code

GA

Crash of a Piper PA-31T Cheyenne near Eatonton: 5 killed

Date & Time: Jun 5, 2020 at 1513 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N135VE
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Williston – New Castle
MSN:
31-7520024
YOM:
1975
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Willison Airport, Florida, at 1401LT bound for New Castle, Indiana, with four passengers and one pilot on board. Almost an hour into the flight, while cruising at an altitude of 25,000 feet, the aircraft entered a right turn then control was lost. While descending, the aircraft lost several pieces (wing parts) and caught fire before crashing in a wooded area located 6 miles northeast of Eatonton, bursting into flames. All five occupants were killed. They were on their way to funeral in Indiana.

Crash of a Cessna 402C in Hampton

Date & Time: May 9, 2020 at 1515 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N4661N
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Peachtree City - Peachtree City
MSN:
402C-0019
YOM:
1979
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Peachtree City-Falcon Field Airport at 0921LT on a survey flight of an area located north of Atlanta. In the afternoon, while returning to its base, the aircraft crashed in a wooded area located near Hampton. The wreckage was found near the Atlanta Motor Speedway. Both occupants were injured.

Crash of a Piper PA-46-310P Malibu near Watkinsville: 3 killed

Date & Time: Mar 3, 2020 at 1634 LT
Registration:
N43368
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Columbia – Tuscaloosa
MSN:
46-8408028
YOM:
1984
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
En route from Columbia, SC, to Tuscaloosa, AL, while cruising at an altitude of 6,500 feet, the single engine airplane initiated a right turn then the pilot encountered poor weather conditions. Control was lost and the aircraft crashed in a wooded located west of Watkinsville, near Bishop, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and all three occupants were killed.

Crash of a Cessna 501 Citation I/SP near Fairmount: 4 killed

Date & Time: Feb 8, 2020 at 1011 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N501RG
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Peachtree City - Nashville
MSN:
501-0260
YOM:
1982
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Peachtree City-Falcon City Airport at 0949LT on a flight to Nashville-John C. Tune Airport. Few minutes later, while cruising in snow falls, the pilot reported technical problems with the left attitude indicator, that he would disconnect the autopilot system and was continuing manually. Shortly later, the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a wooded area. All four occupants were killed.

Crash of a Cessna 560 Citation V in Atlanta: 4 killed

Date & Time: Dec 20, 2018 at 1210 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N188CW
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Atlanta - Millington
MSN:
560-0148
YOM:
1991
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
The aircraft was destroyed when it impacted a field after takeoff from Fulton County Airport-Brown Field (FTY), Atlanta, Georgia. The air transport pilot and three passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was owned and operated by Chen Aircrafts LLC. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 and had an intended destination of Millington-Memphis Airport (NQA), Millington, Tennessee. A review of preliminary radar data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that after departing from runway 8 at FTY, the airplane turned left toward the north climbing to about 3,225 ft msl (2,385 ft agl), then made a descending right 180-degree right turn to the south before radar contact was lost at an altitude of about 1,175 feet msl (335 ft agl). A video obtained from a security camera positioned on top of a building, located about a half mile from the accident site, captured the airplane in a descending left turn prior to rolling inverted until it was lost from view behind a tree line. According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot held an air transport pilot certificate with a rating for airplane multiengine land and a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and single-engine sea. The pilot was issued a secondclass medical certificate on May 31, 2018 and reported 2,300 hours of total flight experience and 150 hours of flight experience in the previous 6 months. According to FAA records, the airplane was manufactured in 1991, and was most-recently registered to a corporation in July 2017. It was equipped with two Pratt & Whitney Canada, JT15D series engines, which could each produce 3,050 pounds of thrust. The 1216 recorded weather observation at FTY, which was about 1 mile to the southwest of the accident location, included wind from 050° at 10 knots, visibility 7 miles, overcast clouds at 600 ft above ground level (agl), temperature 8° C, dew point 8° C, and an altimeter setting of 29.52 inches of mercury.The airplane impacted a tree prior to impacting the field about 50 feet beyond the initial tree strike. All major components of the airplane were located in the vicinity of the wreckage. The debris path was about 325 ft long and was located on a 142° heading. The airplane was highly fragmented and dispersed along the debris path. The main wing spar was separated from the airframe and came to rest about 200 ft from the initial ground impact point. The empennage was impact-separated and located about 275 ft from the initial impact crater. Both engines were impact-separated from the airplane. The cockpit, cabin, and wings were highly fragmented. A cockpit voice recorder and an enhanced ground proximity warning system were located along the debris path and retained for data download. The airplane was moved to a secure facility and retained for further examination.

