North Carolina

The crew was completing a local training flight at Pope AFB. For unknown reasons, the aircraft landed very hard, causing the nose gear to collapse. The aircraft was stopped on the runway and all 11 occupants escaped uninjured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

During his weather briefing, the pilot was told that his destination weather was not available, and was provided weather for an airport about 10 miles north. He was briefed that low visibility due to fog prevailed. The flight departed earlier then usual because the company business manager was concerned that the weather at the destination airport was deteriorating, and if the airplane was not there earlier they might not get into the airport. At the time of the accident there was a power failure, and lights around the destination airport went out. The airplane had struck power lines and a support tower located on the approach end of runway 1 and runway 5, about 1/2 mile southwest of the airport. The airport had one NDB approach which was not authorized at night. The nearest recorded weather, about 10 miles north of the crash site, at the time of the accident was; '...ceiling 100, [visibility] 1/2 mile, fog, [temperature] 46 degrees F, dew point, 42 degrees F, winds 220 degrees at 5 [knots], altimeter 29.90 inches Hg. Witnesses reported that there was heavy fog at the airport and the visibility was below 1/4 mile.

The airplane was over gross weight at takeoff but within Weight and Balance at the time of the accident. Witnesses observed the airplane flying low with the landing gear retracted over a wooded area then observed the airplane bank to the left and pitch down. The airplane then pitched nose up and entered what was described as a flat spin to the left. The airplane descended and impacted the ground upright with the landing gear retracted and the flaps symmetrically extended 6 degrees. Examination of the flight control systems, and engines revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. A cabin door ajar indicating light was not illuminated at impact but the gear warning light was illuminated at impact. The pilot recently purchased the aircraft and only accumulated a total of 1 hour 23 minutes during 6 training flights. He accumulated an additional 3 hours 37 minutes after completion of the training flights while flying with other qualified pilots. The accident flight was the first flight in the make and model while flying with no other multiengine-rated pilot aboard.

Flight 3379 departed Greensboro at 18:03 with a little delay due to baggage rearrangement. The aircraft climbed to a 9,000 feet cruising altitude and contacted Raleigh approach control at 18:14, receiving an instruction to reduce the speed to 180 knots and descend to 6,000 feet. Raleigh final radar control was contacted at 18:25 and instructions were received to reduce the speed to 170 knots and to descend to 3,000 feet. At 18:30 the flight was advised to turn left and join the localizer course at or above 2,100 feet for a runway 05L ILS approach. Shortly after receiving clearance to land, the n°1 engine ignition light illuminated in the cockpit as a result of a momentary negative torque condition when the propeller speed levers were advanced to 100% and the power levers were at flight idle. The captain suspected an engine flame out and eventually decided to execute a missed approach. The speed had decreased to 122 knots and two momentary stall warnings sounded as the pilot called for max power. The aircraft was in a left turn at 1,800 feet and the speed continued to decrease to 103 knots, followed by stall warnings. The rate of descent then increased rapidly to more than 10,000 feet/min. The aircraft eventually struck some trees and crashed about 4 nm southwest of the runway 05L threshold. Five passengers survived while 15 other occupants were killed.

The pilot was performing the initial takeoff, when he observed a loss of power, associated with a torque indication of zero. He force landed the aircraft in a wooded area when he could not make an open field. A post accident inspection of the engine revealed that the fuel control unit arm was loose, and the lock wire was not in place. The arm was positioned so that a maximum power demand from the throttle would correspond to an idle power demand at the fuel control. The engine underwent a 100 hour inspection, by company maintenance personnel, 8 days prior to the accident. The inspection checklist called for examining the fuel control linkage for security.

