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Crash of a Beechcraft 200 Super King Air in Iqaluit

Date & Time: Jul 17, 2016 at 1217 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-FCGW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Iqaluit - Iqaluit
MSN:
BB-207
YOM:
1977
Flight number:
BFF200
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
A Beech 200 Super King Air aircraft operated by Air Nunavut as flight 200, was on a training flight at Iqaluit, NU (CYFB) to upgrade a candidate to captain status. A VFR circuit was executed to simulate a flapless landing. While in the circuit, the crew experienced an actual communication failure on COM 1 while two other aircraft were inbound to Iqaluit. At the end of the downwind leg, a flap failure was simulated and the crew carried out the appropriate checklist. However, the landing checklist was not completed and the aircraft landed with the landing gear in the up position on runway 16. The aircraft skidded on the belly and came to a stop on the runway between taxiway A and G. The crew declared an emergency and evacuated the airplane with no injuries. The aircraft sustained damage to the belly pod and both propellers.

Crash of a Rockwell Shrike Commander 500S in Rankin Inlet

Date & Time: Jul 18, 2010 at 1330 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N5800H
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Portland - Rankin Inlet - Iqaluit - Bern
MSN:
500-3082
YOM:
1970
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
23100
Captain / Total hours on type:
40.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5400
Copilot / Total hours on type:
13
Circumstances:
The Aero Commander 500S had recently been purchased. The new owner of the aircraft retained the services of 2 experienced pilots to deliver the aircraft from Portland, Oregon, United States, to Bern, Switzerland. After having flown several positioning legs, the aircraft arrived at Rankin Inlet for refuelling. The aircraft was refuelled from two 45-gallon drums and was to continue on to Iqaluit, Nunavut. The pilot-in-command occupied the right seat and the pilot flying the aircraft occupied the left seat. The aircraft was at its maximum takeoff weight of 7000 pounds. Prior to take off, the crew conducted a run-up and all indications seemed normal. During the takeoff roll, the engines did not produce full power and the crew elected to reject the takeoff. After returning to the ramp, a second run-up was completed and once again all indications seemed normal. Shortly after second rotation, cylinder head temperatures increased and both Lycoming TIO-540-E1B5 engines began to lose power. The pilots attempted to return to the airport, but were unable to maintain altitude. The landing gear was extended and a forced landing was made on a flat section of land, approximately 1500 feet to the southwest of the runway 13 threshold. There were no injuries and the aircraft sustained substantial damage.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. At the fuel compound, the 45-gallon drum containing slops was located near the stock of sealed 45-gallon drums of 100LL AVGAS, contributing to the fuel handler selecting the drum of slops in error.
2. The 45-gallon drum of slops had similar markings to the stock of sealed 45-gallon drums of 100LL AVGAS, preventing ready identification of the contaminated drum.
3. The fuel handler did not notice that the large bung plug was not sealed on the second 45-gallon drum and, as a result, delivered the drum of slops to the aircraft.
4. The pilots did not notice that the large bung plug was not sealed on the second 45-gallon drum and, as a result, fuelled the aircraft with contaminated fuel.
5. The pilots were inexperienced with refuelling from 45-gallon drums and did not take steps to ascertain the proper fuel grade in the second 45-gallon drum. As a result, slops, rather than 100LL AVGAS, was pumped into the aircraft’s fuel system.
6. The fuel system design was such that the fuel from both wing fuel cells combined in the centre fuel cell and, as a result, contaminated fuel was fed to both engines.
7. The contaminated fuel resulted in engine power loss in both engines and the aircraft was unable to maintain altitude after takeoff.
Finding as to Risk:
1. The impact force angles were substantially different from that of the ELT’s G-switch orientation. As a result, the ELT did not activate during the impact. This could have delayed search and rescue (SAR) notification.
Final Report:

Crash of a Dassault Falcon 10 in Kuujjuaq

Date & Time: Aug 14, 2001 at 1331 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GNVT
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Iqaluit – Kuujjuaq
MSN:
138
YOM:
1978
Flight number:
BFF10
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Iqaluit, the twin engine aircraft bounced twice upon landing. The crew completed the braking procedure 'normally' then vacated the runway and parked the airplane on the apron. After all 10 occupants disembarked, technicians realized that the fuselage was severely damaged and the aircraft was declared as damaged beyond repair.

Crash of an Avro 748-335-2A in Iqaluit

Date & Time: Dec 3, 1998 at 1536 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FBNW
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Iqaluit - Igloolik
MSN:
1759
YOM:
1978
Flight number:
FAB802
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8000
Captain / Total hours on type:
800.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2143
Copilot / Total hours on type:
117
Circumstances:
At approximately 1536 eastern standard time, First Air flight 802, a Hawker Siddeley HS-748-2A, serial number 1759, was on a scheduled flight from Iqaluit to Igloolik, Nunavut. On board were two flight crew, one flight attendant, one loadmaster, and three passengers. During the take-off run on runway 36, at the rotation speed (VR), the captain rotated the aircraft; however, the aircraft did not get airborne. Approximately seven seconds after VR, the captain called for and initiated a rejected take-off. The aircraft could not be stopped on the runway, and the nose-wheel gear collapsed as the aircraft rolled through the soft ground beyond the end of the runway. The aircraft hit the localizer antenna and continued skidding approximately 700 feet. It came to rest in a ravine in a nose-down attitude, approximately 800 feet off the declared end of the runway. The flight attendant initiated an evacuation through the left, main, rear cabin door. The two pilots evacuated the aircraft through the cockpit windows and joined the passengers and the flight attendant at the rear of the aircraft. The flight attendant was slightly injured during the sudden deceleration of the aircraft. The aircraft was substantially damaged.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The captain rejected the take-off at a speed well above the engine-failure recognition speed (V1) with insufficient runway remaining to stop before the end of the runway.
2. The far-forward position of the centre of gravity contributed to the pilot not rotating the aircraft to the normal take-off attitude.
3. The aircraft never achieved the required pitch for take-off. The captain=s inability to accurately assess the pitch attitude was probably influenced by the heavier than normal elevator control forces and the limited nighttime visual references.
4. The loadmaster did not follow the company- and Transport Canada-approved procedures to evaluate the excess baggage added to the aircraft, which led to a discrepancy of 450 pounds and a C of G position further forward than expected.
5. The performance analysis suggested that the aircraft was under-rotated as a result of a forward C of G loading and the generated lift never exceeded the aircraft=s weight during the take-off attempt.
Findings as to Risk:
1. The aircraft was approximately 200 pounds over maximum gross take-off weight.
2. The aircraft accelerated more slowly than normal, probably because of the snow on the runway.
3. Although atmospheric conditions were conducive to contamination and the aircraft was not de-iced, it could not be determined if contamination was present or if it degraded the aircraft performance during the attempted take-off.
4. Water methanol was not used for the occurrence take-off. Use of water methanol may have reduced the consequences of the rejected take-off.
5. The captain did not call for the overrun drill, and none of the items on the checklist were covered by the crew.
6. The co-pilot did not follow the emergency checklist and call air traffic control to advise of the rejected take-off or call over the public address system to advise the passengers to brace.
7. The aircraft lost all its electrical systems during the impact with the large rocks, rendering the radios unserviceable.
8. No HS-748 simulator exists that could be used to train pilots on the various take-off and rejected take-off scenarios.
9. There was confusion regarding the aircraft=s location. The flight service station, fire trucks, and intervening teams were not using an available grid map for orientation.
10. There is a risk associated with not de-icing aircraft before take-off in weather conditions such as those on the day of the accident.
11. There is a risk associated with not calculating the WAT limit and performance of an aircraft during an engine-out procedure in an environment with obstacles.
Other Findings
1. The aircraft=s brakes, anti-skid system, and tires functioned properly throughout the rejected take-off.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Sanikiluaq

Date & Time: Jan 20, 1998
Operator:
Registration:
C-FDNF
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sanikiluaq – Iqaluit
MSN:
31-8252042
YOM:
1982
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2800
Captain / Total hours on type:
1000.00
Circumstances:
The Piper Navajo Chieftain PA-31-350, serial number 31-8252042, was on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight from Sanikiluaq to Iqaluit, Northwest Territories. Two pilots and two passengers were on board. After checking the runway condition and weather, the pilot commenced his take-off run on runway 27. After take-off, the pilot saw flames coming out of the right engine cowl. The right engine was shut down but the aircraft could not maintain a sufficient rate of climb, and it crashed on flat, snow-covered ground about one mile from the end of the runway. The aircraft sustained substantial damage on landing. After the aircraft came to a stop, the occupants evacuated via the left front door and walked back to the airport terminal for shelter and assistance. There were no injuries. The occurrence happened at night in instrument meteorological conditions.
Probable cause:
A modification to the cabin heating unit inconsistent with the manufacturer's recommendations and aviation regulations caused an engine fire in the right engine cowl during the initial climb. The pilot shut down the engine, but the aircraft could not maintain a positive rate of climb and crashed to the ground.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 in Markham Bay: 2 killed

Date & Time: Aug 12, 1996 at 1347 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-GNDN
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Iqaluit - Markham Bay - Lake Harbour
MSN:
427
YOM:
1974
Flight number:
7F064
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
3813
Captain / Total hours on type:
2028.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2724
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1000
Circumstances:
First Air 064, a DHC-6 Twin Otter (Serial No. 427), took off from Iqaluit, Northwest Territories (NWT), at 1258 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) on a charter flight to Markham Bay, Lake Harbour, and back to Iqaluit. The aircraft was carrying six barrels of Jet B fuel to be delivered to Markham Bay, an off-strip landing site. At 1300, just after he took off, the captain told the Iqaluit Flight Service Station (FSS) specialist that the estimated time of arrival (ETA) for Markham Bay would be 1335. At approximately 1345, the crew informed First Air dispatch that they were landing at Markham Bay. After touching down, the pilot attempted an overshoot. During the attempt, the aircraft struck the ground about 200 metres past the end of the landing area, got airborne again, cleared a ridge, then crashed onto a rocky beach. A helicopter located the airplane 629 metres from the beginning of the landing area, partially submerged in water. The two pilots, the only occupants, received fatal injuries in the crash.
Probable cause:
For unknown reasons, a decision was made to overshoot even though insufficient runway remained for acceleration, take-off, and climb. Likely contributing directly to the decision to overshoot was the difficulty in controlling the aircraft on touchdown.
Final Report: