Crash of a Lockheed L-1011 TriStar 200 in Riyadh: 301 killed

Date & Time: Aug 19, 1980 at 2205 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HZ-AHK
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Karachi - Riyadh - Jeddah
MSN:
193U-1169
YOM:
1979
Flight number:
SV163
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
14
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
287
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
301
Captain / Total flying hours:
7674
Captain / Total hours on type:
388.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1615
Copilot / Total hours on type:
125
Aircraft flight hours:
3023
Aircraft flight cycles:
1759
Circumstances:
About 2108LT, the airplane departed Riyadh Airport en route to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Six minutes and 54 seconds after takeoff, while climbing to FL350, visual and aural warnings indicated smoke in the aft cargo compartment C-3. Climbing through FL220, a return to Riyadh was initiated. About two minutes later smoke was noted in the aft of the cabin, and passengers were panicking. At 18:25:26 the no. 2 engine throttle was stuck. The flight landed at about 2136LT and then taxied clear of the runway and came to a stop on an adjacent taxiway. While parked on the taxiway, the aircraft was destroyed by the fire and the three hundred and one persons on board the flight were killed.
Survival aspects:
The accident was survivable. The first door was opened about 23 min after all engines had been shutdown. The first rescue attempt was conducted at L-1 door. Most witness statements agree in content but differ slightly in the time factor element. A witness who participated in the first two efforts to open the doors stated that he was aboard fire truck n°4 was it was positioned near the left rear portion of the aircraft. He observed thick white smoke flowing from the bottom rear fuselage. At that time the aircraft engines were still running. A few seconds later, he observed smoke near the top of the fuselage, forward of the n°2 engine inlet. According to him, this smoke was followed almost immediately by flames in the same area. As the driver of n°4 started applying agent via the monitor, the witness dismounted and moved toward exit L-1. His route was outboard of n°1 engine which he thought was still running. On approaching L-1, he observed the fire chief and other people attempting to reach the L-1 emergency handle via a ladder which was placed on top of fire truck n°6. While fire personnel steadied the ladder, he climbed up and pulled the emergency handle. He was not certain if the door moved or not. An additional effort was attempted while he held onto and rode the monitor. While on the monitor, he pushed on the door to no avail. Most of :he group then moved to R-2 where another ladder had been positioned by other firemen. A firemen then climbed the ladder, operated the handle and the door opened in the emergency mode. The cabin was observed to be full of smoke and no life was observed nor were any human sounds heard. R-2 door was opened at 1905, 26 min after the aircraft came to a stop and 23 min after the shutdown of all engines. Shortly after (about 3 min) R-2 was opened, flames were seen progressing forward from the rear section of the cabin.
Probable cause:
The initiation of a fire in the C-3 cargo compartment. The source of the ignition of the fire is undetermined. Factors contributing to the fatal results of this accident were:
- The failure of the captain to prepare the cabin crew for immediate evacuation upon landing and his failure in not making a maximum stop landing on the runway, with immediate evacuation,
- The failure of the captain to properly utilize his flight crew throughout the emergency,
- The failure of C/F/R headquarters management personnel to ensure that its personnel had adequate equipment and training to function as required during an emergency.
Final Report:

Crash of a Lockheed L-1011-385 TriStar 1 in the Everglades National Park: 99 killed

Date & Time: Dec 29, 1972 at 2342 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N310EA
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
New York - Miami
MSN:
N193A-1011
YOM:
1972
Flight number:
EA401
Crew on board:
13
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
163
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
101
Captain / Total flying hours:
29700
Captain / Total hours on type:
280.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5800
Copilot / Total hours on type:
306
Aircraft flight hours:
986
Aircraft flight cycles:
502
Circumstances:
The flight from New York-JFK was uneventful and the crew started the descent to Miami-Intl Airport by night and good weather conditions. On approach, the captain instructed 'gear down' but all three green lights failed to illuminate properly. The second officer was instructed to enter the forward electronics bay but the problem could not be resolved. The crew informed ATC about the situation and was cleared to climb to 2,000 feet. The crew then discussed to try to find a solution but failed to realize that the airplane was continuing to descend. When a warning sounded in the cockpit indicating a +/- 250 feet deviation from the selected altitude, none of the crew members react to the warning sound and no action was taken. At 2341LT, the crew was instructed by ATC to turn heading 180 and a minute later, the first officer realized that something was wrong with the altitude. Seven seconds later, while turning in a left angle of 28°, the left engine struck the ground then the aircraft crashed in the Everglades National Park, about 20 miles short of runway threshold, and disintegrated on impact. 77 people were rescued while 99 others were killed, among them five crew members. More than a week later, two survivors died from their injuries.
Probable cause:
Failure of the flight crew to monitor the flight instruments during the final 4 minutes of flight, and to detect an unexpected descent soon enough to prevent impact with the ground. Preoccupation with a malfunction of the nose landing gear position indicating system distracted the crew's attention from the instruments and allowed the descent to go unnoticed. The following findings were reported:
- There was no failure or malfunction of the structure, powerplants, systems, or components of the aircraft before impact, except that both bulbs in the nose landing gear position indicating system were burned out.
- The aircraft struck the ground in a 28' left bank with a high rate of sink.
- There was no fire until the integrity of the left wing fuel tanks was destroyed after the impact.
- The tumor in the cranial cavity of the captain did not contribute to the accident.
- The autopilot was utilized in basic CWS.
- The flight crew was unaware of the low force gradient input required to effect a change in aircraft attitude while in CWS.
- The company training program met the requirements of the Federal Aviation Administration.
- The three flight crewmembers were preoccupied in an attempt to ascertain the position of the nose landing gear.
- The second officer, followed later by the jump seat occupant, went into the forward electronics bay to check the nose gear down position indices.
- The second officer was unable visually to determine the position of the nose gear.
- The flight crew did not hear the aural altitude alert which sounded as the aircraft descended through 1,750 feet msl.
- There were several manual thrust reductions during the final descent.
- The speed control system did not affect the reduction in thrust.
- The flight crew did not monitor the flight instruments during the final descent until seconds before impact.
- The captain failed to assure that a pilot was monitoring the progress of the aircraft at all times
Final Report: