Beaumont

About 20 minutes after departing on a cross-country flight, the pilot acknowledged the air traffic controller’s clearance to climb to 17,000 feet mean sea level (msl). Radar data indicated that the airplane reached a maximum altitude of 16,800 feet msl. The airplane then entered a right descending turn followed by a left descending turn. While in the left turn, the pilot informed the controller, “I lost my autopilot; I’m in an unusual attitude.” The pilot stated this same information two more times in response to transmissions by the controller. The pilot’s last transmission was that he was busy trying to recover the airplane. Witnesses heard the airplane flying overhead for several minutes, but they could not see it due to the low ceiling. A postaccident examination of the airplane did not reveal any pre accident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the engine that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the autopilot system revealed a loose screw inside the pitch servo housing. The screw was one of two that secured the high wattage resistor to the solenoid housing. Observed corrosion within the screw threads was consistent with the threads not being engaged in a nut or other internally threaded feature. No mechanical damage or arcing was visible on the screw. The operational impact of the loose screw is unknown. The pilot’s instrument flying proficiency could not be determined. According to log records, the pilot last flew 4.5 months before the accident. The airplane was in instrument meteorological conditions when the pilot stated that he was trying to recover from the unusual attitude. The pilot did not follow prescribed procedures for an autopilot malfunction. Weather data indicates that the airplane most likely encountered turbulence and icing conditions during the flight; however, the airplane was equipped with an ice protection system. Although ethanol was found during the toxicology tests, the levels varied greatly among the tissue/fluid samples. The investigation was unable to determine if the presence of ethanol was from ingestion or from postmortem production or contamination. The detected level of diphenhydramine, an over-the-counter sedating antihistamine used to treat allergies, was above therapeutic levels and likely contributed to the pilot’s inability to recover from the unusual attitude.

The pilot was on an instrument flight from Beaumont, Texas, to Craig Airport, Jacksonville, Florida. According to the pilot's children who were passengers on the airplane, the pilot knew the destination airport was forecast to have fog upon their arrival. Air traffic controllers informed the pilot east of Tallahassee, Florida, the fog at his destination airport would not lift for at least an hour and a half. The pilot was informed the weather at Saint Augustine, Florida, was clear skies with two miles visibility. The pilot informed the controller that he would slow the airplane and continue to Craig. The pilot was subsequently cleared to descend and provided vectors for the ILS Runway 32 approach at Craig. The pilot informed the controller that he had the current automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information. The ATIS for Craig reported an indefinite ceiling with a vertical visibility of 100 feet, and one-quarter of a mile visibility. The weather minimums for the ILS runway 32 approach is a decision height of 241 feet, and one-half mile visibility. The controller informed the pilot to contact Craig Tower. The pilot contacted Craig Tower, and was instructed to report passing the final approach fix. The controller informed the pilot that Jacksonville International Airport had a runway visual range of more than 6,000 feet, and that airplanes were making it in. The controller asked the pilot what his intentions were in the event he made a missed approach. The pilot replied, "I got my brother bringing my mom there into your airfield, so I do not know, what do you think is best, what's closest." The controller replied Jacksonville was closer than Saint Augustine. The pilot informed the controller that he would go to Jacksonville in the event of a missed approach. The pilot was cleared to land, and there was no further radio contact between the pilot and Craig Tower. The airplane was located a short time later in a wooded area, 1.8 miles from the airport. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no preimpact mechanical anomalies.

During a cross-country flight, the pilot of the twin-engine airplane reported to air traffic control that he has 'lost an engine.' A witness observed the right engine hanging from its lower mounts as the airplane turned right and headed towards the nearest airport. The airplane impacted trees approximately 1 mile short of the runway threshold. Examination of the right engine propeller revealed that one of its blades was separated about mid-span. The separated tip section of the blade was not recovered. Metallurgical examination of the fracture surface revealed that the blade failed as a result of a fatigue crack that originated from corrosion pits on the camber surface (face) of the blade. The failed blade was examined approximately 6 hours prior to the accident in accordance with an airworthiness directive (AD 81-13-06 R2) that called for inspections of the blade for corrosion and fatigue. However, the inspections called out in the AD were only applicable to the blade fillet and shank regions, well inboard of the fracture location on the failed blade. Overhaul of the propeller in accordance with the propeller manufacturer's manual includes grinding of each blade to 'remove all visual evidence of corrosion.' According to the airplane's owner, the propellers had not been overhauled in the eight years that he had owned the aircraft. The maintenance records were destroyed in the accident, which precluded determination of the date and time of the last propeller overhaul. The accident airplane was being operated under Title 14 CFR Part 91, and therefore, the propellers were not required to be overhauled at specified intervals.

The pilot landed downwind on his private strip. The exact amount of the tailwind could not be determined. A thunderstorm was located just to the east of the runway and could have readily given N448 a strong tailwind. The aircraft touched down 390 feet beyond the threshold. Light braking action was evident from that point up to a point 400 feet from a hangar where all tire marks disappeared. The aircraft collided with the hangar, which was built at the end of and across the runway, approximately 10 feet above the runway surface and was destroyed by the subsequent post crash fire. The passenger was seriously injured and the pilot was killed.

The Grumman American AA-5A, N9844U, had just landed. While taxing, the aircrew stopped short of runway 13R as Beechcraft. Hawker BH-125, N125E, was taking off. The rated student in N125E, who was on a training flight, was at the controls and began the takeoff. The power-up and takeoff roll were normal. Rotation was described as normal and the left throttle was retarded to idle at 110 knots, as pre-briefed, to simulate an engine failure. The instructor pilot (IP) stated that the lift off appeared normal and directional control was good up to an alt of 10 to 20 feet. The left wing then started to drop and the student applied right aileron, but did not stop the roll. The IP began advancing the left throttle, but did not get on the flight controls. The left wing hit the runway and the aircraft veered left and settled to the ground. At impact, both main gear mounts failed, a fuel tank ruptured and a fire started. N125E then slid into N9844U and both aircraft burned. BH-125 flight man recommends IP follow thru, max bank 5° and cautions negative wxvaning in crosswind. BH-125 rudder bias engaged. AA-5A crew thrown out, seatbelts unlatched.

The aircraft was the second aircraft of a flight of two. The lead aircraft had received radio clearance for takeoff. The lead aircraft was to proceed to a visual checkpoint northwest of the airport and wait for this aircraft to join up. Witnesses observed the aircraft depart runway 17 and remain at low altitude. A left turn was completed with the aircraft passing over the witnesses at low altitude. They saw the pilot looking from side to side just prior to the aircraft colliding with a radio tower/antenna. The aircraft crashed and the pilot, sole on board was killed.

Shortly after takeoff from Dallas-Love Field Airport, while climbing, the pilot informed ATC about serious problems and elected to return for an emergency landing. He was cleared to do so and completed a turn to rejoin the airport when he lost control of the airplane that crashed onto several houses by the airfield. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was killed. There were no injuries on the ground.