Crash of a Beechcraft B200 Super King Air in Greenville

Date & Time: Nov 9, 2009 at 1009 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N337MT
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Greenville - Greenville
MSN:
BB-1628
YOM:
1998
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
15717
Aircraft flight hours:
3060
Circumstances:
The pilot flew the airplane to a maintenance facility and turned it in for a phase inspection. The next morning, he arrived at the airport and planned a local flight to evaluate some avionics issues. He performed a preflight inspection and then went inside the maintenance facility to wait for two avionic technicians to arrive. In the meantime, two employees of the maintenance facility test ran the engines on the accident airplane for about 30 to 35 minutes in preparation for the phase inspection. The pilot reported that he was unaware that the engine run had been performed when he returned to the airplane for the local flight. He referred to the flight management system (FMS) fuel totalizer, and not the aircraft fuel gauges, when he returned to the airplane for the flight. He believed that the mechanics who ran the engines did not power up the FMS, which would have activated the fuel totalizer, thus creating a discrepancy between the totalizer and the airplane fuel gauges. The mechanics who performed the engine run reported that each tank contained 200 pounds of fuel at the conclusion of the engine run. The B200 Pilot’s Operating Handbook directed pilots not take off if the fuel quantity gauges indicate in the yellow arc or indicate less than 265 pounds of fuel in each main tank system. While on final approach, about 23 minutes into the flight, the right engine lost power, followed by the left. The pilot attempted to glide to the runway with the landing gear and flaps retracted, however the airplane crashed short of the runway. Only residual fuel was found in the main and auxiliary fuel tanks during the inspection of the wreckage. The tanks were not breached and there was no evidence of fuel leakage at the accident site.
Probable cause:
A loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion as a result of the pilot’s failure to visually verify that sufficient fuel was on board prior to flight.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 1900D in Charlotte: 21 killed

Date & Time: Jan 8, 2003 at 0849 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N233YV
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Charlotte - Greenville
MSN:
UE-233
YOM:
1996
Flight number:
US5481
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
19
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
21
Captain / Total flying hours:
2790
Captain / Total hours on type:
1100.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
706
Copilot / Total hours on type:
706
Aircraft flight hours:
15003
Aircraft flight cycles:
21332
Circumstances:
On January 8, 2003, about 0847:28 eastern standard time, Air Midwest (doing business as US Airways Express) flight 5481, a Raytheon (Beechcraft) 1900D, N233YV, crashed shortly after takeoff from runway 18R at Charlotte-Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina. The 2 flight crewmembers and 19 passengers aboard the airplane were killed, 1 person on the ground received minor injuries, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. Flight 5481 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Greenville-Spartanburg International Airport, Greer, South Carolina, and was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
Probable cause:
The airplane’s loss of pitch control during takeoff. The loss of pitch control resulted from the incorrect rigging of the elevator control system compounded by the airplane’s aft center of gravity, which was substantially aft of the certified aft limit.
Contributing to the cause of the accident was:
1) Air Midwest’s lack of oversight of the work being performed at the Huntington, West Virginia, maintenance station,
2) Air Midwest’s maintenance procedures and documentation,
3) Air Midwest’s weight and balance program at the time of the accident,
4) the Raytheon Aerospace quality assurance inspector’s failure to detect the incorrect rigging of the elevator system,
5) the FAA’s average weight assumptions in its weight and balance program guidance at the time of the accident, and
6) the FAA’s lack of oversight of Air Midwest’s maintenance program and its weight and balance program.
Final Report: