code

IL

Crash of a Beechcraft 200 Super King Air in Rockford: 1 killed

Date & Time: Aug 20, 2020 at 1540 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N198DM
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
BB-1198
YOM:
1984
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from runway 01 at Rockford-Greater Rockford Airport, while in initial climb, the aircraft rolled to the left and crashed in flames about 570 feet to the left of the main runway, about 3'600 feet from the runway threshold. The aircraft was totally destroyed by fire and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Crash of a Piper PA-61 Aerostar (Ted Smith 601P) in Springfield: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jan 28, 2020 at 1509 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N6071R
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Huntsville – Springfield
MSN:
61P-0686-7963324
YOM:
1979
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
On approach to Springfield-Abraham Lincoln, the pilot reported trouble with his instruments when the airplane descended and crashed left wing first in a garden located in Sangamon County, about 7 miles southeast of the airport, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and all three occupants were killed, among them former Springfield Mayor Frank Edwards.

Crash of a Beechcraft C90 King Air in Rockford

Date & Time: Dec 5, 2017 at 1802 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N500KR
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kissimmee - Rockford
MSN:
LJ-708
YOM:
1977
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2500
Aircraft flight hours:
9856
Circumstances:
The private pilot departed on a cross-country flight in his high-performance, turbine-powered airplane with full tanks of fuel. He landed and had the airplane serviced with 150 gallons of fuel. He subsequently departed on the return flight. As the airplane approached the destination airport, the pilot asked for priority handling and reported that the airplane "lost a transfer pump and had a little less fuel than he thought," and he did not want to come in with a single engine. When asked if he needed assistance, he replied "negative." The pilot was cleared to perform a visual approach to runway 19 during night conditions. As the airplane approached the airport, the pilot requested the runway lights for runway 25 be turned on and reported that the airplane lost engine power in one engine. The controller advised that the lights on runway 25 were being turned on and issued a landing clearance. The airplane impacted terrain before the threshold for runway 25. During examination of the recovered wreckage, flight control continuity was established. No useable amount of fuel was found in any of the airplane's fuel tanks; however, fuel was observed in the fuel lines. All transfer pumps and boost pumps were operational. The engine-driven fuel pumps on both engines contained fuel in their respective fuel filter bowls. Both pumps were able to rotate when their input shafts were manipulated by hand. Disassembly of both pumps revealed that their inlet filters were free of obstructions. Bearing surfaces in both pumps exhibited pitting consistent with pump operation with inadequate fuel lubrication and fuel not reaching the pump. The examination revealed no evidence of airframe or engine preimpact malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Performance calculations using a flight planning method described in the airplane flight manual indicated that the airplane could have made the return flight with about 18 gallons (119 lbs) of fuel remaining. However, performance calculations using a fuel burn simulation method developed from the fuel burn and data from the airplane flight manual indicated that the airplane would have run out of fuel on approach. Regulations require that a flight depart with enough fuel to fly to the first point of intended landing and, assuming normal cruising speed, at night, to fly after that for at least 45 minutes. The calculated 45-minute night reserves required about 56 gallons (366 lbs) of fuel using a maximum recommended cruise power setting or about 37.8 gallons (246 lbs) of fuel using a maximum range power setting. Regardless of the flight planning method he could have used, the pilot did not depart on the accident flight with the required fuel reserves and exhausted all useable fuel while on approach to the destination. The airplane was owned by Edward B. Noakes III.
Probable cause:
The pilot's inadequate preflight planning and his decision to depart without the required fuel reserve, which resulted in fuel exhaustion during a night approach and subsequent loss of engine power.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 767-323ER in Chicago

Date & Time: Oct 28, 2016 at 1435 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N345AN
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Chicago – Miami
MSN:
33084
YOM:
2003
Flight number:
AA383
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
161
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
17400
Captain / Total hours on type:
4000.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
22000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1846
Aircraft flight hours:
50632
Aircraft flight cycles:
8120
Circumstances:
On October 28, 2016, about 1432 central daylight time, American Airlines flight 383, a Boeing 767-323, N345AN, had started its takeoff ground roll at Chicago O’Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois, when an uncontained engine failure in the right engine and subsequent fire occurred. The flight crew aborted the takeoff and stopped the airplane on the runway, and the flight attendants initiated an emergency evacuation. Of the 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 161 passengers on board, 1 passenger received a serious injury and 1 flight attendant and 19 passengers received minor injuries during the evacuation. The airplane was substantially damaged from the fire. The airplane was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The uncontained engine failure resulted from a high-pressure turbine (HPT) stage 2 disk rupture. The HPT stage 2 disk initially separated into two fragments. One fragment penetrated through the inboard section of the right wing, severed the main engine fuel feed line, breached the fuel tank, traveled up and over the fuselage, and landed about 2,935 ft away. The other fragment exited outboard of the right engine, impacting the runway and fracturing into three pieces. Examination of the fracture surfaces in the forward bore region of the HPT stage 2 disk revealed the presence of dark gray subsurface material discontinuities with multiple cracks initiating along the edges of the discontinuities. The multiple cracks exhibited characteristics that were consistent with low-cycle fatigue. (In airplane engines, low-cycle fatigue cracks grow in single distinct increments during each flight.) Examination of the material also revealed a discrete region underneath the largest discontinuity that appeared white compared with the surrounding material. Interspersed within this region were stringers (microscopic-sized oxide particles) referred to collectively as a “discrete dirty white spot.” The National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) investigation found that the discrete dirty white spot was most likely not detectable during production inspections and subsequent in-service inspections using the procedures in place. The NTSB’s investigation also found that the evacuation of the airplane occurred initially with one engine still operating. In accordance with company procedures and training, the flight crew performed memory items on the engine fire checklist, one of which instructed the crew to shut down the engine on the affected side (in this case, the right side). The captain did not perform the remaining steps of the engine fire checklist (which applied only to airplanes that were in flight) and instead called for the evacuation checklist. The left engine was shut down as part of that checklist. However, the flight attendants had already initiated the evacuation, in accordance with their authority to do so in a life-threatening situation, due to the severity of the fire on the right side of the airplane.
Probable cause:
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the high-pressure turbine (HPT) stage 2 disk, which severed the main engine fuel feed line and breached the right main wing fuel tank, releasing fuel that resulted in a fire on the right side of the airplane during the takeoff roll. The HPT stage 2 disk failed because of low-cycle fatigue cracks that initiated from an internal subsurface manufacturing anomaly that was most likely not detectable during production inspections and subsequent in-service inspections using the procedures in place. Contributing to the serious passenger injury was (1) the delay in shutting down the left engine and (2) a flight attendant’s deviation from company procedures, which resulted in passengers evacuating from the left overwing exit while the left engine was still operating. Contributing to the delay in shutting down the left engine was (1) the lack of a separate checklist procedure for Boeing 767 airplanes that specifically addressed engine fires on the ground and (2) the lack of communication between the flight and cabin crews after the airplane came to a stop.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 414A Chancellor in Bloomington: 7 killed

Date & Time: Apr 7, 2015 at 0010 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N789UP
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Indianapolis - Bloomington
MSN:
414A-0495
YOM:
1980
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Captain / Total flying hours:
12100
Captain / Total hours on type:
1150.00
Aircraft flight hours:
8390
Circumstances:
The twin-engine airplane, flown by an airline transport pilot, was approaching the destination airport after a cross-country flight in night instrument meteorological conditions. The destination airport weather conditions about 1 minute before the accident included an overcast ceiling at 200 ft and 1/2-mile visibility with light rain and fog. According to air traffic control (ATC) data, the flight received radar vectors to the final approach course for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 20. As shown by a post accident simulation study based on radar data and data recovered from the airplane's electronic horizontal situation indicator (EHSI), the airplane's flight path did not properly intercept and track either the localizer or the glideslope during the instrument approach. The airplane crossed the final approach fix about 360 ft below the glideslope and then maintained a descent profile below the glideslope until it leveled briefly near the minimum descent altitude, likely for a localizer-only instrument approach. However, the lateral flight path from the final approach fix inbound was one or more dots to the right of the localizer centerline until the airplane was about 1 nautical mile from the runway 20 threshold when it turned 90° left to an east course. The turn was initiated before the airplane had reached the missed approach point; additionally, the left turn was not in accordance with the published missed approach instructions, which specified a climb on runway heading before making a right turn to a 270° magnetic heading. The airplane made a series of pitch excursions as it flew away from the localizer. The simulation study determined that dual engine power was required to match the recorded flight trajectory and ground speeds, which indicated that both engines were operating throughout the approach. The simulation results also indicated that, based on calculated angle of attack and lift coefficient data, the airplane likely encountered an aerodynamic stall during its course deviation to the east. The airplane impacted the ground about 2.2 miles east-northeast of the runway 20 threshold and about 1.75 miles east of the localizer centerline. According to FAA documentation, at the time of the accident, all components of the airport's ILS were functional, with no recorded errors, and the localizer was radiating a front-course to the correct runway. Additionally, a post accident flight check found no anomalies with the instrument approach.An onsite examination established that the airplane impacted the ground upright and in a nose-low attitude, and the lack of an appreciable debris path was consistent with an aerodynamic stall/spin. Wreckage examinations did not reveal any anomalies with the airplane's flight control systems, engines, or propellers. The glideslope antenna was found disconnected from its associated cable circuit. Laboratory examination and testing determined that the glideslope antenna cable was likely inadequately connected/secured during the flight, which resulted in an unusable glideslope signal to the cockpit avionics. There was no history of recent maintenance on the glideslope antenna, and the reason for the inadequate connection could not be determined. Data downloaded from the airplane's EHSI established that the device was in the ILS mode during the instrument approach phase and that it had achieved a valid localizer state on both navigation channels; however, the device never achieved a valid glideslope state on either channel during the flight. Further, a replay of the recorded EHSI data confirmed that, during the approach, the device displayed a large "X" through the glideslope scale and did not display a deviation pointer, both of which were indications of an invalid glideslope state. There was no evidence of cumulative sleep loss, acute sleep loss, or medical conditions that indicated poor sleep quality for the pilot. However, the accident occurred more than 2 hours after the pilot routinely went to sleep, which suggests that the pilot's circadian system would not have been promoting alertness during the flight. Further, at the time of the accident, the pilot likely had been awake for 18 hours. Thus, the time at which the accident occurred and the extended hours of continuous wakefulness likely led to the development of fatigue. The presence of low cloud ceilings and the lack of glideslope guidance would have been stresses to the pilot during a critical phase of flight. This would have increased the pilot's workload and situational stress as he flew the localizer approach, a procedure that he likely did not anticipate or plan to conduct. In addition, weight and balance calculations indicated that the airplane's center of gravity (CG) was aft of the allowable limit, and the series of pitch excursions that began shortly after the airplane turned left and flew away from the localizer suggests that the pilot had difficulty controlling airplane pitch. This difficulty was likely due to the adverse handling characteristics associated with the aft CG. These adverse handling characteristics would have further increased the pilot's workload and provided another distraction from maintaining control of the airplane. Therefore, it is likely that the higher workload caused by the pilot's attempt to fly an unanticipated localizer approach at night in low ceilings and his difficulty maintaining pitch control of the airplane with an aft CG contributed to his degraded task performance in the minutes preceding the accident.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane during the instrument approach in night instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall/spin. Contributing to the accident were pilot fatigue, the pilot's increased workload during the instrument approach resulting from the lack of glide slope guidance due to an inadequately connected/secured glide slope antenna cable, and the airplane being loaded aft of its balance limit.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell Aero Commander 500B in Chicago: 1 killed