Crash of a Lockheed HC-130H Hercules in Savannah: 9 killed

Date & Time: May 2, 2018 at 1130 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
65-0968
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Savannah – Davis-Monthan
MSN:
4110
YOM:
1965
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Circumstances:
After takeoff from runway 10 at Savannah-Hilton Head Airport, while in initial climb, the four engine airplane went out of control, entered a dive and crashed in a huge explosion on road 21 located about a mile east of the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all nine occupants were killed, all members of the contingent of the Puerto Rico Air National Guard (ANG). The aircraft, built in 1965, was on its way to Davis-Monthan AFB to be retired. This was its last flight.

Crash of a Cessna 500 Citation I in Marietta: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 24, 2017 at 1924 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N8DX
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Cincinnati – Atlanta
MSN:
500-0303
YOM:
1976
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
6000
Aircraft flight hours:
9299
Circumstances:
The private pilot departed on an instrument flight rules flight plan in his twin-engine turbojet airplane. The flight was uneventful until the air traffic controller amended the flight plan, which required the pilot to manually enter the new routing information into the GPS. A few minutes later, the pilot told the controller that he was having problems with the GPS and asked for a direct route to his destination. The controller authorized the direct route and instructed the pilot to descend from 22,000 ft to 6,000 ft, during which time the sound of the autopilot disconnect was heard on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). During the descent, the pilot told the controller that the airplane had a steering problem and was in the clouds. The pilot was instructed to descend the airplane to 4,100 ft, which was the minimum vectoring altitude. The airplane continued to descend, entered visual meteorological conditions, and then descended below the assigned altitude. The controller queried the pilot about the airplane's low altitude and instructed the pilot to maintain 4,100 ft. The pilot responded that he was unsure if he would be able to climb the airplane back to that altitude due to steering issues. The controller issued a low altitude warning and again advised the pilot to climb back to 4,100 ft. The pilot responded that the autopilot was working again and that he was able to climb the airplane to the assigned altitude. The controller then instructed the pilot to change to another radio frequency, but the pilot responded that he was still having a problem with the GPS. The pilot asked the controller to give him direct routing to the airport. A few minutes later, the pilot told the controller that he was barely able to keep the airplane straight and its wings level. The controller asked the pilot if he had the airport in sight, which he did not. The pilot then declared an emergency and expressed concerns related to identifying the landing runway. Afterward, radio contact between the controller and the pilot was lost. Shortly before the airplane impacted the ground, a witness saw the airplane make a complete 360° roll to the left, enter a steep 90° bank to the left, roll inverted, and enter a vertical nose-down dive. Another witness saw the airplane spiral to the ground. The airplane impacted the front lawn of a private residence, and a postcrash fire ensued.The pilot held a type rating for the airplane, but the pilot's personal logbooks were not available for review. As a result, his overall currency and total flight experience in the accident airplane could not be determined. The airplane was originally certified for operations with a pilot and copilot. To obtain an exemption to operate the airplane as a single pilot, a pilot must successfully complete an approved single-pilot exemption training course annually. The accident airplane was modified, and the previous owner was issued a single-pilot conformity certificate by the company that performed the modifications. However, there was no record indicating that the accident pilot received training under this exemption. Several facilities that have single-pilot exemption training for the accident airplane series also had no record of the pilot receiving training for single-pilot operations in the accident airplane. Therefore, unlikely that the pilot was properly certificated to act as a single-pilot. The GPS was installed in the airplane about 3.5 years before the accident. A friend of the pilot trained him on how to use the GPS. The friend said that the pilot generally was confused about how the unit operated and struggled with pulling up pages and correlating data. The friend of the pilot had flown with him several times and indicated that, if an air traffic controller amended a preprogrammed flight plan while en route, the pilot would be confused with the procedure for amending the flight plan. The friend also said the pilot depended heavily on the autopilot, which was integrated with the GPS, and that he would activate the autopilot immediately after takeoff and deactivate it on short final approach to a runway. The pilot would not trim the airplane before turning on the autopilot because he assumed that the autopilot would automatically trim the airplane, which led to the autopilot working against the mis-trimmed airplane. The friend added that the pilot was "constantly complaining" that the airplane was "uncontrollable." A postaccident examination of the airplane and the autopilot system revealed no evidence of any preimpact deficiencies that would have precluded normal operation. This information suggests that pilot historically had difficulty flying the airplane without the aid of the autopilot. When coupled with his performance flying the airplane during the accident flight without the aid of the autopilot, it further suggests that the pilot was consistently unable to manually fly the airplane. Additionally, given the pilot's previous experience with the GPS installed on the airplane, it is likely that during the accident flight the pilot became confused about how to operate the GPS and ultimately was unable to properly control of the airplane without the autopilot engaged. Based on witness information, it is likely that during the final moments of the flight the pilot lost control of the airplane and it entered an aerodynamic stall. The pilot was then unable to regain control of the airplane as it spun 4,000 ft to the ground.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed while manually flying the airplane, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and experiencing an aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's inability control the airplane without the aid of the autopilot.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 421B Golden Eagle II in Cherokee County: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 4, 2017 at 0023 LT
Registration:
N421KL
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Tulsa - Cherokee County
MSN:
421B-0015
YOM:
1970
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
4000
Aircraft flight hours:
7522
Circumstances:
The 69-year-old commercial pilot was making a personal cross-country flight in the newly purchased airplane. When the airplane was on final approach to the destination airport in night visual meteorological conditions, airport surveillance video showed it pitch up and roll to the right. The airplane then descended in a nose-down attitude to impact in a ravine on the right side of the runway. During the descent over the ravine the right wing came in contact with a powerline that briefly cut power to the airport. Postaccident examination of the airframe, engines, and their components revealed no evidence of mechanical anomalies or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot's toxicology findings identified five different impairing medications: clonazepam, temazepam, hydrocodone, nortriptyline, and diphenhydramine. Although the results were from cavity blood and may not accurately reflect antemortem levels, the hydrocodone, temazepam, and diphenhydramine levels were high enough to likely have had some psychoactive effects. While the exact effects of these drugs in combination are not known, it is likely that the pilot was impaired to some degree by his use of this combination of medications, which likely contributed to his failure to maintain control of the airplane.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane during a night visual landing approach. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's impairment due to his use of a combination of medications.
Final Report:

Crash of a Swearingen SA227AC Metro III near Pebble City: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 5, 2016 at 2222 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N765FA
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Panama City – Albany
MSN:
AC-765
YOM:
1990
Flight number:
LYM308
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
8451
Captain / Total hours on type:
4670.00
Aircraft flight hours:
24233
Circumstances:
The airline transport pilot delayed his scheduled departure for the night cargo flight due to thunderstorms along the route. Before departing, the pilot explained to the flight follower assigned to the flight that if he could not get though the thunderstorms along the planned route, he would divert to the alternate airport. While en route, the pilot was advised by the air traffic controller in contact with the flight of a "ragged line of moderate, heavy, and extreme" precipitation along his planned route. The controller also stated that he did not see any breaks in the weather. The controller cleared the pilot to descend at his discretion from 7,000 ft mean sea level (msl) to 3,000 ft msl, and subsequently, the controller suggested a diversion to the northeast for about 70 nautical miles that would avoid the most severe weather. The pilot responded that he had enough fuel for such a diversion but concluded that he would "see what the radar is painting" after descending to 3,000 ft msl. About 1 minute 30 seconds later, as the airplane was descending through 7,000 ft msl, the controller stated, "I just lost you on radar, I don't show a transponder, it might have to do with the weather." About 40 seconds later, the pilot advised the controller that he intended to deviate to the right of course, and the controller told the pilot that he could turn left and right as needed. Shortly thereafter, the pilot stated that he was going to turn around and proceed to his alternate airport. The controller cleared the pilot direct to his alternate and instructed him to maintain 3,000 ft msl. The pilot acknowledged the instruction, and the controller then stated, "do you want to climb back up? I can offer you any altitude." The pilot responded that he would try to climb back to 3,000 ft msl. The controller then recommended a heading of 180° to "get you clear of the weather quicker," and the pilot responded, "alright 180." There were no further communications from the pilot. Shortly thereafter, radar data showed the airplane enter a right turn that continued through about 540°. During the turn its airspeed varied between 198 and 130 knots, while its estimated bank angles were between 40 and 50°. Examination of the wreckage indicated that airplane experienced an in-flight breakup at relatively low altitude, consistent with radar data that showed the airplane's last recorded altitudes to be around 3,500 ft msl. The symmetrical nature of the breakup, damage to the outboard wings, and damage to the upper fuselage were all signatures indicative that the left and right wings failed in positive overload almost simultaneously. All of the fracture surfaces examined had a dull, grainy appearance consistent with overstress separation. There was no evidence of pre-existing cracking noted at any of the separation points, nor was there evidence of any mechanical anomalies that would have prevented normal operation. Review of base reflectivity weather radar data showed that, while the pilot was maneuvering to divert to the alternate airport, the airplane was operating in an area of light precipitation that rapidly intensified to heavy precipitation, as shown by radar scans completed shortly after the accident. During this time, the flight was likely operating in clouds along the leading edge of the convective line, where the pilot most likely would have encountered updrafts and severe or greater turbulence. The low visibility conditions that existed during the flight, which was conducted at night and in instrument meteorological conditions, coupled with the turbulence the flight likely encountered, were conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. Additionally, the airplane's maneuvering during the final moments of the flight was consistent with a loss of control due to spatial disorientation. The pilot's continued flight into known convective weather conditions and his delayed decision to divert the flight directly contributed to the accident. Although the operator had a system safety-based program, the responsibility for the safe outcome of the flight was left solely to the pilot. Written company policy required completion of a flight risk assessment tool (FRAT) before each flight by the assigned flight follower; however, a FRAT was not completed for the accident flight. The flight followers responsible for completing the FRATs were not trained to complete them for night cargo flights, and the operator's management was not aware that the FRATs were not being completed for night cargo flights. Further, if a FRAT had been completed for the accident flight, the resultant score would have allowed the flight to commence into known hazardous weather conditions without any further review. If greater oversight had been provided by the operator, it is possible that the flight may have been cancelled or re-routed due to the severity of the convective weather conditions present along the planned route of flight.
Probable cause:
The pilot's decision to initiate and continue the flight into known adverse weather conditions, which resulted spatial disorientation, a loss of airplane control, and a subsequent in-flight breakup.
Final Report:

Ground accident of a Pilatus PC-12/47E in Savannah

Date & Time: Jan 6, 2016 at 0835 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N978AF
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Savannah - Lexington
MSN:
1078
YOM:
2008
Flight number:
Cobalt Air 727
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
23141
Captain / Total hours on type:
534.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7900
Copilot / Total hours on type:
5100
Aircraft flight hours:
4209
Circumstances:
The aircraft collided with a ditch during a precautionary landing after takeoff from Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport (SAV), Savannah, Georgia. The pilot and copilot sustained minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to Upper Deck Holdings, Inc. and was being operated by PlaneSense, Inc,. as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 positioning flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight to Blue Grass Airport (LEX), Lexington, Kentucky. The pilot in the left seat was the pilot monitoring and the copilot in the right seat was the pilot flying. The crew had the full length of the runway 1 available (7,002 ft) for takeoff. The pilots reported that the acceleration and takeoff was normal and after establishing a positive rate of climb, the crew received an auditory annunciation and a red crew alerting system (CAS) torque warning. The engine torque indicated 5.3 pounds per square inch (psi); the nominal torque value for the conditions that day was reported by the crew to be 43.3 psi. With about 2,700 ft of runway remaining while at an altitude of 200 ft msl, the copilot elected to land immediately; the copilot pushed the nose down and executed a 90° left descending turn and subsequently landed in the grass. Although he applied "hard" braking in an attempt to stop, the airplane impacted a drainage ditch, resulting in substantial impact damage and a postimpact fire. The pilot reported that, after takeoff, he observed a low torque CAS message and the copilot told him to "declare an emergency and run the checklist." The pilot confirmed that the landing gear were extended and the copilot turned the airplane to the left toward open ground between the runways and the terminal. About 60 seconds elapsed from the start of the takeoff roll until the accident. The airport was equipped with security cameras that captured the airplane from its initial climb through the landing and collision. One camera, pointed toward the west-southwest, recorded the airplane's left descending turn and its landing in the grass, followed by impact and smoke. A second camera, mounted on the control tower, pointed toward the southeast and showed the airplane during the initial climb before it leveled off and entered a descending left turn; it also showed the airplane land and roll through the grass before colliding with the ditch.