Bridgeport-Igor I. Sikorsky Memorial

The pilot reported that, during the initial climbout, about 1,000 ft above ground level, one of the engines stopped producing power. He confirmed that all engine controls were full forward and the main fuel tanks were selected. Immediately thereafter, the remaining engine began to surge, then stopped producing power. He established best glide speed and looked for an area to perform a forced landing. The airplane crashed into a solid waste disposal facility, about 2.3 nautical miles northwest of the departure airport. First responders arrived immediately after the accident and found only a trace amount of fuel within the confines of the accident site or in the fuel tanks. The only postaccident fire was centered on a small, localized area near the right engine turbocharger. Both main fuel tanks were empty, and the auxiliary bladder tanks were ruptured by impact forces. Examination of both engines revealed no evidence of a pre accident malfunction or anomaly. A surveillance video showed no evidence of smoke or mist training the airplane seconds prior to impact. The pilot reported that he departed the airport with 112 gallons of fuel on board. The pilot did not provide evidence of the latest refueling when requested by investigators. The available evidence is consistent with a total loss of engine power to both engines due to fuel exhaustion.

The first officer was in the left seat, flying the airplane, and the captain was in the right seat, for the positioning flight. Approaching the destination, the crew briefed, then attempted an ILS RWY 18 approach. The captain reported not receiving the localizer, when, in fact, the airplane was actually about 5 nautical miles to the left of it. Winds at the airport, about that time, were from 190 degrees true, at 5 knots; however, area winds at 6,000 feet were from 220 degrees, in excess of 40 knots. The crew executed a missed approach, but did not follow the missed approach procedures. The captain later requested, and received clearance for, the VOR RWY 25 approach. The captain partially briefed the approach to the first officer as the airplane neared the VOR, then subsequently "talked through" remaining phases of the approach as they occurred. The outbound course for the VOR RWY 25 approach was 066 degrees, and the minimum altitude outbound was 4,300 feet. After passing the VOR, the captain directed the first officer to maintain 4,700 feet. The airplane's last radar contact occurred as the airplane was proceeding outbound, 7 nautical miles northeast of the VOR, at 4,800 feet. As the airplane approached the course reversal portion of the procedure turn, the captain initially directed the first officer to turn the airplane in the wrong direction. When the proper heading was finally given, the airplane had been outbound for about 2 minutes. During the outbound portion of the course reversal, the captain told the first officer to descend the airplane to 2,900 feet, although the procedure called for the airplane to maintain a minimum of 4,300 feet until joining the inbound course to the VOR. During the inbound portion of the course reversal, the captain amended the altitude to 3,000 feet. As the airplane neared the inbound course to the VOR, the captain called out the outer marker. The first officer agreed, and the captain stated that they could descend to 2,300 feet. The first officer then noted that the VOR indications were fluctuating. The captain pointed out the VOR's continued reception, and the first officer noted, "but it's all over the place." Shortly thereafter, the first officer stated that he was descending the airplane to 2,300 feet. Three seconds later, the airplane impacted trees, then terrain. The wreckage was located at the 2,300-foot level, on rising mountainous terrain, 061 degrees magnetic, 12.5 nautical miles from the VOR. It was also 10.3 nautical miles prior to where a descent to 2,300 feet was authorized. There was no evidence that the crew used available DME information. There was also no evidence of pre-impact mechanical malfunction.

The purpose of the flight was to prepare two first officers for a captain upgrade flight. The instructor pilot disabled the student's attitude indicator during flight, and the student had difficulty maintaining airplane control. During a simulated instrument approach, while in the procedure turn, the instructor simulated an engine failure in addition to the attitude indicator failure. The student asked the instructor to take control of the airplane because he became disoriented, however, the instructor refused. The investigation revealed that the instructor would turn his own flight instrument lights to the 'dim' position when the student was flying so that he could not 'peek' at the operable attitude indicator. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the instructor's light rheostat was in the dim position. The accident occurred over the ocean, on a moonless night. Neither the operator, nor the FAA were aware that this instructor was using Block Island for training, or what training methods he was employing.

The aircraft descended into the water six and 1/2 miles southwest of Bridgeport, CT. The aircraft was on an ILS approach to runway 06. The aircraft was in communication with NY tracon arrival radar and on his initial call had indicated a desire for a clearance direct to Bridgeport. A brief radio exchange resulted in the desired clearance. There was no indication of any problems or low fuel state in the communication. Approximately 15 minutes after initial call, the controller was giving the final approach instructions to N100CT, after having used some turns and changes in airspeed to space the flight behind landing traffic, when radar and radio contact was lost. Post accident fuel calculations based on fuel aboard vs flight time en route and normal fuel consumption showed approximately 6 gallons of fuel remaining. The normal unusable fuel for this aircraft is 13 gallons which increases during maneuvering. Identifiable parts of the aircraft and some paper documents were recovered by the coast guard. The pilot's body was not recovered.

At 2219LT, while approaching Bridgeport by night on a flight from Worcester, the pilot reported to ATC he was low on fuel. Three minutes later, after becoming lost, the airplane descended and crashed into the sea off Bridgeport. SAR operations were initiated and a dead body was found a day later. All three other occupants as well as the wreckage were never found.

While circling in the traffic pattern to Jacksonville Airport, both engines failed. The crew attempted an emergency landing when the airplane struck trees and crashed. It was destroyed upon impact and both pilots were killed.

En route from Sheppard AFB to Carswell AFB, while cruising at an altitude of 6,000 feet in poor weather conditions, the aircraft collided with a USAF Douglas C-124 Globemaster II. Registered 52-0981, the C-124 was en route from Kelly AFB to Tinker AFB with 15 people on board. Following the collision, both aircraft dove into the ground and crashed in a field located near Bridgeport. All 18 occupants on both aircraft were killed.

En route from Kelly AFB to Tinker AFB, while cruising at an altitude of 6,000 feet in poor weather conditions, the four engine aircraft collided with a USAF Fairchild C-119C-17-FA Flying Boxcar. Registered 49-0195, the Flying Boxcar was en route from Sheppard AFB to Carswell AFB with a crew of three on board. Following the collision, both aircraft dove into the ground and crashed in a field located near Bridgeport. All 18 occupants on both aircraft were killed.

This was scheduled passenger flight 535 of March 1 from Boston, Massachusetts, to New York, New York, with stops planned at New Haven and Bridgeport, Connecticut. The crew, consisting of Captain Edward W. Johnson, First Officer Norman A. Paquette, and Stewardess Marian Sullivan, reported to company operations at Boston well ahead of scheduled departure time. Departure from Boston at 0927 was on time and was in accordance with an TFR clearance to cruise at 6,000 feet via airways to New Haven. The flight was routine and on schedule to New Haven. The aircraft was not refueled during the five-minute stop at New Haven, during which time both engines were stopped. The flight departed the terminal with five passengers and 1460 gallons of fuel. Gross weight of the aircraft was well under the maximum allowable and its center of gravity was located within prescribed limits. The wind was calm and runway 14 (4,116 feet), one of two macadam runways, was selected for takeoff. There is no air traffic control tower at New Haven. After completion of the takeoff checklist, the aircraft moved onto the runway and takeoff was initiated from a tan start without delay. This segment of the flight was being flown by First Officer Paquette who occupied the right seat. Captain Johnson, on the left, maintained directional control during the initial acceleration of the aircraft. Before the aircraft reached the intersection of runways 14 and 19, the landing gear was retracted. The aircraft then skidded clown runway 14 near its center and cane to rest 1,050 feet from the far end. Captain Johnson, Stewardess Sullivan, and three passengers left through the right emergency escape hatch over the wing. First Officer Paquette and the two remaining passengers left through the partially opened front entrance door. Fire, around the left engine and the left outboard wing area, caused considerable damage and was extinguished by the local fire department.

Aviators Jim Mollison and Amy Johnson were engaged in a non stop transatlantic flight from Pendine Sands, Wales, to New York. The couple departed Wales the day prior to the accident and following an uneventful crossing flight, they were passing over Connecticut when they were forced to attempt an emergency landing due to fuel exhaustion. The airplane landed in an open field located in Bridgeport, lost its undercarriage and slid for few metres before coming to rest. Both occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft named 'Seafarer' was damaged beyond repair. It was reported that at the time of the accident, the crew completed a distance of 3,300 miles in 39 hours at an average speed of 85 mph. Probably due to unfavorable wind conditions, the aircraft deviated from the prescribed track too far to the north and was unable to reach New York due to fuel shortage, forcing the crew to attempt an emergency landing.