USAir Flight 1016 was a domestic flight from Columbia (CAE) to Charlotte (CLT). The DC-9 departed the gate on schedule at 18:10. The first officer was performing the duties of the flying pilot. The weather information provided to the flightcrew from USAir dispatch indicated that the conditions at Charlotte were similar to those encountered when the crew had departed there approximately one hour earlier. The only noted exception was the report of scattered thunderstorms in the area. Flight 1016 was airborne at 18:23 for the planned 35 minute flight. At 18:27, the captain of flight 1016 made initial contact with the Charlotte Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) controller and advised that the flight was at 12,000 feet mean sea level (msl). The controller replied "USAir ten sixteen ... expect runway one eight right." Shortly afterward the controller issued a clearance to the flightcrew to descend to 10,000 feet. At 18:29, the first officer commented "there's more rain than I thought there was ... it's startin ...pretty good a minute ago ... now it's held up." On their airborne weather radar the crew observed two cells, one located south and the second located east of the airport. The captain said "looks like that's [rain] setting just off the edge of the airport." One minute later, the captain contacted the controller and said "We're showing uh little buildup here it uh looks like it's sitting on the radial, we'd like to go about five degrees to the left to the ..." The controller replied "How far ahead are you looking ten sixteen?" The captain responded "About fifteen miles." The controller then replied "I'm going to turn you before you get there I'm going to turn you at about five miles northbound." The captain acknowledged the transmission, and, at 18:33, the controller directed the crew to turn the aircraft to a heading of three six zero. One minute later the flightcrew was issued a clearance to descend to 6,000 feet, and shortly thereafter contacted the Final Radar West controller. At 18:35 the Final Radar West controller transmitted "USAir ten sixteen ... maintain four thousand runway one eight right.'' The captain acknowledged the radio transmission and then stated to the first officer "approach brief." The first officer responded "visual back up ILS." Following the first officer's response, the controller issued a clearance to flight 1016 to "...turn ten degrees right descend and maintain two thousand three hundred vectors visual approach runway one eight right.'' At 18:36, the Final Radar West controller radioed flight 1016 and said "I'll tell you what USAir ten sixteen they got some rain just south of the field might be a little bit coming off north just expect the ILS now amend your altitude maintain three thousand." At 18:37, the controller instructed flight 1016 to ''turn right heading zero niner zero." At 18:38, the controller said "USAir ten sixteen turn right heading one seven zero four from SOPHE [the outer marker for runway 18R ILS] ... cross SOPHE at or above three thousand cleared ILS one eight right approach." As they were maneuvering the airplane from the base leg of the visual approach to final, both crew members had visual contact with the airport. The captain then contacted Charlotte Tower. The controller said "USAir ten sixteen ... runway one eight right cleared to land following an F-K one hundred short final, previous arrival reported a smooth ride all the way down the final." The pilot of the Fokker 100 in front also reported a "smooth ride". About 18:36, a special weather observation was recorded, which included: ... measured [cloud] ceiling 4,500 feet broken, visibility 6 miles, thunderstorm, light rain shower, haze, the temperature was 88 degrees Fahrenheit, the dewpoint was 67 degrees Fahrenheit, the wind was from 110 degrees at 16 knots .... This information was not broadcast until 1843; thus, the crew of flight 1016 did not receive the new ATIS. At 18:40, the Tower controller said "USAir ten sixteen the wind is showing one zero zero at one nine." This was followed a short time later by the controller saying "USAir ten sixteen wind now one one zero at two one." Then the Tower controller radioed a wind shear warning "windshear alert northeast boundary wind one nine zero at one three.'' On finals the DC-9 entered an area of rainfall and at 18:41:58, the first officer commented "there's, ooh, ten knots right there." This was followed by the captain saying "OK, you're plus twenty [knots] ... take it around, go to the right." A go around was initiated. The Tower controller noticed Flight 1016 going around "USAir ten sixteen understand you're on the go sir, fly runway heading, climb and maintain three thousand." The first officer initially rotated the airplane to the proper 15 degrees nose-up attitude during the missed approach. However, the thrust was set below the standard go-around EPR limit of 1.93, and the pitch attitude was reduced to 5 degrees nose down before the flightcrew recognized the dangerous situation. When the flaps were in transition from 40 to 15 degrees (about a 12-second cycle), the airplane encountered windshear. Although the DC-9 was equipped with an on-board windshear warning system, it did not activate for unknown reasons. The airplane stalled and impacted the ground at 18:42:35. Investigation revealed that the headwind encountered by flight 1016 during the approach between 18:40:40 and 18:42:00 was between 10 and 20 knots. The initial wind component, a headwind, increased from approximately 30 knots at 18:42:00 to 35 knots at 18:42:15. The maximum calculated headwind occurred at 18:42:17, and was calculated at about 39 knots. The airplane struck the ground after transitioning from a headwind of approximately 35 knots, at 18:42:21, to a tailwind of 26 knots (a change of 61 knots), over a 14 second period.

Parked at Pope AFB, the Starlifter was ready to embark its passengers. About 500 paratroopers were around the aircraft. On final approach to runway 23, at an altitude of 300 feet, an USAF Lockheed C-130E Hercules registered 68-10492 collided with a USAF F-16 Fighting Falcon (88-0171) that was approaching the same runway to land. The crew of the C-130 was able to land safely while both pilots on board the F-16 ejected before the fighter crashed on the parked C-141. Several explosion occurred and 23 soldiers who were already on board were killed while 80 others were injured, some seriously. The aircraft was destroyed by fire.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Pope AFB. Apparently following a wrong approach configuration, the aircraft landed too far down the runway and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest, broken in two. All 14 occupants were injured.

The four engine aircraft departed Pope AFB on a training flight with nine crew members on board. In unknown circumstances, the airplane went out of control and crashed in the Blewett Falls Lake, about 80 km southwest of Pope AFB. All nine occupants were killed.

The commercial pilot was on a part 135 cargo flight. Since the destination airport had no weather reporting facility, company policy and far 135 required a VFR descent and landing from the MVA. The pilot requested and received clearance for a localizer approach to the airport, although a nearby airport was reporting 400' broken/3 miles with fog. The pilot reported to ATC that he had missed his first approach, and requested a second approach to the same airport. After executing the missed approach, the aircraft impacted mountainous terrain while aligned with the extended centerline of the localizer. Cap personnel reported that the accident site was obscured in clouds at the time of the accident. The investigation revealed that the aircraft descended about 1,500 feet below a minimum altitude on the first approach attempt. Mode c altitude data was lost during the missed approach. Four years earlier, this pilot descended below glidepath on an ILS approach and crashed into trees with weather below approach minimums. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.