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Crash of a Canadair RegionalJet CRJ-100ER in Yerevan
Date & Time:
Feb 14, 2008 at 0415 LT
Operator:
Registration:
EW-101PJ
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Yerevan - Minsk
MSN:
7316
YOM:
1999
Flight number:
BRU1834
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
18
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
15563
Aircraft flight cycles:
14352
Circumstances:
A Canadair CRJ100ER passenger jet, operated by Belavia, was destroyed when crashed and burned on takeoff from Yerevan-Zvartnots Airport (EVN), Armenia. All three crew members and eighteen passengers survived the accident. The airplane arrived as flight BRU1833 from Minsk-2 International Airport (MSQ), Belarus at 02:05. Refueling was carried out in preparation for the return flight and the crew conducted the flight planning. After refueling the pilot carried out a tactile and visual inspection of all critical surfaces of the wing and visual inspection of the tail assembly. All the planes were clean and dry. The weather reported for the 04:00 was: wind 110 degrees at the ground 1 m/sec, visibility 3500 meters, haze, small clouds, vertical visibility of 800 meters, scattered clouds at 3000 m, a temperature of minus 3° C, dew point minus 4° C, pressure 1019 hPa. At 04:08 both engines were started. The engine air intake heating (cowl anti-ice) was switched on but the wing anti-icing system was not switched on. The crew taxied to runway 27 and were cleared for departure. During takeoff the airplane progressively banked left until the left wing tip contacted runway. The airplane went off the side with the airplane rolling the right. The right hand wing broke off and spilled fuel caught fire. The airplane came to rest upside down.
Probable cause:
The accident involving aircraft CRJ-100LR registration number EW-101PJ was the result of an asymmetric loss of lift of the wing during take-off, which led to the toppling of the aircraft immediately after liftoff from the runway, the left wing tip contacting the ground, the subsequent destruction and fire. The reason for the loss of lift of the wing at the actual weather conditions, was the formation of frost, which "pollutes" the surface of the wing. The cause of formation of frost, most likely, was the fuel icing, while the aircraft was parked at the airport and during taxiing for the return flight, resulting in a difference in temperature of the surrounding air and cold fuel in the tanks after the flight. The situation could be aggravated when exceeding the values recommended by the operations manual of the angular velocity when lifting the nose wheel during takeoff with "contaminated" wings when it is impossible to monitor this parameter instrumentally. Existing procedural methods of control of the aerodynamic surfaces of the aircraft before departure, along with the inefficiency, during takeoff, the existing system of protection from stalling due to increased sensitivity of the wing, even to a slight contamination of the leading edge, can not fully guarantee the prevention of similar accidents in future. An Airworthiness Directive on the need to include anti-icing systems on the wing in the final stage of taxiing at the actual weather conditions was issued by Transport Canada after the accident. This probably could have prevented the accident.
Crash of a Canadair RegionalJet CRJ-100ER in Toronto
Date & Time:
May 20, 2007 at 1235 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-FRIL
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Moncton – Toronto
MSN:
7051
YOM:
1994
Flight number:
AC8911
Crew on board:
37
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft, with 3 crew members and 37 passengers on board, was operating as Air Canada Jazz Flight 8911 from Moncton, New Brunswick, to Toronto/Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Ontario. At 1235 eastern daylight time, the aircraft landed on Runway 06R with a 90º crosswind from the left, gusting from 13 to 23 knots. The aircraft first contacted the runway in a left-wing-down sideslip. The left main landing gear struck the runway first and the aircraft sustained a sharp lateral side load before bouncing. Once airborne again, the flight and ground spoilers deployed and the aircraft landed hard. Both main landing gear trunnion fittings failed and the landing gear collapsed. The aircraft remained upright, supported by the landing gear struts and wheels. The aircraft slid down the runway and exited via a taxiway, where the passengers deplaned. There was no fire. There were no injuries to the crew; some passengers reported minor injuries as a result of the hard landing.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. On final approach, the captain diverted his attention from monitoring the flight, leaving most of the decision making and control of the aircraft to the first officer, who was significantly less experienced on the aircraft type. As a result, the first officer was not fully supervised during the late stages of the approach.
2. The first officer did not adhere to the Air Canada Jazz standard operating procedures (SOPs) in the handling of the autopilot and thrust levers on short final, which left the aircraft highly susceptible to a bounce, and without the bounce protection normally provided by the ground lift dump (GLD) system.
3. Neither the aircraft operating manual nor the training that both pilots had received mentioned the importance of conducting a balked or rejected landing when the aircraft bounces. Given the low-energy state of the aircraft at the time of the bounce, the first officer attempted to salvage the landing.
4. When the thrust levers were reduced to idle after the bounce, the GLD system activated. The resultant sink rate after the GLD system deployed was beyond the certification standard for the landing gear and resulted in the landing gear trunnion fitting failures.
5. There was insufficient quality control at the landing gear overhaul facility, which allowed non-airworthy equipment to enter into service. The condition of the shock struts would have contributed to the bounce.
Findings as to Risk:
1. Several passengers took carry-on items with them as they exited the aircraft, despite being instructed not to do so.
2. The location of the stored megaphone did not allow the flight attendant to have ready access after the passengers started moving to the exit door.
1. On final approach, the captain diverted his attention from monitoring the flight, leaving most of the decision making and control of the aircraft to the first officer, who was significantly less experienced on the aircraft type. As a result, the first officer was not fully supervised during the late stages of the approach.
2. The first officer did not adhere to the Air Canada Jazz standard operating procedures (SOPs) in the handling of the autopilot and thrust levers on short final, which left the aircraft highly susceptible to a bounce, and without the bounce protection normally provided by the ground lift dump (GLD) system.
3. Neither the aircraft operating manual nor the training that both pilots had received mentioned the importance of conducting a balked or rejected landing when the aircraft bounces. Given the low-energy state of the aircraft at the time of the bounce, the first officer attempted to salvage the landing.
4. When the thrust levers were reduced to idle after the bounce, the GLD system activated. The resultant sink rate after the GLD system deployed was beyond the certification standard for the landing gear and resulted in the landing gear trunnion fitting failures.
5. There was insufficient quality control at the landing gear overhaul facility, which allowed non-airworthy equipment to enter into service. The condition of the shock struts would have contributed to the bounce.
Findings as to Risk:
1. Several passengers took carry-on items with them as they exited the aircraft, despite being instructed not to do so.
2. The location of the stored megaphone did not allow the flight attendant to have ready access after the passengers started moving to the exit door.
Final Report:
Crash of a Canadair RegionalJet CRJ-100SE in Moscow
Date & Time:
Feb 13, 2007 at 1637 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N168CK
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Moscow - Berlin
MSN:
7099
YOM:
1996
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Copilot / Total hours on type:
68
Aircraft flight hours:
3814
Aircraft flight cycles:
1765
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a positioning flight from Moscow to Berlin for maintenance purposes. After the crew was cleared to start up the engines, the aircraft was towed to the deicing pad where the crew requested a two-step deicing procedure. The deicing was completed at 1618LT and the crew was cleared for takeoff at 1636LT. After a course of 1,500 metres on runway 06 in snow falls, the pilot-in-command started the rotation when the aircraft rolled left and right. The right wing struck the ground, the aircraft went out of control, got inverted and crashed in a snow covered area located 450 metres further and 35 metres to the right of the runway. All three crew members escaped with minor injuries while the aircraft was destroyed. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were as follow: wind from 130 at 10 knots, horizontal visibility 1,000 metres in snow falls, vertical visibility 300 feet, OAT -6° and dewpoint at -7°.
Probable cause:
Loss of control at liftoff due to a loss of lift caused by a stall consecutive to an excessive accumulation of ice/frost on the critical surfaces despite the aircraft had been deiced/anti-iced prior to takeoff. The following findings were identified:
- The aircraft was deiced in a two-step procedure - deicing with Type I then anti-icing with Type IV. The treatment was completed at 1618LT, 19 minutes prior to the accident,
- At the time of the accident, there were moderate to strong snow falls at the airport,
- The crew did not receive the full meteorological bulletin prior to departure and failed to determine the correct holdover time,
- Referring to the actual weather conditions, the crew failed to proceed with a second deicing/anti-icing procedure,
- Lack of adequate check by crew members and/or the airline representatives regarding the quality of the anti-icing treatment,
- The crew failed to comply with AFM relating to the actual weather conditions,
- The takeoff was started at a speed that was 12 knots below the reference speed, increasing the stall condition with leading edges that were slightly contaminated with frost/ice.
- The aircraft was deiced in a two-step procedure - deicing with Type I then anti-icing with Type IV. The treatment was completed at 1618LT, 19 minutes prior to the accident,
- At the time of the accident, there were moderate to strong snow falls at the airport,
- The crew did not receive the full meteorological bulletin prior to departure and failed to determine the correct holdover time,
- Referring to the actual weather conditions, the crew failed to proceed with a second deicing/anti-icing procedure,
- Lack of adequate check by crew members and/or the airline representatives regarding the quality of the anti-icing treatment,
- The crew failed to comply with AFM relating to the actual weather conditions,
- The takeoff was started at a speed that was 12 knots below the reference speed, increasing the stall condition with leading edges that were slightly contaminated with frost/ice.
Final Report:
