight UKL4010 en-route Toronto (Canada) - Toulouse (France) and at 06:15 UTC, it landed at the Toulouse aerodrome (France). The plane delivered 1537 kg cargo to the Toulouse aerodrome (France). After the completion of post-flight procedures, the flight crew went to rest at the hotel, while the technicians remained on the aircraft to perform technical works. The next flight was scheduled from Toulouse to Birmingham airport (Great Britain). However, during the day, at the initiative of the operator, it was decided to change the route and perform the flight en-route Toulouse - Vigo (Spain) - Istanbul (Turkey). At the Toulouse aerodrome, the plane was filled with 6,000 liters of fuel. Also in Toulouse, a flight engineer was replaced. At 16:16 UTC, the plane took off from Toulouse to Vigo without cargo. Landing at the Vigo aerodrome (Spain) was performed on 03.10.2020 at 18:20 UTC. At the Vigo aerodrome, the plane was loaded with vehicle spare parts with a total weight of probably 14078 kg. From the Vigo aerodrome (Spain), the plane took off on 03.10.2019 at 22:20, flight UKL4050, with a delay of 2 h 20 minutes. On 04.10.2020, at 03:17:29 UTC, the plane approached the airspace border of the Lviv control area. The crew contacted the controller of the Lviv ACC of LVE + LVW sector and reported about the approach to waypoint MALBE at FL250. The controller informed the crew about the establishment of the radar identification of the aircraft and instructed to wait for the procedure for radar guidance to RW-31 using the ILS system. At 03:20:27, under instruction the ACC controller, the crew listened to the ATIS "Romeo" information as follows: “Lviv, ATIS “Romeo” for 03:20. The ILS approach at the aerodrome uses low visibility procedures. Runway in use is RW-31. Runway surface condition known at 19:53 - wet, clear. The measured friction coefficient is 0.55. Estimated surface friction assessed as good. Transition level - 110. Warning: large flocks of birds in the aerodrome area and on the landing final. There is no wind. Visibility - 150 meters; visibility range on the runway at the touchdown point - 550 meters, in the middle of the runway - 550 meters, at the end of the runway - 550 meters, fog. Vertical visibility - 50 meters. Temperature + 3ºС, dew point + 3ºС. Atmospheric pressure QNH - 1013 hectopascals, QFE - 974 hectopascals. Weather forecast for TREND landing: visibility sometimes is 400 meters, fog; vertical visibility - 60 meters. Attention: the frequency "Lviv-taxiing" does not work, while taxiing, get in touch with the "LvivTower" at a frequency of 128.0 MHz. Please acknowledge receipt of Romeo's information." ATIS information was transmitted in English. At 03:22:14, the crew informed the controller about the completion of listening to ATIS information and received clearance to descend to FL120. At 03:22:40, the aircraft began its descent from FL250 and at 03:28:35 switched to the frequency of the ACC controller of the LVT sector. After contacting the controller of the ACC of the LVT sector, the crew reported a descend to FL120 to KOKUP point. At 03:29:08, the ACC controller of the LVT sector instructed the crew to continue descending to an altitude of 10,000 feet at atmospheric pressure QNH-1013 hPa, reported the transition level, and instructed to wait for radar guidance for ILS approach on RW-31. The crew confirmed the instruction to descent to 10,000 feet, QNH, transition level and reported expectation for radar guidance. At 03:30:14, LVT sector ACC controller began radar guidance. At 03:32:49, the controller instructed the crew to descend to 4,000 feet. At 03:35:33, LVT sector ATC controller instructed to descend to an altitude of 3200 feet, taking into account the temperature correction. The procedure for temperature correction at determination of flight levels by an air traffic controller during the radar vectoring was published in the Aeronautical Information Publication of Ukraine, UKLL AD 2.24.7-1 dated 12.09.2019. At 03:38:33, the ATC controller of the LVT sector provided the crew with information about its location of 27 km from VOR/DME LIV, instructed by the left turn to take a 340º heading, cleared the ILS landing approach to runway 31 and gave the control instruction to inform of “the localizer beam capture.” At 03:40:01 (the height above the runway was 1170 m, descent rate: -4 ... -4.5 m/s, speed 352 km/h, distance from the runway threshold: 15.7 km), the crew reported of the localizer beam capture. At 03:40:09, ATC controller of LVT sector instructed the crew to continue the ILS approach to RWY 31. At 03:40:26, the controller informed the crew about the weather conditions at the aerodrome: RW-31 runway visual range (RVR) in the touchdown zone – 800 meters, in the middle of the runway – 800 meters, at the end of the runway – 750 meters, vertical visibility – 60 meters, fog. The crew confirmed receipt of the information. At 03:41:22, the ATC controller of LVT sector instructed to switch the communication to the ATC Lviv controller at a frequency of 128.0 MHz. There were no irregularities in air traffic servicing of the An-12 aircraft, flight UKL4050, during the flight in the area of responsibility of the TMA Lviv "LVT" sector. To enter the glide path, the PIC increased the vertical descent rate. At 03:41:47, the crew established communication with the Tower controller. The distance from the threshold was 11.3 km, the elevation over the glide path was 70 m, the vertical rate of descent was -5.5 ... -6 m/s. After communication with the air traffic controller, the crew reported an ILS approach to RW-31 and the atmospheric pressure QNH setting of 1013 hPa. At 03:41:58, the Tower controller informed the crew about the absence of wind on the surface of RW-31 and gave clearance to land. The crew confirmed the landing clearance. According to the recorders, at this time the distance to the touchdown point was 7.58 km, the plane was 11 m below the glide path, the vertical descent rate was -4.5-5.5 m/s, and the speed was 290 km/h, the flight heading – 315º. At a distance of 5.0 km to the touchdown point, the plane was 25 m below the glide path. At a distance of 3 km from the touchdown, the plane descended to an altitude of 105 meters and continued the flight with the constant descent. At an altitude of 60 meters, an audible alarm was triggered on board the aircraft, when the decision height had been reached, to which none of the crew members responded. At a distance of 1348 meters from the threshold of the RW-31, at an altitude of 5-7 meters, the aircraft collided with trees, fell to the ground and came to rest at a distance of 1117 meters from the runway threshold. All three passengers were seriously injured and all five crew members were killed.
Probable cause:
The most probable cause of the accident, collision of a serviceable aircraft with the ground during the landing approach in a dense fog, was the crew’s failure to perform the flight in the instrument conditions due to the probable physical excessive fatigue, which led to an unconscious descent of the aircraft below the glide path and ground impact (controlled flight into terrain).
Contributing Factors:
Probable exceeding the aircraft takeoff weight during departure from the Vigo Airport, which could result in increase in consumption of the fuel, the remainder of which did not allow to perform the flight to the alternate Boryspil aerodrome.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-8 near Sosenky: 5 killed

Date & Time: Sep 27, 1988 at 1922 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-48101
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Moscow - Lviv - Baku
MSN:
0G3490
YOM:
1960
Flight number:
92055
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Aircraft flight hours:
12272
Aircraft flight cycles:
5853
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Moscow-Domodedovo at 1838LT on a cargo flight to Baku with an intermediate stop in Lviv, carrying five crew members and a load of various goods for a total weight of 400 kilos, among them metallic hoses. Nine minutes after takeoff, while climbing to a height of about 3,600 meters, the crew noticed discrepancies in the fuel system which resulted in a slight reduction of the fuel pressure in the fuel supply line connected to the left engine. The left part of the aircraft was visually inspected and as nothing abnormal was noted, the crew decided to continue the flight. 18 minutes later, while approaching the altitude of 7,200 meters, the crew noticed an important increase in the fuel consumption while the fuel supply system pressure dropped. An analysis of the system made it possible to detect a leak and as the crew was attempting to shut down the left engine, a fire started in the bottom of the left engine nacelle. At 1914LT, the captain informed ATC about the failure of the left engine and was cleared to return to Domodedovo Airport. Less than two minutes later, the captain reported to ATC that the left engine was on fire and requested to be vectored to the nearest airport. At that time, the nearest airport was Tula-Klokovo located 140 km from his position. Few minutes later, the left engine, engulfed by flames, detached and fell away. As the captain realized it would not be possible to reach Tula Airport, he continued the descent with a rate of descent of 100 meters per second in an attempt to land in an open field. The aircraft entered clouds and at a height of 300 meters, the pilot-in-command suffered a spatial disorientation. The aircraft nosed down by an angle of 80° and crashed at a speed of 612 km/h in a wooded area located 3,5 km northeast of Sosensky. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all five occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The left engine caught fire and detached after a fuel line broke in flight, causing the fuel to leak in the engine nacelle and to ignite while in contact with high temperature parts. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Failure of the crew to identify the fuel leak in time,
- Failure of the crew to abort the flight and to return to the departure airport in time,
- Failure of the crew to shut off the fuel supply system in time, which contributed to the fire development,
- Failure of the crew to follow the emergency procedures,
- Loss of control after the pilot-in-command suffered a spatial disorientation.

Crash of an Antonov AN-26 near Zolochiv: 15 killed

Date & Time: May 3, 1985 at 1213 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
101 red
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Lviv - Moscow
MSN:
9506
YOM:
1980
Flight number:
CCCP-26492
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
15
Aircraft flight hours:
1756
Aircraft flight cycles:
2346
Circumstances:
The Antonov AN-26 departed Lviv-Sknyliv Airport at 1202LT and was climbing to 3,900 meters. En route to Moscow, it was carrying 15 people, most of them officers from the Carpathian Military contingent. While cruising in clouds at an altitude of 3,900 meters, the AN-26 collided with an Aeroflot Tupolev TU-134 registered CCCP-65856 that was descending to Lviv Airport on a flight from Tallinn with 79 people on board. Following the collision, both aircraft entered a dive and crashed in an open field located near the city of Zolochiv, about 60 km east of Lviv. Both aircraft were totally destroyed and all 94 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the accident was the consequence of a poor radar coverage by ATC who failed to properly coordinate control and assistance to both planes. ATC in charge of the sector where the collision occurred cleared the crew of the TU-134 to continue to descend when he actually had no idea of the exact position of both planes. This caused the Tupolev to descend too low and to cut the Antonov trajectory. The supervisor in charge of the sector was also blamed insofar he failed to pay sufficient attention to the operations and was unable to identify in time a possible conflict and thus, was unable to initiate any corrective action and to assist his colleague.

Crash of a Tupolev TU-134A near Zolochiv: 79 killed

Date & Time: May 3, 1985 at 1213 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-65856
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Tallin – Lviv – Chisinau
MSN:
23253
YOM:
1975
Flight number:
SU8381
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
72
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
79
Aircraft flight hours:
18548
Aircraft flight cycles:
12306
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Tallin, the aircraft entered the TMA of Lviv and was cleared to descend from 4,800 meters to 4,200 meters. The crew was informed about the presence of an Antonov AN-26 that took off from Lviv-Sknyliv Airport at 1202LT and was climbing to 3,900 meters. En route to Moscow, the AN-26 was carrying 15 people, most of them officers from the Carpathian Military contingent. At 1212LT, the crew of the TU-134 was cleared to continue to descend below 4,200 meters. One minute later, while cruising in clouds at an altitude of 3,900 meters, both aircraft collided, entered a dive and crashed in an open field located near the city of Zolochiv, about 60 km east of Lviv. Both aircraft were totally destroyed and all 94 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the accident was the consequence of a poor radar coverage by ATC who failed to properly coordinate control and assistance to both planes. ATC in charge of the sector where the collision occurred cleared the crew of the TU-134 to continue to descend when he actually had no idea of the exact position of both planes. This caused the Tupolev to descend too low and to cut the Antonov trajectory. The supervisor in charge of the sector was also blamed insofar he failed to pay sufficient attention to the operations and was unable to identify in time a possible conflict and thus, was unable to initiate any corrective action and to assist his colleague.