American Airlines

Flight 476 of August 4 was a scheduled operation between Tulsa, Oklahoma, and La Guardia Field, New York, with several intermediate stops including Joplin, Springfield, and St. Louis, Missouri. The flight departed Tulsa at 1006 (one minute behind schedule) with Captain Hugh C. Barren, First Officer William G. Gates, and Stewardess Thelma R. Ballard as crew. En route stops were made at Joplin and Springfield, and no discrepancies were reported or noted at either point. However, a traffic delay in the Joplin area resulted in the flight arriving and departing Springfield 21 minutes behind schedule. Two of the eight passengers deplaned at Springfield, 21 passengers boarded the flight there. Gross weight of the aircraft at takeoff was 38,663 pounds, 2,302 pounds under that allowable, and the center of gravity was located within prescribed limits. Flight 476 departed Springfield VFR for St. Louis, its next scheduled stop, at 1153 via Victor Airway 14 to cruise at 7,000 feet. It was off the ground at 1156. Twenty-one minutes later (1217) the crew initiated a general call asking, "Does anyone read 476?" Springfield company radio acknowledged but received no reply. Two other American Airlines flights, one cruising in the vicinity of Springfield at 7,000 feet, the other 30 miles north-northeast of St. Louis, heard a transmission from Flight 476 that No. 2 engine was on fire. This message was also heard by American's ground station at St. Louis. Three minutes later the American flight in the Springfield area intercepted the following message, "Springfield, are you reading 476? We have bad engine fire." This was the last message heard from the flight. All transmissions were on company frequency. During this interval numerous witnesses on the ground back along the flight path saw the aircraft with smoke and flame coming from the right engine. The aircraft was also tracked by a military radar installation near Springfield until it disappeared from the scope in the vicinity of Fort Leonard Wood. At approximately 1222 the operations officer on duty at Forney Field, Fort Leonard Wood, received a radio message from an Army pilot flying nearby that a two-engine aircraft with a fire in the right engine was on final approach to runway 14. The tower operator at Forney Field saw the approaching aircraft and gave it clearance to land. Before the operations officer could alert the crash crew another call from the Army pilot informed him that the airplane had crashed short of the runway. The time was 1223. Army personnel with portable fire-fighting equipment reached the wreckage on foot. There were no survivors. Heavy fire-fighting equipment and ambulances could not reach the scene until the Army engineers had bulldozed a road through the densely wooded area in which the crash occurred.

American 711 reported en route to the company that it was over Vichy (a position along Victor Airway 14 about 100 miles from Springfield) and estimated it would reach the Springfield VOR station at 2233. Initial radio contact with Springfield Approach Control was established at 2218 and the flight gave it the same Springfield estimate. The approach controller transmitted the 2208 weather observation to the flight. Reported conditions were: Ceiling 400 feet overcast; visibility 10 miles; wind west 12; altimeter 29.68. In response to the controller’s question the flight then indicated it intended to land at Springfield. Immediately thereafter clearance was issued for a standard range approach, instructing flight 711 to report over the range station and when starting the procedure turn. Shortly thereafter the flight asked clearance to descend. There being no other traffic the controller cleared the flight for an approach and to descend whenever it wished. At 2229 the latest weather observation for the airport, completed at 2228, was transmitted to the flight. Conditions given were: Ceiling 500 feet overcast; visibility 8 miles, very light drizzle; wind west 10. The flight informed the controller it would make a circling approach to runway 31, the active runway. At 2234 the flight reported, “American 711, over the Omni at 34, proceeding to the field.” Approximately two minutes later an explosion was seen and heard north-northwest of the airport and attempts to contact the flight thereafter failed. The aircraft crashed about 0,25 miles short of runway 31 and was destroyed. Both pilots and 11 passengers were killed. A weather observation immediately following the accident was: Ceiling 500 feet overcast; visibility 5 miles, very light drizzle; wind northwest 8; altimeter 29.66.

While taxiing to Runway 23 the flight received an IFR (Instrument Plight Rules) clearance from ARTC (Air Route Traffic Control). Normal pre-takeoff checks were performed and the takeoff roll was started at 1640. The aircraft became airborne after using approximately one-half of the 5.630-foot runway. Immediately after leaving the ground the gear was raised and the first officer saw the left feathering button light come on dimly which indicated that the left propeller was in the process of being feathered by the auto-feathering system. After definitely determining the light was on and visually checking the left propeller, the auto-feathering system was disarmed and the captain., in an effort to stop the feathering cycle, pulled the feathering button to neutral. This effort was unsuccessful. the left propeller feathered, and the engine stopped. During the climb an air speed of 140 m.p.h. was reached and maintained., the right engine remaining at full takeoff power. Approximately 250 feet above the ground a shallow left turn was started and the first officer was ordered to reinstate the left engine. the captain believing the aircraft would climb no farther. In the effort to restart the left engine by unfeathering the left propeller. only 600 r.p.m. could be obtained and the captain felt a buffeting through the control yoke. The aircraft at this time had progressed in the left turn approximately 180 degrees from the takeoff direction and the captain. fearing he would be unable to clear obstructions. Including high tension lines, decided to make a wheels-up landing. The landing was made in a field approximately one mile south of the airport. When the aircraft stopped, the passengers and crew evacuated it in an expeditious and orderly manner. The airplane was damaged beyond repair.

American Airlines' Flight 723 of September 16, 1953, was a scheduled operation between Boston Massachusetts, and Chicago, Illinois, with intermediate stops among which were Hartford, Connecticut, and Albany, New York. The crew consisted of Captain J. W. Stentz, First Officer W. J. Schanken, and Stewardess J. G. Thornquist, Prior to departing Boston the crew filed a company VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flight plan to Chicago following which the company issued a flight clearance to proceed to Albany INSTOP (Instrument or On Top of Clouds Authorize d) 2 with an intermediate landing at Bradley Field, the airport serving Hartford, Connecticut, and Springfield, Massachusetts. The alternate airport was Syracuse, New York. At the time this flight clearance was issued, the weather en route to Albany was good mid the conditions at Albany were above minimums. The portion of the flight to Bradley Field was without incident and the aircraft arrived there at 0657. At Bradley Field Captain Stentz reviewed the latest weather reports in the company's operations office and was advised that Bradley Field had been added to his flight clearance as a second alternate in addition to Syracuse because the weather at Albany at this time was below the company's landing minimums 3 was forecast to improve to within limits by the time the flight arrived there. The special Albany 0642 weather report available to the captain at this time was: ceiling indefinite zero, sky obscured, visibility zero, fog. The en route weather was clear. According to the company's records, the gross takeoff weight of the aircraft at Hartford was 37,889 pounds which was within the allowable gross take-off weight of 40,503 pounds; the load was properly distributed with respect to the center of gravity limits of the aircraft. Departure from Bradley Field was made at 0714 with 25 passengers. Immediately before departing, the flight advised the tower it was proceeding to Albany VFR. At 0737, a message from the company's dispatcher at New York was relayed to Captain Stentz through the company radio at Albany as follows: "If Albany still below limits on your arrival, if OK with you, suggest hold vicinity until at least 0830 EST. Expect Albany to have limits 0730-0800 EST. Advise fuel on board when over Albany." Flight 723 acknowledged and advised. "We will hold." At 0740, the flight reported to Albany Approach Control that it was over Montgomery Ward, an in-range visual check point, VFR, and requested a clearance of at least 500 feet on top of clouds to the Albany Range Station. This request was approved and the flight was cleared to maintain at least 500 feet on top and to hold north of the Range Station. The 0739 Albany special weather report was given the flight: "Ceiling indefinite, 100 feet, sky obscured, visibility 1/4 mile, fog, wind west-southwest one mile per hour." Flight 723 reported aver the Range Station at 0742. During the holding period the number of aircraft in this pattern varied from six to nine. The special Albany weather report issued at 0750 indicated thin obscurement, ceiling estimated 4,000, overcast, fog, visibility 3/4 miles. At 0753, the first of the aircraft in the holding pattern, American Airlines' Flight 750, was cleared for an instrument approach to Runway 19. At 0800, this aircraft missed its approach and was immediately cleared to climb toward the south and to again remain at least 500 feet on top of clouds. A second aircraft which was holding was then cleared to make a similar approach and it too was forced to execute a missed approach procedure. At 08163 an instrument approach mid a landing on Runway 19 were successfully completed by one of the holding aircraft. Immediately following this landing. Flight 723 was cleared to make an instrument approach to Runway 19. Three minutes later the flight advised the tower that its approach was being abandoned because the aircraft's flaps could not be lowered. It was then still at least 500 feet on top of clouds and was advised by the tower to remain there until further advised. At approximately 0830, the following message was transmitted from the Albany Tower: "All aircraft holding Albany. It now appears to be pretty good for a contact approach from the west. It looks much better than to the north." Immediately following this message, Flight 723 was asked by the tower if it would accept a contact approach from the west for a landing on Runway 10. After requesting and receiving current weather including altimeter setting (29.74) and the length of Runway 10 (4,500 feet). the flight stated it would accept a contact approach. Clearance was then issued the flight to make a contact approach to Runway 10. Acknowledgement of this clearance was the last radio contact with the flight. At approximately 0834, Flight 723 struck the radio towers and crashed. The weather reported at the time of the accident was thin scattered clouds at 500 feet, ceiling estimated 4,500 feet, broken clouds, visibility 1-1/2 miles, fog.

The approach to Newark was completed in marginal weather conditions with a ceiling at 400 feet and a 3/4 mile visibility. For unknown reason, the aircraft deviated from the approach path to the left and, in a relative flat attitude, hit an obstacle and eventually crashed in flames on several houses located in the city of Elizabeth, about three miles from runway 06 threshold. All 23 occupants on board the aircraft and seven people in the ground were killed while nine others were injured. Few houses were destroyed.

Flight 157 originated at LaGuardia Field, New York, for Mexico City, Mexico, with stops scheduled at Washington, D C., and Dallas, Tex. Departure from LaGuardia was at 2147, November 28 Between LaGuardia and Washington the flight was reported to be uneventful with all of the aircraft's components functioning normally. At Washington, a flight plan was filed with, and approved by, Airway Route Traffic Control It specified Instrument Flight Rules to Dallas, with Wichita Falls, Tex, as the alternate, a cruising altitude of 18,000 feet, and a flight time of 5 hours and 4 minutes The gross height of the aircraft at takeoff was 82,298 pounds, which was 3,577 pounds less than the maximum allowable gross weight of 85,875 pounds, and the disposable load was distributed so that the center of gravity was within prescribed limits. At 0206 the flight requested and received permission to change its flight plan to Visual Flight Rules A posit-,on report was made over Nashville at 16,000 feet at 0254 and a descent was started to 6,000 feet When approaching Nashville, 1 No 1 engine had started backfiring at intervals of about 20 seconds Various corrective measures, including the application of alcohol and carburetor heat, and the richening of fuel mixture, were applied but were not successful and the backfiring continued. The captain and the flight engineer discussed the malfunctioning following which No 1 engine was feathered at a point about 25 miles southwest of Nashville at approximately 0300, however, the feathering was not reported to the company until 0429, where the flight was in the vicinity of Altheimer, Ark, a routine position reporting point about 125 miles beyond Memphis At that time, the crew advised a change of aircraft on arrival at Dallas. When 15 miles northeast of Dallas, at 0536, the flight was given permission to enter the traffic pattern at Love Field, Dallas, with a right-hand turn and instructed to land on Runway 36 The altimeter setting of 29 83 inches and the weather, which included unlimited ceiling, a visibility of 15 miles and a north-northeast wind of 5 mph, were given the flight The captain and the flight engineer conferred regarding returning No 1 engine to service and decided against doing so. The crew then went through the pre-landing cheek The landing lights were turned or and the Plans were lowered to the 20 degree position. The flight turned -flight to final approach when approximately over the Range Station which is 2 2 miles south of the approach end of Runway 36 At this time its altitude was estimated to be 1200 feet AFL 2 by the captain and 800 feet AFL by the first officer At a distance of about 1 1/2 miles from the approach end of the runway, the landing gear was extended. Shortly thereafter the flaps were extended fully, the turn to final placed be aircraft to the left of the runway Accordingly an "S" turn was made to correct the misalignment During this "S" turn the aircraft skidded to Its left, the air speed dropped abruptly and the aircraft settled rapidly. At this point the captain increased power to engines Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in an attempt to maintain control. Control tower operators watching the approach estimated that the aircraft cleared by 75 to 100 feet obstruction lights mounted on 30-foot poles on a power line located 800 feet south of the approach end of the runway. The aircraft continued in a generally northwest direction, across the airport on a heading about 40 degrees to the left of Runway 36, in a tail low attitude. Its air speed continued to fall, its attitude became increasingly nose-high. and a stall developed just prior to striking a hangar and other buildings on the northwest side of the airport. Both pilots and 26 passengers were killed.

After 2.700 feet of takeoff roll the aircraft became airborne with an estimated air speed of 120 miles per hour, but at an altitude from 20 to 50 feet the right engine failed and the right propeller automatically feathered. Retraction of the landing gear was accomplished after momentary hesitation as the flight continued straight ahead, gaining altitude very slowly. It passed over the end of the runway at about 50 feet. A power transmission line, 11,700 feet from the start of the takeoff roll. was located across the flight's course. Two towers of this transmission line between which the aircraft was flown extended to an elevation of 371 feet, or a height of 111 feet above the southwest end of Runway 2 from where the takeoff was started. Elevation of the lowest point of the top series of wires as they hung between the two towers was 335 feet or 75 feet above the southwest end of Runway 2. The flight cleared these wires at this lowest point by 10 to 20 feet. Just before flying over the power lines at an air speed of 110 miles per hour, a slow retraction of the flaps was started. After crossing the power lines, the air speed fell to 105 miles per hour even though the left engine continued to develop full takeoff power. Not being able to hold altitude, a shallow right turn was made to relatively clear terrain where the aircraft was crash landed 18,713 feet northeast from the starting point of the takeoff. The aircraft slid over the ground for a distance of 217 feet, skidded over an embankment and a highway, then came to rest. Control tower personnel had observed the feathering of the right propeller and the slow rate of climb. Feeling that the aircraft would not remain airborne, the airport controller instructed another air carrier flight, then on a landing approach to Memphis, to circle the Convair so as to keep the tower advised of its position. Instructions were immediately transmitted to the field's fire and crash personnel following which the city fire and police departments and hospitals were notified. Since fire and crash equipment had actually been dispatched while the aircraft was still in flight, it arrived only two or three minutes after the crash. Fire which started in the left engine nacelle after landing was quickly extinguished, and prompt medical attention was available for all occupants. Although the stewardess had received minor injuries, she, with the aid of one of the passengers, had opened two emergency exits. She had then deplaned all passengers. Thirteen passengers and one crew member received serious injuries, and 18 passengers and two crew members received minor injuries.

During the takeoff roll in Tulsa, the nose gear hit a snowdrift. After departure, during initial climb, the crew was unable to raise the nose gear so the captain decided to divert to Dallas-Love Field for a safe landing. After touchdown, the aircraft slid on its nose and came to rest. There were no casualties but the aircraft was written off.

Enroute from San Francisco to Chicago, the crew informed ATC that a fire erupted in the rear compartment of the aircraft and decided to divert to Gallup Airport for an emergency landing. The aircraft was difficult to maneuver and landed in flames. After it came to a halt, all 25 occupants were quickly disembarked and helped by local rescuers before the aircraft being totally destroyed by fire.

The aircraft took off on runway 13 of La Guardia Airport at 1843LT, having been cleared on an instrument flight plan to Rochester, New York, with Toronto, Ontario, as an alternate. Approximately 2 minutes after take-off the flight called La Guardia Tower and reported that it was in the vicinity of the south end of Whitestone Bridge, approximately 2 1/2 miles northeast of La Guardia Airport. The flight advised that the oil pressure was low on one engine, and requested clearance to land on runway 22. The request was approved, and the tower informed the crew that the wind was calm. When asked if emergency equipment was desired to stand by, the flight replied in the negative. Shortly thereafter, NX88787 reported that it was on the final approach, and that it was over the sand barges, located approximately one-half mile off the approach end of runway 22. In reply the flight was again given clearance to land. The aircraft was first seen at an altitude of approximately 800 feet, and about 1,300 feet off the approach end of runway 22 with the landing gear extended. The flaps were lowered, and the aircraft started a steep descent to runway 22,but it passed over the approach end of the runway at an altitude of approximately 300 feet. The flight then requested and was granted permission by the tower to make a right turn, however, the aircraft continued straight ahead over the runway, gradually losing altitude. When one-third of the way down the runway, the right propeller was feathered. When over the intersection of runways 22 and 18 and at an altitude of 200 feet the flaps were raised, which resulted in an additional loss of altitude. During or directly after raising the flaps, a right turn was initiated, and the landing gear was observed to retract slowly. Competent witnesses stated that the right turn was made at a very slow speed, at a high angle of attack, and at an altitude appearing never to have exceeded 200 feet. Over Bowery Bay the aircraft on two occasions almost settled into the water. When in a flat right turn toward runway 13 it lost altitude to about 50 feet. Approximately 2,000 feet from the end of the runway, the landing gear started to extend, and became fully extended when the aircraft was aligned with runway 13. At this time the airplane attitude appeared to be that of a steep climb. The wings were seen to wobble slightly, then the left wing and nose dropped, and the airplane struck the water at an angle of approximately 20 degrees. The forward movement of the aircraft continued on the surface of the water for 40 to 50 feet, throwing up a great spray as the tail rose to a vertical position, after which the aircraft continued over on its back and sank in about 5 minutes.