Test

The mechanic who maintained the airplane reported that, on the morning of the accident, the right engine would not start due to water contamination in the fuel system. The commercial pilot and mechanic purged the fuel tanks, flushed the fuel system, and cleaned the left engine fuel injector nozzles. After the maintenance work, they completed engine ground runs for each engine with no anomalies noted. Subsequently, the pilot ordered new fuel from the local fixed-based operator to complete a maintenance test flight. The pilot stated that he completed a preflight inspection, followed by engine run-ups for each engine with no anomalies noted and then departed with one passenger onboard. Immediately after takeoff, the right engine stopped producing full power, and the airplane would not maintain altitude. No remaining runway was left to land, so the pilot conducted a forced landing to a field about 1 mile from the runway; the airplane landed hard and came to rest upright. Postaccident examination revealed no water contamination in the engines. Examination of the airplane revealed numerous instances of improper and inadequate maintenance of the engines and fuel system. The fuel system contained corrosion debris, and minimal fuel was found in the lines to the fuel servo. Although maintenance was conducted on the airplane on the morning of the accident, the right engine fuel injectors nozzles were not removed during the maintenance procedures; therefore, it is likely that the fuel flow volume was not measured. It is likely that the corrosion debris in the fuel system resulted when the water was recently purged from the fuel system. The contaminants were likely knocked loose during the subsequent engine runs and attempted takeoff, which subsequently blocked the fuel lines and starved the right engine of available fuel.

Following a technical maintenance, a test flight was scheduled with two engineers and two pilots. The twin engine airplane departed Mumbai-Juhu Airport and the crew completed several manoeuvres over the city before returning. On approach in heavy rain falls, the aircraft went out of control and crashed at the bottom of a building under construction located in the Ghatkopar West district, some 3 km east from Mumbai Intl Airport, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all four occupants were killed as well as one people on the ground.

The airplane manufacturer was conducting spin flight testing for the installation of a cargo pod when the airplane exhibited aberrant behavior and the testing was halted. The chief design engineer (CDE) was consulted, and, to provide a margin of safety for further flights, a forward center of gravity position was authorized for flaps up and flaps takeoff entries to gain more insight into the airplane's behavior on the previous flight. At the final briefing, before the next flight, the flight crew added spins with flaps in the landing configuration (flaps landing) into the test plan without the CDE's consultation or authorization. According to the pilot flying, after two wings-level, power on, flaps landing spins with left rudder and right aileron, a third spin entry was flown in the same configuration except that the entry was from a 30° left-bank turn. The airplane entered a normal spin, and, at one turn, flight controls were inputted for a normal recovery; however, the airplane settled into a fully developed spin. When recovery attempts failed, the decision was made to deploy the anti-spin parachute. After repeated unsuccessful attempts to deploy the anti-spin parachute, and when the airplane's altitude reached about 500 ft above the briefed minimum bailout altitude, both pilots called for and executed a bailout. The airplane impacted the ground and was destroyed. A postaccident examination of the anti-spin parachute system revealed that half of the connector hook had opened, which allowed the activation pin lanyard for the anti-spin parachute to become disengaged. Based on the airplane's previous aberrant behavior and the conservative parameters that the CDE had previously set, it is not likely that the CDE would have authorized abused spin entries without a prior testing buildup to those entries. Thus, the flight crew made an inappropriate decision to introduce flaps landing entry spin testing, and the failure of the anti-spin parachute contributed to the accident.

The crew was completing a local test flight at Gavião Peixoto-Embraer Unidade Airport on this first prototype built in 2015 and flying under the Brazilian Air Force colour scheme. Following several circuits, the crew landed on runway 20. After touchdown, the airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance and overran. While contacting soft ground, it lost its undercarriage and came to rest few dozen metres further. All three crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair.

The pilot, accompanied by an aircraft mechanic, departed Grenoble-Aples-Isère Airport (saint-Geoirs) to carry out a check flight following a maintenance operation on the airplane. Once in an open area south of the aerodrome, the pilot began the maneuvers provided for in the test program. At the end of a stall maneuver, he found that his actions on the rudder pedals have no effect. However, it maintained control of the ailerons and elevators. He informed the aerodrome controller of the problem and indicated that he was coming back to to land to the paved runway 09. Unable to determined the exact nature of the damage, the pilot chose to land with the flaps retracted. He managed with difficulty to aligne the airplane witn the runway 09 centerline. On final, at an altitude of 300 feet, the pilot changed his mind and decided to land on the unpaved right-hand runway 09 which adjoins the paved runway. On very short final, at flare, while reducing power, at a height of about 1-2 metres, the airplane rolled to the right then to the left, causing the wing tips and the propeller to struck the ground. The aircraft exited the unpaved runway to the left and came to rest on the right edge of the paved runway. Both occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