Date & Time: Nov 18, 2014 at 0245 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N30MB
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Chicago - Ohio State University
MSN:
500-1453-160
YOM:
1964
Flight number:
CTL62
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
1339
Captain / Total hours on type:
34.00
Aircraft flight hours:
26280
Circumstances:
The commercial pilot was conducting an on-demand cargo charter flight. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot informed the tower controller that he wanted to "come back and land" because he was "having trouble with the left engine." The pilot chose to fly a left traffic pattern and return for landing. No further transmissions were received from the pilot. The accident site was located about 0.50 mile southeast of the runway's displaced threshold. GPS data revealed that, after takeoff, the airplane entered a left turn to a southeasterly course and reached a maximum GPS altitude of 959 ft (about 342 ft above ground level [agl]). The airplane then entered another left turn that appeared to continue until the final data point. The altitude associated with the final data point was 890 ft (about 273 ft agl). The final GPS data point was located about 135 ft northeast of the accident site. Based on GPS data and the prevailing surface winds, the airspeed was about 45 knots during the turn. According to the airplane flight manual, the stall speed in level flight with the wing flaps extended was 59 knots. Postaccident examination and testing of the airframe, engines, and related components did not reveal any preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation; therefore, the nature of any issue related to the left engine could not be determined. Based on the evidence, the pilot failed to maintain adequate airspeed while turning the airplane back toward the airport, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall/spin.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain airspeed while attempting to return to the airport after a reported engine problem, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall/spin.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 421C Golden Eagle III in Paris: 1 killed

Date & Time: Aug 27, 2013 at 1120 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N229H
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Paris - Terre Haute
MSN:
421C-0088
YOM:
1976
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
8600
Captain / Total hours on type:
2000.00
Aircraft flight hours:
3000
Circumstances:
Company personnel reported that, in the weeks before the accident, the airplane's left engine had been experiencing a problem that prevented it from initially producing 100 percent power. The accident pilot and maintenance personnel attempted to correct the discrepancy; however, the discrepancy was not corrected before the accident flight, and company personnel had previously flown flights in the airplane with the known discrepancy. Witnesses reported observing a portion of the takeoff roll, which they described as slower than normal. However, the airplane was subsequently blocked from their view. Examination of the runway environment showed that, during the takeoff roll, the airplane traveled the entire length of the 4,501-ft runway, continued to travel through a 300-ft-long grassy area and a 300- ft-long soybean field, and then impacted the top of 10-ft-tall corn stalks for about 50 ft before it began to climb. About 1/2 mile from the airport, the airplane impacted several trees in a leftwing, nose-low attitude, consistent with the airplane being operated below the minimum controllable airspeed. The main wreckage was consumed by postimpact fire. Postaccident examinations revealed no evidence of mechanical anomalies with the airframe, right engine, or propellers that would have precluded normal operation. Given the left engine's preexisting condition, it is likely that its performance was degraded; however, postimpact damage and fire preluded a determination of the cause of the problem.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to abort the takeoff during the ground roll after detecting the airplane's degraded performance. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's decision to attempt a flight with a known problem with the left engine and the likely partial loss of left engine power for reasons that could not be determined during the postaccident examination of the engine.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 200 Super King Air in Wheeling

Date & Time: Jun 25, 2013 at 2030 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N92JR
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Springfield - Wheeling
MSN:
BB-751
YOM:
1981
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7125
Captain / Total hours on type:
572.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6709
Circumstances:
Before departure, the pilot performed fuel calculations and determined that he had enough fuel to fly to the intended destination. While enroute the pilot flew around thunderstorms. On arrival at his destination, the pilot executed the instrument landing system approach for runway 16. While on short final the right engine experienced a total loss of power. The pilot switched the fuel flow from the right tank to the left tank. The left engine then experienced a total loss of power and the pilot made an emergency landing on a road. The airplane received substantial damage to the wings and fuselage when it struck a tree. A postaccident examination revealed only a few gallons of unusable fuel in the left fuel tank. The right fuel tank was breached during the accident sequence but no fuel smell was noticed. The pilot performed another fuel calculation after the accident and determined that there were actually 170 gallons of fuel onboard, not 230 gallons like he originally figured. He reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation and determined that he exhausted his entire fuel supply.
Probable cause:
The pilot's improper fuel planning and management, which resulted in a loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft G18 in Taylorville: 1 killed

Date & Time: Aug 11, 2012 at 1124 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N697Q
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Taylorville - Taylorville
MSN:
BA-468
YOM:
1959
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
1429
Captain / Total hours on type:
7.00
Aircraft flight hours:
13833
Circumstances:
The airplane was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain in a residential neighborhood in Taylorville, Illinois. The commercial pilot sustained fatal injuries. Twelve parachutists on-board the airplane exited and were not injured. No persons on the ground were injured. The airplane was registered to Barron Aviation, LLC; Perry, Missouri, and operated by Barron Aviation Private Flight Services, LLC; Hannibal, Missouri, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, as a sport parachuting flight. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The local flight originated from Taylorville Municipal Airport (TAZ), Taylorville, Illinois, about 1100. The airplane had climbed to an altitude of about 11,000 feet mean sea level (msl) and the parachutists were seated inside the airplane on two rear facing "straddle benches". As the airplane arrived at the planned drop location, the parachutists stood up, opened the door, and moved further aft in the airplane in preparation for their jump. Five of the parachutists were positioned hanging on to the outside of the airplane with several others standing in the door and the remainder were standing in the cabin forward of the door. Several parachutists reported that they were almost ready to jump when they heard the sounds of the airplane's stall warning system. The airplane then suddenly rolled and all twelve parachutists quickly exited the airplane. Several of those who were last to exit reported that the airplane was inverted or partially inverted as they went out the door. The pilot, seated in the left front cockpit seat, did not exit the airplane. Several witnesses reported seeing the airplane turning and descending in an inverted attitude when the airplane appeared to briefly recover, but then entered a nearly vertical dive. The airplane impacted a tree and terrain in the back yard of an occupied residence. Emergency personnel who first responded to the accident scene reported a strong smell of gasoline and ordered the evacuation of several nearby homes. There was no post impact fire.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed and use the appropriate flaps setting during sport-parachuting operations, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall/spin and a subsequent loss of control. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure to follow company guidance by allowing more than four passengers in the door area during exit, which shifted the airplane’s center of gravity aft.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Riverwoods: 3 killed

Date & Time: Nov 28, 2011 at 2250 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N59773
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jesup - Chicago-Palwaukee
MSN:
31-7652044
YOM:
1976
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
6607
Captain / Total hours on type:
120.00
Aircraft flight hours:
17630
Circumstances:
The airplane was dispatched on an emergency medical services flight. While being vectored for an instrument approach, the pilot declared an emergency and reported that the airplane was out of fuel. He said the airplane lost engine power and that he was heading toward the destination airport. The airplane descended through clouds and impacted trees and terrain short of its destination. No preimpact anomalies were found during a postaccident examination. The postaccident examination revealed about 1.5 ounces of a liquid consistent with avgas within the airplane fuel system. Based on the three previous flight legs and refueling receipts, postaccident calculations indicated that the airplane was consuming fuel at a higher rate than referenced in the airplane flight manual. Based on this consumption rate, the airplane did not have enough fuel to reach the destination airport; however, a 20-knot tailwind was predicted, so it is likely that the pilot was relying on this to help the airplane reach the airport. Regardless, he would have been flying with less than the 45-minute fuel reserve that is required for an instrument flight rules flight. The pilot failed to recognize and compensate for the airplane’s high fuel consumption rate during the accident flight. It is likely that had the pilot monitored the gauges and the consumption rate for the flight he would have determined that he did not have adequate fuel to complete the flight. Toxicology tests showed the pilot had tetrahydrocannabinol and tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic acid (marijuana) in his system; however, the level of impairment could not be determined based on the information available. However, marijuana use can impair the ability to concentrate and maintain vigilance and can distort the perception of time and distance. As a professional pilot, the use of marijuana prior to the flight raises questions about the pilot’s decision-making. The investigation also identified several issues that were not causal to the accident but nevertheless raised concerns about the company’s operational control of the flight. The operator had instituted a fuel log, but it was not regularly monitored. The recovered load manifest showed the pilot had been on duty for more than 15 hours, which exceeded the maximum of 14 hours for a regularly assigned duty period per 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. The operator stated that it was aware of the pilot’s two driving while under the influence of alcohol convictions, but the operator did not request a background report on the pilot before he was hired. Further, the operator did not list the pilot-rated passenger as a member of the flight crew, yet he had flown previous positioning legs on the dispatched EMS mission as the pilot-in-command.
Probable cause:
The pilot's inadequate preflight planning and in-flight decision-making, which resulted in a loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion during approach. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's decision to operate an airplane after using illicit drugs.
Final Report: