Training

While completing a training mission, the airplane crashed in unknown circumstances near the Zhengchang village, in the Guizhou Province. The PLA Air Force Y-8GX4 Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) aircraft, registered 30513, was assigned to the PLAAF 20th Special Missions Division. The Y-8G fleet of the division is reportedly based close to the crash site. The airplane was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 12 occupants were killed.

The twin engine aircraft departed Eskişehir Airport at 1103LT on a training flight, carrying one technician and two pilots. While flying in good weather conditions, the airplane struck the top of a snow covered mountain located in the region of Yalvaç, some 80 km northeast of Isparta. The wreckage was found at 1430LT. All three crew members were killed.

The flight instructor, commercial pilot receiving instruction, and commercial pilot-rated passenger were conducting an instructional flight in the multi-engine airplane during instrument meteorological conditions. After performing a practice instrument approach, the flight was cleared for a second approach; however, the landing runway changed, and the controller vectored the airplane for an approach to the new runway. The pilot was instructed to turn to a southwesterly heading and maintain 1,600 ft until established on the localizer. Radar information revealed that the airplane turned to a southwesterly heading on a course to intercept the localizer and remained at 1,600 ft for about 1 minute 39 seconds before beginning a descending right turn to 1,400 ft. The descent continued to 1,100 ft; at which time the air traffic control controller issued a low altitude alert. Over the following 10 seconds, the airplane continued to descend at a rate in excess of 4,800 ft per minute (fpm). The controller issued a second low altitude alert to the crew with instructions to climb to 1,600 ft immediately. The pilot responded about 5 seconds later, "yeah I am sir, I am, I am." The airplane then climbed 1,400 ft over 13 seconds, resulting in a climb rate in excess of 6,700 fpm, followed by a descent to 1,400 ft over 5 seconds, resulting in a 1,500-fpm descent before radar contact was lost in the vicinity of the accident site. Radar data following the initial instrument approach indicated that the airplane was flying a relatively smooth and consistent flightpath with altitude and heading changes that were indicative of autopilot use until the final turn to intercept the localizer course. Maneuvering the airplane in restricted visibility placed the pilot in conditions conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. The accident circumstances, including altitude and course deviations and the subsequent high-energy impact, are consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation. Additionally, examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of any preexisting anomalies that would have precludednormal operation. Therefore, it is likely that the pilot receiving instruction was experiencing the effects of spatial disorientation when the accident occurred. Toxicology testing of the flight instructor identified significant amounts of oxycodone as well as its active metabolite, oxymorphone, in liver tissue; oxycodone was also found in muscle. Oxycodone is an opioid pain medication available by prescription that may impair mental and/or physical ability required for the performance of potentially hazardous tasks. The flight instructor's tissue levels of oxycodone suggest that his blood level at the time of the accident was high enough to have had psychoactive effects, and his failure to recognize and mitigate the pilot's spatial disorientation and impending loss of control further suggest that the flight instructor was impaired by the effects of oxycodone. Toxicology testing of all three pilots identified ethanol in body tissues; however, given the varying amounts and distribution, it is likely that the identified ethanol was from postmortem production rather than ingestion.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Comayagua-Palmerola AFB when the twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances onto a building. The captain was killed while the copilot and the flight engineer were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.
Crew:
Cpt Olvin Emanuel Florez Meraz, pilot, †
Lt Cesar Augusto Banegas Corea, copilot,
Cdt Brayan Daniel Zavala Amaya, flight mechanic.

The twin engine airplane departed El Palomar Airport at 1604LT on a training flight, carrying one passenger and two pilots. While descending to Buenos Aires-Ezeiza-Ministro Pistarini Airport, the right engine failed. The crew was unable to restart the engine and to maintain a safe altitude, so he attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crashed in an open field located 24 km from the airport, bursting into flames. All three occupants were injured and the aircraft was partially destroyed by fire.

On 30 May 2017, a Cessna 441 Conquest II (Cessna 441), registered VH-XMJ (XMJ) and operated by AE Charter, trading as Rossair, departed Adelaide Airport, South Australia for a return flight via Renmark Airport, South Australia. On board the aircraft were:
• an inductee pilot undergoing a proficiency check, flying from the front left control seat
• the chief pilot conducting the proficiency check, and under assessment for the company training and checking role for Cessna 441 aircraft, seated in the front right control seat
• a Civil Aviation Safety Authority flying operations inspector (FOI), observing and assessing the flight from the first passenger seat directly behind the left hand pilot seat.
Each pilot was qualified to operate the aircraft. There were two purposes for the flight. The primary purpose was for the FOI to observe the chief pilot conducting an operational proficiency check (OPC), for the purposes of issuing him with a check pilot approval on the company’s Cessna 441 aircraft. The second purpose was for the inductee pilot, who had worked for Rossair previously, to complete an OPC as part of his return to line operations for the company. The three pilots reportedly started their pre-flight briefing at around 1300 Central Standard Time. There were two parts of the briefing – the FOI’s briefing to the chief pilot, and the chief pilot’s briefing to the inductee pilot. As the FOI was not occupying a control seat, he was monitoring and assessing the performance of the chief pilot in the conduct of the OPC. There were two distinct exercises listed for the flight (see the section titled Check flight sequences). Flight exercise 1 detailed that the inductee pilot was to conduct an instrument departure from Adelaide Airport, holding pattern and single engine RNAV2 approach, go around and landing at Renmark Airport. Flight exercise 2 included a normal take-off from Renmark Airport, simulated engine failure after take-off, and a two engine instrument approach on return to Adelaide. The aircraft departed from Adelaide at 1524, climbed to an altitude about 17,000 ft above mean sea level, and was cleared by air traffic control (ATC) to track to waypoint RENWB, which was the commencement of the Renmark runway 073 RNAV-Z GNSS approach. The pilot of XMJ was then cleared to descend, and notified ATC that they intended to carry out airwork in the Renmark area. The pilot further advised that they would call ATC again on the completion of the airwork, or at the latest by 1615. No further transmissions from XMJ were recorded on the area frequency and the aircraft left surveillance coverage as it descended towards waypoint RENWB. The common traffic advisory frequency used for air-to-air communications in the vicinity of Renmark Airport recorded several further transmissions from XMJ as the crew conducted practice holding patterns, and a practice runway 07 RNAV GNSS approach. Voice analysis confirmed that the inductee pilot made the radio transmissions, as expected for the check flight. At the completion of the approach, the aircraft circled for the opposite runway and landed on runway 25, before backtracking and lining up for departure. That sequence varied from the planned exercise in that no single-engine go-around was conducted prior to landing at Renmark. At 1614, the common traffic advisory frequency recorded a transmission from the pilot of XMJ stating that they would shortly depart Renmark using runway 25 to conduct further airwork in the circuit area of the runway. A witness at the airport reported that, prior to the take-off roll, the aircraft was briefly held stationary in the lined-up position with the engines operating at significant power. The take-off roll was described as normal however, and the witness looked away before the aircraft became airborne. The aircraft maintained the runway heading until reaching a height of between 300-400 ft above the ground (see the section titled Recorded flight data). At that point the aircraft began veering to the right of the extended runway centreline (Figures 1 and 15). The aircraft continued to climb to about 600 ft above the ground (700 ft altitude), and held this height for about 30 seconds, followed by a descent to about 500 ft (Figures 2 and 13). The information ceased 5 seconds later, which was about 60 seconds after take-off. A distress beacon broadcast was received by the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre and passed on to ATC at 1625. Following an air and ground search the aircraft was located by a ground party at 1856 about 4 km west of Renmark Airport. All on board were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

The crew was performing a local training mission at Balashov Airport, in the region of Saratov. Following several touch-and-go manoeuvres, the crew initiated a new approach. On final, the airplane descended below the MDA and, at a speed of 240 km/h, rolled to the right to an angle of 24°, stalled and crashed in a field located 1,100 metres from the airfield, bursting into flames. Five occupants were injures while a pilot under supervision was killed. The airplane had the dual registration RF-36160 and 79 red.
Crew:
Cpt Y. Tereshin,
Maj S. Rodionov,
Ens Frolov,
P. Halaimov,
I. Makhmoudov,
M. Artemiev. †

The airplane departed Playa Baracoa Airport at 0638LT on a training flight and continued to the southwest. En route, it impacted the slope of Mt Loma de la Pimienta located about six km north of San Cristóbal, province of Artemisa. The aircraft was destroyed and all eight crew members were killed. Owned by Aerogaviota, the airplane was operated by the Cuban Air Force (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias) under flight code FAR1436.

On 14 Mar 17, at 1835 local time (L), a U-28A, tail number 0724, crashed one-quarter mile south of Clovis Municipal Airport (KCVN), New Mexico (NM). This aircraft was operated by the 318th Special Operations Squadron, 27th Special Operations Wing, Cannon Air Force Base (AFB), NM. The aircraft was destroyed and all three crewmembers died upon impact. The Mishap Aircraft (MA) departed Cannon AFB at 1512L for tactical training over Lubbock, Texas, followed by pilot proficiency training at KCVN. The Mishap Crew (MC) entered Lubbock airspace at 1545L, completed their tactical training, and departed Lubbock airspace at 1735L enroute to KCVN. The MC entered the KCVN traffic pattern at 1806L, where they conducted multiple approaches and landings prior to executing the mishap maneuver, a practice turnback Emergency Landing Pattern (ELP). The MC entered the practice turnback ELP with 0° flaps led to increased aircraft nose-down attitudes and higher descent rates required to maintain a safe angle of attack versus a comparative 15° flap approach. In addition, 0° flap stall speeds are higher than 15° flap stall speeds – 15 to 25 knots higher for the range of bank angles flown by the MC during the practice turnback ELP. The MC was also late to achieve the bank angle required to enable the MA to align with the extended centerline for the runway resulting in an overshoot condition. The MC attempted to arrest their excessive nose-down attitude, descent rate, and shallow bank angle by pulling back on the aircraft yoke and increasing bank angle. The g-load from the MC pull back, coupled with the MA's increased bank angle, slowed the MA airspeed below 0° flap stall speed and it departed controlled flight. Subsequent power increase and flight control inputs would not have enabled the aircraft to recover from the stall within remaining altitude. After entering the stall, the MC increased power; however, it was not enough to overcome the MA descent rate. At no point during the practice turnback ELP did the MA performance reflect a MC intent to abort the maneuver. The MA impacted the ground with a 13° nose-high, 7° left-wing low attitude. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all three occupants were killed.
Crew:
Cpt Andrew Becker, pilot,
1st Lt Frederick Dellecker, copilot,
Cpt Kenneth Dalga, combat systems officer.

The private pilot, who had recently purchased the airplane, and the flight instructor were conducting an instructional flight in the multi-engine airplane to meet insurance requirements. Radar data for the accident flight, which occurred on the second day of 2 days of training, showed the airplane maneuvering between 1,000 ft and 1,200 ft above ground level (agl) just before the accident. The witness descriptions of the accident were consistent with the airplane transitioning from slow flight into a stall that developed into a spin from which the pilots were unable to recover before the airplane impacted terrain. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal evidence of any preexisting mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. After the first day of training, the pilot told friends and fellow pilots that the instructor provided non-standard training that included stall practice that required emergency recoveries at low airspeed and low altitude. The instructor used techniques that were not in keeping with established flight training standards and were not what would be expected from an individual with his extensive background in general aviation flight instruction. Most critically, the instructor used two techniques that introduced unnecessary risk: increasing power before reducing the angle of attack during a stall recovery and introducing asymmetric power while recovering from a stall in a multi-engine airplane; both techniques are dangerous errors because they can lead to an airplane entering a spin. At one point during the first day of training, the airplane entered a full stall and spun before control was regained at very low altitude. The procedures performed contradicted standard practice and Federal Aviation Administration guidance; yet, despite the pilot's experience in multi-engine airplanes and in the accident airplane make and model, he chose to continue the second day of training with the instructor instead of seeking a replacement to complete the insurance check out. The spin encountered on the accident flight likely resulted from the stall recovery errors advocated by the instructor and practiced on the prior day's flight. Unlike the previous flight, the accident flight did not have sufficient altitude for recovery because of the low altitude it was operating at, which was below the safe altitude required for stall training (one which allows recovery no lower than 3,000 ft agl).