code

NC

Crash of a Piper PA-46R-350RT Malibu Matrix in Lake Norman Airpark: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 31, 2023 at 1215 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N539MA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Lake Norman Airpark - Lake Norman Airpark
MSN:
46-92139
YOM:
2010
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The pilot departed Lake Norman Airpark Runway 32 at 1152LT on a local flight. After takeoff, he continued to the northwest for about 10 minutes then initiated a turn to the left and a descent back to the airfield. On short final, the single engine airplane crashed nearby a wooded area located near Adrian Lane, about 1,200 metres short of runway 14. The airplane was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Crash of a Pilatus PC-12/47E off Drum Inlet: 8 killed

Date & Time: Feb 13, 2022 at 1402 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N79NX
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Hyde County - Beaufort
MSN:
1709
YOM:
2017
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Circumstances:
After its departure from Hyde County Airport, North Carolina, the single engine airplane followed an erratic track according to ATC. While cruising along the shore, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the sea about 30 km northeast of Beaufort-Michael J. Smith Field Airport, few km east of the Drum Inlet. The wreckage was found at a depth of about 55 feet. Two bodies and other remains were later found.

Crash of a Cessna 421B Golden Eagle II in Franklin

Date & Time: Mar 11, 2021 at 1953 LT
Registration:
N80056
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Franklin - Franklin
MSN:
421B-0654
YOM:
1974
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3000
Captain / Total hours on type:
7.00
Aircraft flight hours:
3406
Circumstances:
According to the pilot, during the takeoff roll from the 5,000-ft-long runway, after reaching an airspeed of 90 knots, the airplane’s acceleration slowed. The airplane reached a maximum airspeed of about 92 knots, which was below the planned rotation speed of 100 knots. The pilot elected to abort the takeoff with about 1,500 ft of remaining runway. He reduced the power to idle and initiated maximum braking. The pilot stated that he did not sense the airplane slowing down but observed tire marks on the runway postaccident that were consistent with braking. The airplane continued off the end of the runway and collided with a fence before coming to a stop. All of the occupants exited the airplane safely, and a post-crash fire ensued. Examination of the runway revealed tire skid marks that began 1,200 ft from the runway end and continued into the grass leading to the airplane. An examination of the airplane revealed that the entire cockpit and cabin areas were destroyed by fire. The engines did not display evidence of a catastrophic failure but were otherwise unable to be examined in more detail due to the degree of fire damage. The parking brake control was found in the off position. All hydraulic brake lines were destroyed by fire, and the main landing gear sustained fire and impact damage. Although the tire marks on the runway indicated that some braking action took place, the extensive fire damage precluded a detailed examination of the braking system, and there was insufficient evidence to determine the reason for the runway excursion.
Probable cause:
The reason for this accident could not be determined based on the available information.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-46-350P Malibu Mirage near Castalia: 4 killed

Date & Time: Jun 7, 2019 at 1331 LT
Registration:
N709CH
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Naples - Easton
MSN:
46-36431
YOM:
2007
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
312
Captain / Total hours on type:
147.00
Aircraft flight hours:
1449
Circumstances:
The pilot departed on the cross-country flight with the airplane about 730 lbs over its maximum gross weight. While in cruise altitude at 27,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilot reported to air traffic control that he observed weather on his radar along his route and ahead of his position. The areas of weather included thunderstorms with cloud tops up to 43,000 ft msl. The controller acknowledged the weather; however, she did not provide specifics to the pilot, including the size and strength of the area of precipitation or cloud tops information, nor did she solicit or disseminate any pilot reports related to the conditions, as required. The airplane entered an area of heavy to extreme precipitation, likely a thunderstorm updraft, while in instrument meteorological conditions. Tracking information indicated that the airplane climbed about 300 ft, then entered a right, descending spiral and broke up in flight at high altitude. The recovered wreckage was found scattered along a path about 2.6 miles in length. Both wings separated, and most of the empennage was not located. The airplane was likely about 148 lbs over the maximum allowable gross weight at the time of the accident. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of a pre accident malfunction or failure that would have prevented normal operation. The pilot, who owned the airplane, did not possess an instrument rating. The pilot-rated passenger in the right seat was instrument-rated but did not meet resency of experience requirements to act as pilot-in-command. Toxicology testing detected a small amount of ethanol in the pilot’s liver but not in muscle. After absorption, ethanol is uniformly distributed throughout all tissues and body fluids; therefore, the finding in one tissue but not another is most consistent with post-mortem production. Hazardous weather avoidance is ultimately the pilot’s responsibility, and, in this case, the airplane was sufficiently equipped to provide a qualified pilot with the information necessary to navigate hazardous weather; however, the controller’s failure to provide the pilot with adequate and timely weather information as required by Federal Aviation Administration Order JO 7110.65X contributed to the pilot’s inability to safely navigate the hazardous weather along his route of flight, resulting in the penetration of a thunderstorm and the resulting loss of airplane control and inflight breakup.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s failure to navigate around hazardous weather, resulting in the penetration of a thunderstorm, a loss of airplane control, and an inflight breakup. The air traffic controller’s failure to provide the pilot with adequate and timely weather information as required by FAA Order JO 7110.65X contributed to the pilot’s inability to safely navigate the hazardous weather along his route of flight.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 200 in Louisburg