While conducting a post maintenance test flight in visual flight rules conditions, the private pilot of the multi-engine airplane reported an oil leak to air traffic control. The controller provided vectors for the pilot to enter a right base leg for a landing to the south at the nearest airport, about 7 miles away. The pilot turned toward the airport but indicated that he did not have the airport in sight. Further, while maneuvering toward the airport, the pilot reported that the engine was "dead," and he still did not see the airport. The final radar data point recorded the airplane's position about 3.5 miles west-northwest of the approach end of the runway; the wreckage site was located about 4 miles northeast of the runway, indicating that the pilot flew past the airport rather than turning onto a final approach for landing. The reason that the pilot did not see the runway during the approach to the alternate airport, given that the airplane was operating in visual conditions and the controller was issuing guidance information, could not be determined. Regardless, the pilot did not execute a precautionary landing in a timely manner and lost control of the airplane. Examination of the airplane's left engine revealed that the No. 2 connecting rod was broken. The connecting rod bearings exhibited signs of heat distress and discoloration consistent with a lack of lubrication. The engine's oil pump was intact, and the gears were wet with oil. Based on the available evidence, the engine failure was the result of oil starvation; however, examination could not identify the reason for the starvation.

Based on a Piaggio P.180 Avanti, the Piaggio P.1HH HammerHead is a drone prototype. Engaged in a series of test as part of the certification program, the twin engine aircraft left Trapani-Vincenzo Florio Airport at 1120LT for a local test flight. About 20 minutes later, the contact was lost with the ground station and the aircraft crashed into the sea about 8 km north of the Levanzo Island. The aircraft was lost.

The twin engine aircraft was engaged in a post-maintenance test flight out from Santiago de Querétaro Airport, carrying three engineers and two pilots. It departed runway 09 at 1421LT and the crew was cleared to climb to FL125. While approaching the altitude of 12,000 feet, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed on a motorway located 11 km southwest of the airport, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all five occupants were killed.

The pilot departed on a postmaintenance test flight during day visual meteorological conditions. According to the operator, the purpose of the flight was to break in six recently installed engine cylinders, and the flight was expected to last 3.5 hours. Recorded automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data showed that the airplane was operating at altitudes of less than 500 ft mean sea level for the majority of the flight. The data ended about 3 hours after takeoff with the airplane located about 23 miles from the accident site. There were no witnesses to the accident, which occurred in a remote area. When the airplane did not return, the operator reported to the Federal Aviation Administration that the airplane was overdue. Searchers subsequently discovered the fragmented wreckage submerged in a swift moving river, about 40 miles southeast of the departure/destination airport. Postmortem toxicology tests identified 21% carboxyhemoglobin (carbon monoxide) in the pilot's blood. The pilot was a nonsmoker, and nonsmokers normally have no more than 3% carboxyhemoglobin. There was no evidence of postimpact fire; therefore, it is likely that the pilot's elevated carboxyhemoglobin level was from acute exposure to carbon monoxide during the 3 hours of flight time before the accident. As the pilot did not notify air traffic control or the operator's home base of any problems during the flight, it is unlikely that he was aware that there was carbon monoxide present. Early symptoms of carbon monoxide exposure may include headache, malaise, nausea, and dizziness. Carboxyhemoglobin levels between 10% and 20% can result in confusion, impaired judgment, and difficulty concentrating. While it is not possible to determine the exact symptoms the pilot experienced, it is likely that the pilot had symptoms that may have been distracting as well as some degree of impairment in his judgment and concentration. Given the low altitudes at which he was operating the airplane, he had little margin for error. Thus, it is likely that the carbon monoxide exposure adversely affected the pilot's performance and contributed to his failure to maintain clearance from the terrain. According to the operator, the airplane had a "winter heat kit" installed, which modified the airplane's original cabin heat system. The modification incorporated an additional exhaust/heat shroud system designed to provide increased cabin heat during wintertime operations. Review of maintenance records revealed that the modification had not been installed in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration field approval procedures. Examination of the recovered wreckage did not reveal evidence of any preexisting mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Examination of the airplane's right side exhaust/heat exchanger did not reveal any leaks or fractures that would have led to carbon monoxide in the cabin. Because the left side exhaust/heat exchanger was
not recovered, it was not possible to determine whether it was the source of the carbon monoxide.

Brand new, the aircraft just came out from the manufacturer in Seville and was engaged in its first post assembly test flight. After take off from Seville-San Pablo Airport Runway 09 at 1254LT, the crew completed a 90° turn to the left bound to the north. Shortly later, three of the four engines (engines n°1, 2 and 3) got stuck at high power. The crew attempted to control the power setting to the normal mode but those three engines failed to respond. The crew reduced the engine power after selecting the thrust levers to idle. The regime of those three engines remained blocked in idle so the crew decided to return to the airport for an emergency landing. On approach, the aircraft collided with power lines, stalled and crashed in an open field located 1,6 km north of the airport, bursting into flames. Two crew members were rescued while four others were killed. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire. The aircraft was following a test program prior to its delivery to the Turkish Air Force (Türk Hava Kuvvetleri).