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Crash of a Boeing 737-476 in Bergamo

Date & Time: Aug 5, 2016 at 0407 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HA-FAX
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Paris-Roissy-CDG - Bergamo
MSN:
24437/2162
YOM:
1991
Flight number:
QY7332
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
9787
Captain / Total hours on type:
2254.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
343
Copilot / Total hours on type:
86
Aircraft flight hours:
65332
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Paris-Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport at 0254LT on a cargo flight (service QY7332) to Bergamo on behalf of DHL Airways. Upon arrival at Bergamo-Orio al Serio Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity, heavy rain falls and strong wind. The aircraft crossed the runway threshold at a speed of 156 knots and landed 18 seconds later, 2,000 metres pas the runway threshold. Unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 28 is 2,807 metres long), the aircraft overran, went through the perimeter fence, lost its undercarriage and both engines and eventually stopped in a motorway, some 520 metres pas the runway end. Both crew members evacuated safely and the aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
The causes of the accident are mainly due to the human factor. In particular, the accident was caused by the runway overrun during the landing phase, caused by a loss of situational awareness relating to the position of the aircraft with respect to the runway itself. This loss of situational awareness on the part of the crew caused a delay in contact with the runway, which occurred, at a still high speed, in a position too far to allow the aircraft to stop within the remaining distance.
Contributing to the dynamics of the event:
- The commander's prior decision not to carry out a go-around procedure (this decision is of crucial importance in the chain of events that characterized the accident),
- Inadequate maintenance of flight parameters in the final phase of landing,
- Failure of the crew to disconnect the autothrottle prior to landing,
- Poor lighting conditions with the presence of storm cells and heavy rain falls at the time of the event (environmental factor), which may have contributed to the loss of situation awareness,
- The attention paid by the crew during the final phase of the flight, where both pilots were intent to acquire external visual references and did not realize that the aircraft crossed over the runway at high speed for 18 seconds before touchdown,
- The lack of assertiveness of the first officer in questioning the commander's decisions.
Finally, it cannot be excluded that a condition of tiredness and fatigue may have contributed to the accident, even if not perceived by the crew, which may have influenced the cognitive processes, in particular those of the captain, interfering with his correct decision making process.
Final Report:

Crash of a Let L-410UVP-E19A in Bergamo: 3 killed

Date & Time: Oct 30, 2005 at 2204 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
9A-BTA
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Bergamo - Zagreb
MSN:
91 25 38
YOM:
1991
Flight number:
TDR729
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
7780
Captain / Total hours on type:
760.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1272
Copilot / Total hours on type:
200
Aircraft flight hours:
7185
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Bergamo-Orio al Serio Airport on a night cargo service to Zagreb, carrying one passenger (the captain's wife), two pilots and a load of 1,600 kilos of small packages. After takeoff from runway 28, while climbing in foggy conditions, the aircraft entered a left turn then descended, collided with a powerline and crashed in an open field located one km north of the airfield. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all three occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
As far as is established, documented and substantiated, the cause of the accident is due to a loss of control in flight of the aircraft. Although the cause of this loss of control could not be established with incontrovertible certainty, it can reasonably be assumed that it was caused by a deterioration in the situation awareness of the crew during the initial climb immediately after take-off. The loss of such situation awareness may have been contributed jointly or severally:
- The displacement or incorrect positioning of the load, which would have induced a moment of rotation on the longitudinal axis of the aircraft (roll) not immediately perceived and counteracted by the crew;
- Spatial disorientation, as a result of the possible optical illusion produced by the high speed "E" TWY lights, which, crossing the thick fog, could have induced the pilot to veer, thus causing the final loss of control of the aircraft. In addition, the limited flight experience of the co-pilot and the inadequate application of CRM techniques by the crew did not allow for a timely identification of the hazardous situation and the necessary actions to recover the aircraft.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 707-331B in Santa Maria: 144 killed

Date & Time: Feb 8, 1989 at 1408 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N7231T
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Bergame - Santa Maria - Punta Cana
MSN:
19572
YOM:
1968
Flight number:
IDN1851
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
137
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
144
Aircraft flight hours:
44755
Aircraft flight cycles:
12589
Circumstances:
Independent Air flight IDN1851, a Boeing 707, departed Bergamo, Italy (BGY) at 10:04 UTC for a flight to Punta Cana, Dominican Republic (PUJ) via Santa Maria, Azores (SMA). At 13:56:47 Santa Maria Tower cleared the flight to descend to 3000 feet for a runway 19 ILS approach: "Independent Air one eight five one roger reclear to three thousand feet on QNH one zero two seven and runway will be one niner." In that transmission, the trainee controller had transmitted an incorrect QNH that was 9 hPa too high. The actual QNH was 1018.7 hPa. After a brief pause the message resumed at 13:56:59: "expect ILS approach runway one niner report reaching three thousand." This transmission was not recorded on the voice recorder of Flight 1851, probably because the first officer keyed his mike and read back: "We’re recleared to 2,000 feet and ah ... ." The first officer paused from 13:57:02 to 13:57:04, then unkeyed the mike momentarily. This transmission was not recorded on the ATS tapes. In the cockpit, the first officer questioned aloud the QNH value, but the captain agreed that the first officer had correctly understood the controller. After being cleared for the ILS approach the crew failed to accomplish an approach briefing, which would have included a review of the approach plate and minimum safe altitude. If the approach plate had been properly studied, they would have noticed that the minimum safe altitude was 3,000 feet and not 2,000 feet, as it had been understood, and they would have noticed the existence and elevation of Pico Alto. At 14:06, the flight was 7.5 nm from the point of impact, and beginning to level at 2,000 feet (610 meters) in light turbulence at 250 KIAS. At 14:07, the flight was over Santa Barbara and entering clouds at approximately 700 feet (213 meters) AGL in heavy turbulence at 223 KIAS. At 14:07:52, the captain said, "Can’t keep this SOB thing straight up and down". At approximately 14:08, the radio altimeter began to whine, followed by the GPWS alarm as the aircraft began to climb because of turbulence, but there was no reaction on the part of the flight crew. At 14:08:12, the aircraft was level when it impacted a mountain ridge of Pico Alto. It collided with a rock wall on the side of a road at the mountain top at an altitude of approximately 1,795 feet (547 meters) AMSL.
Probable cause:
The Board of Inquiry understands that the accident was due to the non-observance by the crew of established operating procedures, which led to the deliberate descent of the aircraft to 2000ft in violation the minimum sector altitude of 3,000 feet, published in the appropriate aeronautical charts and cleared by the Santa Maria Aerodrome Control Tower.
Other factors:
1) Transmission by the Santa Maria Aerodrome Control Tower of a QNH value 9 hPa higher than the actual value, which put the aircraft at an actual altitude 240 feet below that indicated on board,
2) Deficient communications technique on the part of the co-pilot, who started reading back the Tower's clearance to descend to 3000ft before the Tower completed its transmission, causing a communications overlap,
3) Violation by the Aerodrome Control Tower of established procedures by not requiring a complete read back of the descent clearance,
4) Non-adherence by the crew to the operating procedures published in the appropriate company manuals, namely with respect to cockpit discipline, approach briefing , repeating aloud descent clearances, and informal conversations in the cockpit below 10,000 feet,
5) General crew apathy in dealing with the mistakes they made relating to the minimum sector altitude, which was known by at least one of the crew members, and to the ground proximity alarms,
6) Non-adherence to standard phraseology both by the crew and by Air Traffic Control in some of the air-ground communications,
7) Limited experience of the crew, especially the co-pilot, in international flights,
8) Deficient crew training, namely concerning the GPWS as it did not include emergency manoeuvres to avoid collision into terrain,
9) Use of a route which was not authorized in the AIP Portugal,
10) The operational flight plan, whose final destination was not the SMA beacon, was not developed in accordance with the AIP Portugal.

Crash of a Beechcraft 200 Super King Air in Bergamo

Date & Time: Mar 26, 1984 at 0830 LT
Operator:
Registration:
F-GCCC
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Grenoble – Bergamo
MSN:
BB-504
YOM:
1979
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On final approach to Bergamo-Orio al Serio Airport, the pilot failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft struck power cables. It stalled and crashed in a field short of runway, bursting into flames. All six occupants evacuated the cabin before the aircraft would be destroyed by fire. All five passengers were unhurt while the pilot suffered a broken vertebra.

Crash of a Fokker F28 Fellowship 1000 in Bergamo

Date & Time: Apr 9, 1975 at 0850 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
I-TIDA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bergamo - Rome
MSN:
11014
YOM:
1969
Flight number:
IH779
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
27
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
12139
Aircraft flight cycles:
14456
Circumstances:
During the takeoff roll at Bergamo-Orio al Serio Airport, the captain started the rotation when he noticed a sudden loss of power on both engines. Decision to abandon the takeoff was taken and the captain initiated an emergency braking procedure. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the airplane overran, struck several approach lights, lost its nose gear and came to rest 200 meters further. All 31 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Beechcraft C-45F Expeditor in Bergamo

Date & Time: Mar 25, 1971
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
MM61735
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
7694
YOM:
1944
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Crashed in unknown circumstances at Bergamo-Orio al Serio Airport. There were no casualties.