Date & Time: Sep 6, 2015 at 1540 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N181CS
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Washington - Louisburg
MSN:
181
YOM:
1968
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7337
Captain / Total hours on type:
1058.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3187
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1180
Aircraft flight hours:
26915
Circumstances:
The airline transport pilot was conducting a cross-country aerial observation flight in the multiengine airplane. The pilot reported that the airplane was on the final leg of the traffic pattern when he reduced the power levers for landing and noticed that the right engine sounded like the propeller was moving toward the beta position. The pilot increased the engine power, and the sound stopped. As the airplane got closer to the runway, he decreased the engine power, and the sound returned. In addition, the airplane began to yaw right. The pilot applied left aileron and rudder inputs to remain above the runway centerline without success. While over the runway, the pilot reduced the engine power to idle, and the airplane continued to yaw right. The pilot applied full power in an attempt to perform a go-around; however, the airplane yawed about 30 degrees off the runway centerline, touched down in the grass, and impacted trees before coming to rest. The right wing, right engine, and right propeller assembly were impact-separated. The right engine propeller came to rest about 50 ft forward of the main wreckage, and it was found in the feathered position. A review of maintenance records revealed that the right propeller had been overhauled and reinstalled on the airplane 2 days before the accident and had operated 9 hours since that time. Subsequent testing of the right propeller governor revealed that it functioned without anomaly; however, the speed settings were improperly configured. Further, the testing revealed that the beta valve travel from the neutral position was out of tolerance. Although this could have let oil pressure port to one side of the spool or the other and, thus, changed the propeller blade angle, it could not be determined whether this occurred during the accident landing. Impact damage precluded examination of the right propeller governor control linkage; therefore, it could not be determined if it was inadequately installed or rigged, which could have resulted in the propeller moving into the beta position. The investigation could not determine why the right propeller moved toward the beta position as engine power was reduced, as reported the pilot.
Probable cause:
The propeller’s movement to the beta position during landing for reasons that could not be determined during postaccident examination and testing, which resulted in an attempted goaround and subsequent loss of airplane control.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-46-350P Malibu Mirage in Statesville

Date & Time: Aug 1, 2014 at 2100 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N472ST
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Manassas – Statesville
MSN:
46-36472
YOM:
2010
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2556
Captain / Total hours on type:
1200.00
Aircraft flight hours:
1656
Circumstances:
According to the pilot, she was flying an instrument landing system approach when she noted that the glide slope was out of service. She transitioned to a localizer-only approach and continued. Night, instrument meteorological conditions prevailed with a 400-foot ceiling. She noticed that the airplane was "high and fast" on final approach, so she used speed brakes and flaps to slow the airplane and descend to the minimum descent altitude. As the airplane descended below the ceiling, she observed runway lights and attempted to land on the runway. The airplane landed long, departed the runway at the departure end, and struck an embankment before coming to rest. An inspector from the Federal Aviation Administration examined the airplane and confirmed substantial damage to the fuselage, wings, and empennage. The pilot reported no pre-impact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain a proper glide path and airspeed on final approach, which resulted in a long landing and runway excursion.
Final Report:

Crash of a Pilatus PC-12/45 in Burlington: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jan 16, 2013 at 0556 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N68PK
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Burlington - Morristown
MSN:
265
YOM:
1998
Flight number:
SKQ53
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
6369
Captain / Total hours on type:
315.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4637
Circumstances:
The pilot departed in night instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions on a medical specimen transport flight. During the climb, an air traffic controller told the pilot that the transponder code he had selected (2501) was incorrect and instructed him to reset the transponder to a different code (2531). Shortly thereafter, the airplane reached a maximum altitude of about 3,300 ft and then entered a descending right turn. The airplane’s enhanced ground proximity warning system recorded a descent rate of 11,245 ft per minute, which triggered two “sink rate, pull up” warnings. The airplane subsequently climbed from an altitude of about 1,400 ft to about 2,000 ft before it entered another turning descent and impacted the ground about 5 miles northeast of the departure airport. The airplane was fragmented and strewn along a debris path that measured about 800-ft long and 300-ft wide. Postaccident examination of the airplane did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded the pilot from controlling the airplane. The engine did not display any evidence of preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. An open resistor was found in the flight computer that controlled the autopilot. It could not be determined if the open resistor condition existed during the flight or occurred during the impact. If the resistor was in an open condition at the time of autopilot engagement, the autopilot would appear to engage with a mode annunciation indicating engagement, but the pitch and roll servos would not engage. The before taxiing checklist included checks of the autopilot system to verify autopilot function before takeoff. It could not be determined if the pilot performed the autopilot check before the accident flight or if the autopilot was engaged at the time of the accident. The circumstances of the accident are consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation. Dark night IFR conditions prevailed, and the track of the airplane suggests a loss of attitude awareness. Although the pilot was experienced in night instrument conditions, it is possible that an attempt to reset the transponder served as an operational distraction that contributed to a breakdown in his instrument scan. Similarly, if the autopilot’s resistor was in an open condition and the autopilot had been engaged, the pilot’s failure to detect an autopilot malfunction in a timely manner could have contributed to spatial disorientation and the resultant loss of control.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain airplane control due to spatial disorientation during the initial climb after takeoff in night instrument flight rules conditions.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 501 Citation I/SP in Franklin: 5 killed

Date & Time: Mar 15, 2012 at 1350 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N7700T
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Venice - Franklin
MSN:
501-0248
YOM:
1982
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
1159
Captain / Total hours on type:
185.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4825
Circumstances:
The pilot was not familiar with the mountain airport. The airplane was high during the first visual approach to the runway. The pilot performed a go-around and the airplane was again high for the second approach. During the second approach, the approach angle steepened, and the airplane pitched nose-down toward the runway. The nosegear touched down about halfway down the runway followed by main gear touchdown. The airplane then bounced and the sound of engine noise increased as the airplane banked right and the right wing contacted the ground. The airplane subsequently flipped over and off the right side of the runway, and a postcrash fire ensued. Examination of the airframe and engines did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions. The examination also revealed that the right engine thrust reverser was deployed during the impact sequence, and the left engine thrust reverser was stowed. Although manufacturer data revealed single-engine reversing has been demonstrated during normal landings and is easily controllable, the airplane had already porpoised and bounced during the landing. The pilot’s subsequent activation of only the right engine’s thrust reverser would have created an asymmetrical thrust and most likely exacerbated an already uncontrolled touchdown. Had the touchdown been controlled, the airplane could have stopped on the remaining runway or the pilot could have performed a go-around uneventfully.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to achieve a stabilized approach, resulting in a nose-first, bounced landing. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's activation of only one thrust reverser, resulting in asymmetrical thrust.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 550 Citation II in Manteo

Date & Time: Oct 1, 2010 at 0830 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N262Y
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tampa - Manteo
MSN:
550-0291
YOM:
1981
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
9527
Captain / Total hours on type:
2025.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3193
Copilot / Total hours on type:
150
Aircraft flight hours:
9643
Circumstances:
According to postaccident written statements from both pilots, the pilot-in-command (PIC) was the pilot flying and the copilot was the pilot monitoring. As the airplane approached Dare County Regional Airport (MQI), Manteo, North Carolina, the copilot obtained the current weather information. The automated weather system reported wind as 350 degrees at 4 knots, visibility at 1.5 miles in heavy rain, and a broken ceiling at 400 feet. The copilot stated that the weather had deteriorated from the previous reports at MQI. The PIC stated that they would fly one approach to take a look and that, if the airport conditions did not look good, they would divert to another airport. Both pilots indicated in phone interviews that, although they asked the Washington air route traffic control center controller for the global positioning system (GPS) runway 5 approach, they did not expect it due to airspace restrictions. They expected and received a GPS approach to runway 23 to circle-to-land on runway 5. According to the pilots' statements, the airplane was initially fast on approach to runway 23. As a result, the copilot could not deploy approach flaps when the PIC requested because the airspeed was above the flap operating range. The PIC subsequently slowed the airplane, and the copilot extended flaps to the approach setting. The PIC also overshot an intersection but quickly corrected and was on course about 1 mile prior to the initial approach fix. The airplane crossed the final approach fix on speed (Vref was 104) at the appropriate altitude, with the flaps and landing gear extended. The copilot completed the approach and landing checklist items but did not call out items because the PIC preferred that copilots complete checklists quietly. The PIC then stated that they would not circle-to-land due to the low ceiling. He added that a landing on runway 23 would be suitable because the wind was at a 90-degree angle to the runway, and there was no tailwind factor. Based on the reported weather, a tailwind component of approximately 2 knots existed at the time of the accident, and, in a subsequent statement to the Federal Aviation Administration, the pilot acknowledged there was a tailwind about 20 degrees behind the right wing. The copilot had the runway in sight about 200 feet above the minimum descent altitude, which was 440 feet above the runway. The copilot reported that he mentally prepared for a go around when the PIC stated that the airplane was high about 300 feet above the runway, but neither pilot called for one. The flight crew stated that the airplane touched down at 100 knots between the 1,000-foot marker and the runway intersection-about 1,200 feet beyond the approach end of the 4,305-foot-long runway. The speed brakes, thrust reversers, and brakes were applied immediately after the nose gear touched down and worked properly, but the airplane departed the end of the runway at about 40 knots. According to data extracted from the enhanced ground proximity warning system, the airplane touched down about 1,205 feet beyond the approach end of the 4,305-foot-long wet runway, at a ground speed of 127 knots. Data from the airplane manufacturer indicated that, for the estimated landing weight, the airplane required a landing distance of approximately 2,290 feet on a dry runway, 3,550 feet on a wet runway, or 5,625 feet for a runway with 0.125 inch of standing water. The chart also contained a note that the published limiting maximum tailwind component for the airplane is 10 knots but that landings on precipitation-covered runways with any tailwind component are not recommended. The note also indicates that if a tailwind landing cannot be avoided, the above landing distance data should be multiplied by a factor that increases the wet runway landing distance to 3,798 feet, and the landing distance for .125 inch of standing water to 6,356 feet. All distances in the performance chart are based on flying a normal approach at Vref, assume a touchdown point 840 feet from the runway threshold in no wind conditions, and include distance from the threshold to touchdown. The PIC's statement about the airplane being high at 300 feet above the runway reportedly prompted the copilot to mentally prepare for a go around, but neither pilot called for one. However, the PIC asked the copilot what he thought, and his reply was " it's up to you." The pilots touched down at an excessive airspeed (23 knots above Vref), more than 1,200 feet down a wet 4,305-foot-long runway, leaving about 3,100 feet for the airplane to stop. According to manufacturer calculations, about 2,710 feet of ground roll would be required after the airplane touched down, assuming a touchdown speed at Vref; a longer ground roll would be required at higher touchdown speeds. Although a 2 knot crosswind component existed at the time of the accident, the airplane's excessive airspeed at touchdown (23 knots above Vref) had a much larger effect on the outcome of the landing.
Probable cause:
The pilot-in-command's failure to maintain proper airspeed and his failure to initiate a go-around, which resulted in the airplane touching down too fast on a short, wet runway and a subsequent runway overrun. Contributing to the accident was the copilot's failure to adequately monitor the approach and call for a go around and the flight crew's lack of proper crew resource management.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 60 Duke in Edenton: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jun 7, 2010 at 1932 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N7022D
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Edenton - Edenton
MSN:
P-13
YOM:
1968
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
1558
Captain / Total hours on type:
343.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
30000
Aircraft flight hours:
3562
Circumstances:
The pilot was receiving instruction and an instrument proficiency check (IPC) from a flight instructor. Following an hour of uneventful instruction, the IPC was initiated. During the first takeoff of the IPC, the pilot was at the flight controls, and the flight instructor controlled the throttles. Although the pilot normally set about 40 inches of manifold pressure for takeoff, the flight instructor set about 37 inches, which resulted in a longer than expected takeoff roll. Shortly after takeoff, at an altitude of less than 100 feet, with the landing gear extended, the flight instructor retarded the left throttle at 83 to 85 knots indicated airspeed; 85 knots was the minimum single engine control speed for the airplane. The pilot attempted to advance the throttles, but was unable since the flight instructor’s hand was already on the throttles. The airplane veered sharply to the left and rolled. The pilot was able to level the wings just prior to the airplane colliding with trees and terrain. The pilot reported that procedures for simulating or demonstrating an engine failure were never discussed. Although the flight instructor’s experience in the accident airplane make and model was not determined, he reported prior to the flight that he had not flown that type of airplane recently. The flight instructor was taking medication for type II diabetes. According to his wife, the flight instructor had not experienced seizures or a loss of consciousness as a result of his medical condition.
Probable cause:
The flight instructor’s initiation of a simulated single engine scenario at or below the airplane’s minimum single engine control speed, resulting in a loss of airplane control. Contributing to the accident was the flight instructor’s failure to set full engine power during the takeoff roll and the flight instructor’s lack of recent experience in the airplane make and model.
Final Report: