Piper PA-46 (Malibu/Meridian/Mirage/Matrix/M-Class)

The single engine airplane departed Campinas-Campo de Amarais-Prefeito Francisco Amaral Airport on a flight to Belo Horizonte-Pampulha-Carlos Drummond de Andrade Airport. After takeoff, the pilot continued to the east when he apparently encountered adverse weather conditions. The airplane entered an uncontrolled descent, suffered an in-flight breakup, lost a wing and eventually crashed in a prairie located less than 3 km south of Itapeva. The airplane was totally destroyed and all seven occupants were killed.

On final approach to Saltillo-Plan de Guadalupe Airport Runway 35, the single engine airplane entered a sudden left turn, impacted the ground and crashed in an open field. The wreckage was found about 200 metres short of runway threshold. The airplane was destroyed upon impact and all four occupants were killed.

The pilot departed Lake Norman Airpark Runway 32 at 1152LT on a local flight. After takeoff, he continued to the northwest for about 10 minutes then initiated a turn to the left and a descent back to the airfield. On short final, the single engine airplane crashed nearby a wooded area located near Adrian Lane, about 1,200 metres short of runway 14. The airplane was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Shortly after takeoff from McCook-Ben Nelson Regional Airport, en route to Schreveport, Louisiana, the single engine airplane went out of control and crashed in a garden located in a residential area. One occupant was killed and the second one was injured. The airplane was destroyed.

The pilot reported that before takeoff on the cross-country flight, the airplane contained 100 gallons of fuel, with 11 gallons in the header fuel tank, and the airplane’s automatic fuel transfer system was configured as per the checklist. No anomalies were noted during the engine start, takeoff, and initial climb. About 7 minutes into the flight and climbing through 12,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the engine sustained an abrupt loss of power that was confirmed by the loss of torque and engine compressor turbine rpm (Ng) speed. The pilot noted no cockpit warning or abnormal indications before the loss of engine power. The pilot declared an emergency and then executed a 180° turn back to the departure airport. The pilot attempted two engine restarts, and both were unsuccessful. Unable to make it back to the airport, the pilot executed an off airport forced landing. During the forced landing, the airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings. A postaccident examination of the airframe, fuel system components, and functional engine test revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The fuel transfer pump switch was found in the manual position. The engine’s fuel was provided by the airframe header tank. Avionics data indicated that during the short flight, the header fuel tank quantity consistently decreased, and the airplane’s automatic fuel system did not continually resupply fuel to the header tank. Based on the available data, a functional engine test, and functional testing of the airplane’s fuel system, it is likely the pilot improperly configured the airplane’s fuel transfer system, which prevented the header fuel tank from automatically refilling during the flight and resulted in fuel starvation and total loss of engine power. Although the pilot reported that he had configured the airplane’s automatic fuel transfer system per the checklist, it is likely that the fuel transfer switch was in the manual or OFF position during the flight. In addition, the pilot did not properly monitor the header tank’s fuel quantity.

While climbing the airplane to cruise altitude after takeoff, the pilot observed an increase in engine oil temperature above the normal range and requested to return to the departure airport. While receiving vectors for an instrument approach, the pilot saw smoke in the cabin and the engine lost total power. Unable to glide to any runway, the pilot selected a field for the forced landing, during which the airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. Postaccident examination revealed that about 2 quarts of oil remained in the engine, and the recovered oil displayed evidence of metal contamination. There was evidence of an oil leak in the engine compartment and along the lower fuselage. There was evidence of a crankcase fracture near the oil dip stick port; however, a laboratory examination determined the fracture to be consistent with overload and likely due to impact-related damage. The engine exhibited no evidence of any loose or disconnected oil lines. The oil filter was removed, and the filter material was found to be saturated with metallic particles. The oil suction screen plug, located on the oil sump, was not secured with safety wire as required per the manufacturer’s maintenance manual. There was no evidence that the plug or required safety wire was damaged by other objects. The oil suction screen plug was found to be loose, with engine oil observed below the oil suction screen plug. The crush washer behind the oil screen plug was intact and exhibited no damage. Laboratory analysis of the metallic debris recovered from the oil suction screen was consistent with connecting rod material as well as steel from fittings, fasteners, and brackets. The metallic debris found in the recovered oil, oil filter, and oil suction screen was likely due to mechanical damage associated with oil starvation. Eleven days before the accident flight, the pilot observed decreased engine manifold pressure and a partial loss of engine power. He diverted to an airport, where he had the turbocharger replaced by an aviation mechanic. In addition to replacing the turbocharger, the mechanic also drained and replaced the engine oil, which included removal and reinstallation of the oil suction screen plug. The loss of engine power was likely due to a loss of oil during the flight that led to oil starvation within the engine. The loose oil suction screen plug, the absence of safety wire on the plug, and the evidence of an oil leak beneath the plug were consistent with the mechanic’s failure to properly secure the oil suction screen plug during recent maintenance.

The pilot reported that the airplane did not gain sufficient airspeed during the takeoff roll. He stated that, to avoid overrunning the runway onto a busy road he lifted the airplane off the runway when it reached rotation speed near the end of the runway. He was able to clear the highway, but the airplane contacted trees on the far side of the highway. The airplane descended to the ground and postimpact fire ensued. Witnesses who heard and saw the airplane taking off reported the engine sounded strong, as if it was running at full power. One witness observed the airplane pitch up into a steep nose-up attitude, climb to an estimated altitude of 100 ft, then start settling, barely clearing the streetlights along the side of a road. The airplane then began a slight roll to the left and struck trees. A large fireball erupted almost immediately upon impact with the trees. The climb and impact sequence were later verified by review of airport security camera video. The pilot contacted air traffic control (ATC) and requested to take off from a runway that was 2,700 ft in length, had an uphill gradient, and obstacles off the departure end. In addition, the pilot did not use the entire runway for the takeoff; instead, he initiated the takeoff with 2,301 ft of runway available. The requested runway also resulted in him departing with a tailwind component of about 3 knots, and an 11-knot crosswind component. The primary runway in use was 8,001 ft long and would have resulted in the airplane taking off downhill, with a headwind and no obstacles off the departure end. The runway selected by the pilot was closer to his hangar than the available longer runway. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of preimpact failure of the engine or airplane that would have precluded normal operation. As the postimpact fire consumed many of the items onboard, the investigation was unable to establish the actual weight of the items that were loaded onto the airplane. However, the weights of the recovered cargo, in addition to the weights of the occupants (the pilot, his wife, and their dog), and the fuel onboard, indicated that at a minimum the total weight was in excess of the airplane’s maximum takeoff weight by about 14 pounds and the center of gravity (CG) was outside of the forward limit of the operating envelope. Based on this information, it is most likely that the overweight condition and exceedance of the CG limitations resulted in performance degradation that prevented the pilot from gaining sufficient airspeed and altitude to clear the trees off the end of the runway. The performance degradation was compounded by the pilot’s runway selection, which resulted in a takeoff tailwind component and obstacles.

The airplane sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident near Thedford, Nebraska. The pilot and passenger were uninjured. The airplane was being operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot reported that during landing, when the nose wheel made contact with the runway, the airplane began to veer right. He attempted to use left rudder and brake to keep the airplane on the runway, but as the airspeed decreased, directional control became harder to maintain and the airplane subsequently departed the right side of the runway. During the runway excursion, the airplane impacted a runway light, spun left and the landing gear collapsed. During a post accident examination, it was determined that the airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing.

The pilot reported, and airport security video confirmed, that during a takeoff attempt, the right wing contacted the runway and the pilot pulled back excessively on the yoke. The airplane pitched up, stalled, and descended back on to the runway. It subsequently traveled off the end of the runway and impacted trees, before coming to rest on its side. The pilot added that in retrospect, he should have rejected the takeoff when the right wing contacted the runway. Examination of the wreckage by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions, nor did the pilot report any. The inspector noted that both wings separated, and the fuselage was substantially damaged.