Charlotte-Douglas

A USAir Boeing 737-401, registration N416US, was scheduled to depart from Baltimore/Washington (BWI) as flight 1846 at 15:10, but air traffic inbound to New York-LaGuardia (LGA) delayed the takeoff until 19:35. Holding on the taxiway at BWI for 1.5 hours required the flight to return to the terminal area for fuel. The Boeing 737-400 left BWI uneventfully and arrived at LGA's Gate 15 at 20:40. Weather and air traffic in the LGA terminal area had caused cancellations and delayed most flights for several hours. The USAir dispatcher decided to cancel the Norfolk leg of Flight 1846, unload the passengers, and send the flight to Charlotte (CLT) without passengers. Several minutes later, the dispatcher told the captain that his airplane would not be flown empty but would carry passengers to Charlotte as USAir flight 5050. This seemed to upset the captain. He expressed concern for the passengers because more delays would cause him and the first officer to exceed crew duty time limitations before the end of the trip. While passengers were boarding, the captain visited USAir's ground movement control tower to ask about how decisions were made about flights and passengers. The captain returned to the cockpit as the last of the passengers were boarding, and the entry door was closed. After the jetway was retracted, the passenger service representative told the captain through the open cockpit window that he wanted to open the door again to board more passengers. The captain refused, and flight 5050 left Gate 15 at 22:52. The 737 taxied out to runway 31. Two minutes after push-back, the ground controller told the crew to hold short of taxiway Golf Golf. However, the captain failed to hold short of that taxiway and received modified taxi instructions from the ground controller at 22:56. The captain then briefed takeoff speeds as V1: 125 knots, VR: 128 knots, and V2: 139 knots. The first officer was to be the flying pilot. He was conducting his first non supervised line takeoff in a Boeing 737. About 2 minutes later, the first officer announced "stabilizer and trim" as part of the before-takeoff checklist. The captain responded with "set" and then corrected himself by saying: "Stabilizer trim, I forgot the answer. Set for takeoff." Flight 5050 was cleared into position to hold at the end of the runway at 23:18:26 and received takeoff clearance at 23:20:05. The first officer pressed the autothrottle disengage and then pressed the TO/GA button, but noted no throttle movement. He then advanced the throttles manually to a "rough" takeoff-power setting. The captain then said: "Okay, that's the wrong button pushed" and 9 seconds later said: "All right, I'll set your power." During the takeoff roll the airplane began tracking to the left. The captain initially used the nosewheel steering tiller to maintain directional control. About 18 seconds after beginning the roll a "bang" was heard followed shortly by a loud rumble, which was due to the cocked nosewheel as a result of using the nosewheel steering during the takeoff roll. At 23:20:53, the captain said "got the steering." The captain later testified that he had said, "You've got the steering." The first officer testified that he thought the captain had said: "I've got the steering." When the first officer heard the captain, he said "Watch it then" and began releasing force on the right rudder pedal but kept his hands on the yoke in anticipation of the V1 and rotation callouts. At 23:20:58.1, the captain said: "Let's take it back then" which he later testified meant that he was aborting the takeoff. According to the captain, he rejected the takeoff because of the continuing left drift and the rumbling noise. He used differential braking and nose wheel steering to return toward the centerline and stop. The throttle levers were brought back to their idle stops at 23:20:58.4. The indicated airspeed at that time was 130 knots. Increasing engine sound indicating employment of reverse thrust was heard on the CVR almost 9 seconds after the abort maneuver began. The airplane did not stop on the runway but crossed the end of the runway at 34 knots ground speed. The aircraft dropped onto the wooden approach light pier, which collapsed causing the aircraft break in three and drop into 7-12 m deep East River. The accident was not survivable for the occupants of seats 21A and 21B because of the massive upward crush of the cabin floor.

During the final approach on the instrument landing system, the pilot descended below the glidepath. The aircraft collided with a tree and struck the ground short of the runway threshold. The pilot was seriously injured.

During arrival, Piedmont flight 467 was vectored for an ILS runway 36R approach. At 2001 cdt (approximately 7 minutes before landing), all arriving flights were advised the weather was (in part): 400 feet overcast, visibility 2 miles with light rain and fog, wind from 090° at 8 knots. Runway 05/32 was out of-svc at that time. Flight 467 was vectored for right turns (from north and west) onto final approach. At 2002:42, the ATC final controller told another flight (same frequency) that there was a 20 to 25 knots right crosswind on final approach. When flight 467 was cleared for landing at 2005:36, the surface wind was reported from 100° at 4 knots. The aircraft was not configured for landing until just before touchdown and the copilot did not alert the captain of the deviation. The aircraft landed approximately 3,200 feet from the threshold and the captain was unable to stop on the wet runway. After departing the runway, the aircraft hit an ILS antenna and a culvert, then went thru a fence and stopped beside railroad tracks. Reportedly, the captain added 20 knots to approach speed for possible wind shear and delayed spoiler option after touchdown. There was evidence of hydroplaning and poor frictional quality on last 1,500 feet of runway. Three passengers received back injuries; both pilots and one flight attendant had minor injuries.

The aircraft collided with a tree and a pole short of the runway during a night VFR approach to land. The pilot changed from runway 18 to 36 during the approach. He was seen low and fast on downwind which ended in a steep descending turn to ground contact. The tower had overied the pilot during the initial approach because of his speed and high altitude. The pilot replied that he would be down and requested a change of runway. The wind was reported as from 150° at 7 knots. Both occupants were killed.

The aircraft was first radar identified about 18 miles north of the airport and was given radar vectors for a right downwind and base to runway 36R. While on a downwind heading 150°, the pilot was assigned a heading of 270° and was queried if the airport was in sight. The pilot responded '...we got it.' However, radar data shows the aircraft continuing the turn through 270° to about 350°. After about 1/2 mile, the aircraft turned left to 250° descending. The turn continued to a southwest heading approximately aligned with a city street that passes south of the airport on a course of 250°. The altitude decreased with a consistent rate to 900 feet when radar contact was lost. Elevation at the approach end of runway 36R is 724 feet. Wreckage distribution was along a 245° heading. A flight inspection of the runway 36R edge lights at night during VFR conditions indicated the lights were not visible beyond 30° of the runway centerline. The pilot got up at 0730 on 11/14.

The pilot reported that on the previous flight, the center fuel tank gauge was malfunctioning and indicated 800 lbs even when it was full with 1400 lbs. After landing at Charlotte, NC, it was still indicating 800 lbs. Before takeoff, the center tank was refilled. While en route about 40 miles west of Atlanta, GA, the pilot noted that the fuel gauge indicated 500 lbs and was dropping rapidly. A few minutes later, both engines flamed out. Vectors were obtained to fly to the nearest airport. During the descent, the engines were restarted. The pilot intercepted the ILS and remained high on the glide slope. The weather at the airport was reported as 100 feet overcast, visibility 1/4 mile with fog and rain. The aircraft broke out of the clouds approximately 2/3 of the way down the runway, then continued off the end of the runway and went thru ILS antenna array. An exam revealed the center fuel cap was missing, it was found in the grass near the parking ramp at Charlotte. The fuel cap was found to be worn and would not lock securely.

While in normal cruise on a cargo flight from Hartford to Charlotte by night, the pilot informed ATC about technical problems. The aircraft lost 2,000 feet then entered an uncontrolled descent and eventually crashed in a field. The pilot was seriously injured.

The crew was engaged in a local training mission at Charlotte-Douglas Airport. Just after liftoff, while in initial climb, the instructor pilot cut the right engine mixture. The airplane encountered difficulties to gain height then stalled and crashed near the airport. Both occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

After takeoff from Charlotte-Douglas Airport, while climbing, the pilot informed ground about an engine failure and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. The pilot encountered other technical problems and was unable to lower the gear when control was lost. The airplane lost altitude and crashed in flames by the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Eastern Air Lines Flight 212, a Douglas DC-9-31, N8984E, operated as a scheduled passenger flight from Charleston, South Carolina, to Chicago, Illinois, with an en route stop at Charlotte, North Carolina. The flight departed Charleston at 07:00 hours local time with 78 passengers and 4 crew members on board. The first officer was Pilot Flying. During the descent into Charlotte, until about 2 minutes and 30 seconds prior to the accident, the flight crew engaged in conversations not pertinent to the operation of the aircraft. These conversations covered a number of subjects, from politics to used cars, and both crew members expressed strong views and mild aggravation concerning the subjects discussed. At 07:32:13, as the flight intercepted the inbound VOR radial for the approach, the flight crew commenced a discussion of Carowinds Tower, which was located ahead and to the left of the projected flight path. This discussion lasted 35 seconds, during which 12 remarks were made concerning the subject. A considerable degree of the flight crew's attention was directed outside the cockpit during that time. During this period, the aircraft descended through 1,800 feet (1,074 feet above touchdown elevation), the altitude which should have been maintained until it crossed Ross Intersection, the final approach fix (FAF). At the end of the 35-second period, the aircraft was still 1.5 nm short of the FAF. At 07:32:41, during the latter part of the discussion regarding Carowinds Tower, the terrain warning alert sounded in the cockpit, signifying that the aircraft was 1,000 feet above the ground. Within seconds after the discussion of Carowinds Tower terminated at 07:32:48, the rate of descent of the aircraft was slowed from about 1,500 feet per minute to less than 300 feet per minute. At 07:33:24, the aircraft passed over Ross Intersection (the FAF) at an altitude of 1,350 feet (624 feet above field elevation), which is 450 feet below the prescribed crossing altitude. The captain did not make the required callout at the FAF, which should have included the altitude (above field elevation) and deviation from the Vref speed. Although shortly before crossing the FAF, one of the pilots stated "three ninety four," a reference to the MDA in height above field elevation. While in the vicinity of Ross Intersection, the first officer asked for 50 degrees of flaps; this request was carried out by the captain. The airspeed at this time was 168 knots, as contrasted with the recommended procedure which calls for the airspeed when passing over the FAF to be in the area of Vref, which in this instance was 122 knots. At 07:33:36, the captain advised Charlotte Tower that they were by Ross Intersection. The local controller cleared the flight to land on runway 36. The last radio transmission from the flight was the acknowledgement, "Alright," at 07:33:46. Shortly after passing Ross Intersection, the aircraft passed through an altitude of 500 feet above field elevation, which should have prompted the captain to call out altitude, deviation from Vref speed, and rate of descent. No such callout was made, nor was the required callout made when the plane descended through an altitude 100 feet above the MDA of 394 feet above the field elevation. The descent rate, after passing Ross, increased to 800 feet per minute, where it stabilized until approximately 7 to 8 seconds prior to impact, when it steepened considerably. According to the CVR, at 0733:52, the captain said, "Yeah, we're all ready," followed shortly thereafter by "All we got to do is find the airport". At 07:33:57, the first officer answered "Yeah". About one-half second later both pilots shouted. The aircraft struck some small trees and then impacted a cornfield about 100 feet below the airport elevation of 748 feet. The aircraft struck larger trees, broke up, and burst into flames. It was destroyed by the impact and ensuing fire. The aircraft crashed about 1.75 statute miles from Ross Intersection and about 3.3 statute miles short of the threshold of runway 36. Eleven passengers and two crew members survived the crash and fire. One passenger died 3 days after the crash, one after 6 days and another passenger died 29 days after the accident.