Crash of a BAe 3201EP Jetstream 32 in El Estrecho: 1 killed
Date & Time:
Sep 20, 2022 at 0853 LT
Operator:
Registration:
OB-2152
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
El Estrecho – Iquitos
MSN:
941
YOM:
1991
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
15
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total hours on type:
454.00
Copilot / Total hours on type:
628
Aircraft flight hours:
26267
Aircraft flight cycles:
34966
Circumstances:
During the takeoff run from runway 31 at El Estrecho Airport, when the aircraft reached a speed of 80 knots, the captain handed over control to the first officer to complete the takeoff maneuver. However, after traveling approximately 1,000 metres down the runway without being able to lift off, the First Officer decided, without communicating this to the Captain, to abort the takeoff, for which he reduced power by braking the aircraft. Upon feeling the reduction in power, the Captain took the controls, applied reverse thrust to the engines, and simultaneously applied the brakes. The aircraft overshot the end of the runway by approximately 50 metres, causing a Runway Excursion, colliding with and coming to an abrupt stop on a mound of earth and vegetation in the runway extension, leaving the aircraft partially destroyed and causing the death of one of the passengers, as well as injuries to the rest of the occupants.
Probable cause:
Loss of directional control of the aircraft and a subsequent Runway Excursion, resulting from a combination of errors in takeoff planning and execution, incorrect configuration of the RPM throttles levers, failure to comply with standard procedures and poor cockpit resource management (CRM).
The following contributing factors were identified:
- The inappropriate decision to abort takeoff at a speed higher than that described in the performance tables significantly increased the required braking distance.
- Ineffective communication between flight crew members, especially during the critical takeoff phase, creating confusion and incorrect decision-making.
- The ASDA (Accelerate-Stop Distance Available) and takeoff speed calculations used by the crew were significantly higher, increasing the distance and speed required for a safe takeoff.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- The inappropriate decision to abort takeoff at a speed higher than that described in the performance tables significantly increased the required braking distance.
- Ineffective communication between flight crew members, especially during the critical takeoff phase, creating confusion and incorrect decision-making.
- The ASDA (Accelerate-Stop Distance Available) and takeoff speed calculations used by the crew were significantly higher, increasing the distance and speed required for a safe takeoff.
Final Report:
