Piper PA-61 Aerostar (Ted Smith 601)

The twin engine aircraft was en route from Yellowknife, NT to Fort St. John, BC. The pilot noticed fumes and smoke coming from behind the rear cabin wall. The cabin was depressurized and the door opened to clear the smoke. A forced landing was conducted onto the frozen surface of Falaise Lake, NT. The pilot immediately egressed, however, the aircraft was soon engulfed in flames and was completely consumed. The pilot was not injured and was flown out by helicopter.

After takeoff, the right engine experienced a loss of power followed by the left engine losing power. The pilot maneuvered the airplane toward the nearest open field and the airplane impacted terrain during landing, resulting in a circumferential split in fuselage near the aft pressure bulkhead. The airplane was equipped with 4 fuel tanks: 2 located in each wing outboard of the engine nacelle (65-gallon capacity), 1 main fuselage tank (about 44-gallon capacity), and 1 auxiliary tank located in forward section of baggage compartment (45-gallon capacity). The airplane was capable of carrying 209.5 gallons usable fuel and the pilot stated that prior to departure he filled the main fuselage tank to capacity, added 20 gallons in the auxiliary tank and 25 gallons in each wing tank, which he equated to a total of 131 gallons on board. The fuselage contained two fuel filler necks, one for each fuselage tank (main and auxiliary). The auxiliary tank was clearly placarded with a red placard visibly standing out against a silver paint stripe; the main tank was not clearly placarded, with a red placard blending easily with red paint stripe. A salvage retriever recalled that during recovery the left wing contained 17 gallons of fuel, the right wing contained 57 gallons of fuel, the main fuselage tank contained 2.5 gallons of fuel, and the auxiliary fuselage tank contained 28 gallons of fuel. A postaccident examination of the airplane and engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The main fuselage tank and auxiliary fuselage tank were not breached and the fuel sumps contained check valves which prevent the back-flow of fuel from one fuel tank to another. Based on the evidence it is likely that the pilot exhausted the airplane's fuel supply in the main fuselage tank, which resulted in the loss of power to both engines.

The visibility at the time of the accident was 1/2 mile with fog and the vertical visibility was 100 feet. A witness stated that the pilot checked the weather, but that he appeared to be in a hurry and took off without performing a preflight inspection of the aircraft. After takeoff, air traffic control instructed the pilot to turn left to a heading of 270 degrees. The pilot reported to the controller that he was at 1,300 feet climbing to 3,000 feet and the controller cleared the pilot to climb to 4,000 feet; the pilot acknowledged the clearance. Witnesses on the ground noted that the airplane was loud; one witness located about 1.5 miles from the departure airport reported that the airplane flew overhead at treetop height. The airplane impacted trees and a residence about 2.3 miles north-northeast of the departure airport. The airplane's turning ground track and the challenging visibility conditions were conducive to the onset of pilot spatial disorientation. Post accident inspection failed to reveal any mechanical failure that would have resulted in the accident. The pilot purchased the airplane about three months prior to the accident; at that time he reported having 72.6 hours of instrument flight experience and 25 hours of multi-engine experience, with none in the accident airplane make and model. After purchasing the airplane, the pilot received 52 hours of flight instruction in the accident airplane in 7 days. Logbook records were not located to establish subsequent flight experience.

The private pilot was continuing a cross-country flight after having stopped for fuel. About 20 minutes into the flight, the pilot said both engines started running rough, and he turned the airplane toward the nearest airport and descended. The pilot reported that he did not think the airplane would make it to the airport, and that due to the rugged terrain, he felt it was better to ditch the airplane in a large lake he was flying over. The pilot reported there were no mechanical anomalies prior to the loss of engine power. He said he felt that fuel contamination was the cause of the engine problem, and that not fueling during heavy rain might have prevented the problem. Fuel samples were taken from the fuel supply where he added fuel, and the equipment used to fuel the airplane. No other instances of fuel contamination were reported, and according to the FAA inspector the fuel samples were tested, and found to be clean. The airplane was not recovered from the lake, and has not been examined by the NTSB.

During the initial climb, a "throbbing or surging" sound was heard as the airplane departed in gusting wind conditions with a 600-foot ceiling and 1/2 mile visibility in snow. Moments later the airplane came "straight down" and impacted the ground. During examination of the wreckage, it was discovered that that the fuel selector switch for the right engine had been in the "X-FEED" position during the accident. Examination of documents discovered in the wreckage revealed, three documents pertaining to operation of an Aerostar. These documents consisted of two airplane flight manuals (AFMs) from two different manufacturers, and a checklist. Examination of the first of the AFMs revealed, that it had the name of both the pilot and the operator on the cover of the document. Further examination revealed that it had been published 4 years prior to the manufacture of the accident airplane, and contained information for a Ted Smith Aerostar Model 601P, which the operator had previously owned. This document contained no warnings regarding the use of the crossfeed system during takeoff. Examination of the second of the two AFMs found in the wreckage revealed that it was the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved AFM for the accident airplane. Unlike the first AFM, the second AFM advised that the fuel selector "X-FEED" position should be used in "level coordinated flight only." It also advised that each engine fuel selector "must be in the ON position for takeoff, climb, descent, approach, and landing." It also warned that, if the airplane was not in a level coordinated flight attitude, "engine power interruptions may occur on one or both engines" when "X-FEED" is selected "due to unporting of the respective engine's fuel supply intake port." Review of the checklist contained in the FAA approved AFM for the Piper Aircraft Model 601P under "STARTING ENGINES," required a check of the crossfeed system prior to engine start by selecting each fuel selector to "ON," then selecting "X-FEED," and after verifying valve actuation and annunciator light illumination, returning the fuel selector to "ON." Additionally, under "BEFORE TAKEOFF" It also required that the fuel selectors be checked in the "ON" position, and that the "X-FEED" annunciator light was out, prior to takeoff. Examination of the pilot's checklist revealed that, it consisted of multiple pages inserted into plastic protective sleeves and included both typed, and hand written information. A review of the section titled "BEFORE TAKEOFF" revealed that the checklist item "Fuel Selectors - ON Position," which was listed in the AFM, had been omitted.

On the day of the accident, the pilot was returning to his home airport, after dropping off friends at a different airport. No weather briefing or flight plan was filed with Flight Service for either flight. A witness and radar data depicted the accident airplane on a straight-in approach for runway 1, in a landing configuration, at a ground speed of approximately 120 knots. The last radar target was recorded about 1/4 mile from the runway threshold, at an altitude of approximately 150 feet agl. The wreckage was later found about 1/2 mile east of the runway threshold. Review of weather information revealed general VFR conditions along the route of flight, and at reporting stations near the accident site. Gusty winds, low-level wind shear, and moderate to severe turbulence also prevailed at the time of the accident. In addition, weather radar depicted scattered light snow showers in the vicinity of the accident site, and possibly a snow squall. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions. The pilot had a total flight experience of 14,000 hours, with 8,500 hours in multiengine airplanes, including 2,600 hours in the same make and model as the accident airplane. He also had 4,100 hours of instrument flight experience.

The 700-hour private pilot flying the twin-engine airplane with four passengers aboard used approximately three-quarters of runway 18 before becoming airborne. After establishing a positive rate of climb, the pilot retracted the landing gear and pitched the airplane for a 92 knot climb. Shortly thereafter the rate of climb decreased and the airplane's control authority began to decay. The pilot responded by applying full throttle to both engines and reduced the angle of attack in an attempt to regain airspeed. The pilot was able to arrest the airplane's decaying airspeed and descent; however, the airplane collided with a barn and then a grassy field before coming to rest in an upright position. The pilot and passengers were able to egress the airplane unassisted and the airplane was engulfed in flames a few minutes later. About 23 minutes after the mishap the weather reporting station 24 miles north of the accident site reported, the wind from 230 degrees at 6 knots, the temperature 84 degrees Fahrenheit, and dew point of 60 degrees Fahrenheit. Runway 18 was reported as a 4,002-foot long by 60-foot wide asphalt runway with trees near the departure end. The field elevation at the airport was reported at 544 feet and the density altitude was calculated at 1,860 feet. The estimated weight of the airplane at the time of departure was near its maximum gross weight of 6,000 pounds. The pilot reported that he had not performed a weight and balance check, calculated density altitude, and was not sure of how much fuel was onboard the airplane prior to departure. The pilot further reported that there were no apparent anomalies with the airplane.

After takeoff for a maintenance check flight, both engines on the twin-engine airplane experienced a loss of engine power. The 7,200-hour pilot had recently purchased the airplane, which had not been flown for nearly four years. The pilot, who is also a certificated airframe and powerplant mechanic, completed the inspection of the airplane prior to takeoff. During the engine run-up, the pilot noticed that the RPM and manifold pressure on the left engine did not correspond with those of the right engine. During the takeoff roll, the pilot believed the RPM on both engines began to rise to near acceptable levels, but not entirely. However, he did not abort the takeoff. The airplane became airborne for a short time, and then began to descend into trees before impacting the ground. The reason for the reported loss of engine power could not be determined.

Immediately after taking off and raising the landing gear, the pilot noticed the left engine began to lose power. The airplane subsequently veered to the left before impacting up slopping terrain in a left wing low attitude, resulting in a fire breaking out which consumed the left side of the airplane. A postaccident examination revealed that the left engine had sustained thermal but no impact damage, and that the engine's right hand turbocharger had no thermal or impact damage. A further examination indicated that no restrictions were found in the center section of the turbocharger and there was no damage to the housing or the impeller; however, the impeller was frozen in the center section and would not turn. Indications of grooving and scraping from a lack of lubrication to the bearings and drive shaft was observed. No mechanical anomalies with the aircraft were noted by the pilot prior to takeoff which would have prevented normal operations.

The pilot attempted a night landing on a taxiway in front of the control tower, which was closed at the time. The airplane overran the end of the taxiway, rolled down an embankment and struck trees. The pilot, whose identity was not confirmed, was believed to have incurred minor injuries. He subsequently paid a passerby to take him to a local hotel, and after a night's rest, he left the area. Ownership of the airplane could not be determined due to a recent sale. Approximately 250 kilos of cocaine were found onboard the airplane. Further investigation was being conducted by federal authorities and local law enforcement.