Kenai

The flight crew was returning from off-loading their cargo at a remote site on the west side of a mountain range. The return flight would provide an option of following a lower mountain pass, or flying over the mountainous terrain. Witnesses related that prior to the flight's departure, the marginal VFR weather conditions began to deteriorate very rapidly, with winds in excess of 50 knots, lowering ceilings, rain, and turbulence. An airmet, valid during the time of the accident, forecast high winds, mountain obscuration, and turbulence. The wreckage of the airplane was located near the crest of a 2,900 feet msl ridge. Wreckage debris was scattered on both sides of the ridge, and the airplane was destroyed by the high speed impact. Inspection of the wreckage disclosed no evidence any mechanical anomalies. A radar track analysis of a target airplane believed to be the accident airplane, depicted a track on a direct route of flight over the mountains from the departure airport towards the destination airport. Altitude data was not received from the target airplane's Mode C transponder, and therefore was extrapolated from the less reliable radar plot information. The maximum altitude plotted was approximately 10,800 feet, prior to a descent as the airplane neared the west side of the range. Mountains along the route of flight exceed 10,000 feet msl.

The CFR Part 135 cargo flight departed at night on an IFR flight with a load of mining equipment. Route of flight was over remote/mountainous terrain. About 2 hours after takeoff, while cruising at 12,000' feet msl, the right engine and propeller began to overspeed. The captain feathered the #2 engine and declared an emergency. He began to divert to an alternate destination, about 120 miles away in an area of lower terrain, but the aircraft would not maintain altitude (single engine service ceiling, as loaded, was about 8,700 feet). The captain increased power to the left engine, but it began to produce banging and coughing noises. The captain elected to perform an emergency landing at a nearby, remote, military airfield (A/F). The A/F was located in mountainous terrain and had a one-way, daylight only approach. The captain lowered the gear and flaps, and began a visual approach while attempting to keep the runway end identifier lights (REIL) in view. The aircraft encountered severe turbulence, and the captain applied full throttle to the left engine in an attempt to climb. The REIL disappeared from view, and the aircraft collided with snow covered terrain about 2 miles west of the A/F. Ground personnel at the A/F reported high winds and blowing snow with limited visibility. Postcrash exam of the right engine revealed a loss of the propeller control system hydraulic oil. Flight at 12,000 feet was conducted without crew oxygen. The crew had exceeded their maximum allowable duty day without adequate crew rest.

The pilot reportedly flew a route along the power lines between Kenai and Homer. The flight took place on a dark moonless night over rising terrain. The accident site was located 200 yards east of the power lines. Radar data shows the airplane in the area of the crash site at a steady state heading, airspeed, and level altitude. This flight marked the first time that the pilot did not complete a company flight plan. On his off days, the pilot got 9-11 hours of sleep. His wife said he was not a morning person. The pilot had commented to her that when away from home, the quality of his sleep was poor. On the day of the accident, the pilot was awake at 0340 for the 0500 departure; he had about 6 hours of sleep.

The flight was level at 10,000 feet msl in IMC conditions when the controller noticed the airplane take a sharp right turn and descend rapidly. Attempts to contact the flight were negative. Examination of the accident showed all the major components present, however, impact damage precluded any flight control continuity check. The engines could not be recovered from the impact crater. The accident site was not accessible with specialized equipment. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft was on an IFR flight from Kenai to the Beluga Airport. The airport did not have an instrument approach procedure, a co-located navaid or a co-located intersection or fix. Reportedly, pilots would routinely file IFR for the route, fly outbound from Kenai for 34.5 miles, then atmt visibility acquisition of the airport. On this flight, ARTCC cleared the pilot to fly direct to the airport at an altitude of 2,000 feet. Before reaching the airport, the pilot acknowledged receipt of a clearance to cruise at 2,000 feet and to report cancellation of IFR, then there was no further communication between ARTCC and the flight. Mode C radar data showed the aircraft descended to 600 feet as it was approaching about 5 miles south of the Beluga Airport. Subsequently, the aircraft flew past the uncontrolled airport and crashed into trees about 8 miles northwest of the airport. Marks on the trees showed the aircraft was in a right descending turn on an easterly heading, when it crashed. Elevation of the crash site was 560 feet. Minimum safe (IFR) altitude for the Beluga Airport area was 2,000 feet. There were indications that the destination weather was below VFR conditions. No preimpact mechanical problem was found that would have resulted in the accident. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot had just departed the runway when he reported to the flight service station that he had engine problems. The aircraft was observed by witnesses to be about 300 feet on a descending downwind. The pilot stated that he was circling for runway 01. Surviving passengers described the engines as running rough and uneven. The investigation revealed that the aircraft's weight was more than the pilot had calculated and the CofG was 3.4 inches further aft than was calculated. However, the weight and CofG were within limits. Examination of the engine disclosed that the right engine had an extensive cylinder head crack, a partially disconnected intake pipe, and was capable of producing 55% of rated power. The left engine had seven severely worn cam lobes. The rudder trim was deflected full left at impact. The evidence indicated that the pilot had retarded the throttle for the left engine and was using only the right engine to sustain flight. Exam of company checklist usage revealed several different improper versions. The pilot and five passengers were killed. Two others passengers and two people on the ground were injured.

The aircraft crashed one mile short of the runway. The accident occurred during an ILS approach in instrument meteorological conditions. During a post accident interview with the pilot he stated that he did not recognize and react in a timely manner to the gross deviation of the decision height. He continued down until striking the ground short of the runway.