Rio de Janeiro-Galeão

The nose gear collapsed upon landing at Rio de Janeiro-Galeão and the airplane came to rest. There were no injuries but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Few minutes after its takeoff from Rio de Janeiro-Galeão Airport, the twin engine airplane crashed in unknown circumstances into the sea some 30 km off Ilha Grande. All four crew members were killed, among them Lt Luís Gonzaga Villas Boas, pilot, and 2nd Lt José Roberto Mendes Pereira da Ponte, copilot.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Rio de Janeiro-Galeão Airport. On final approach, the instructor voluntarily shut down the engine number four to simulate a failure. Simultaneously, the pilot under training lost control of the airplane that stalled and struck the runway surface. After impact, the airplane veered off runway and came to rest. While all four crew members were evacuated safely, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew departed Rio de Janeiro-Santos Dumont Airport on a local training flight to Rio de Janeiro-Galeão Airport. Shortly after takeoff, while climbing, the crew informed ATC that the right engine caught fire and received the permission to return for an emergency landing. Unable to extinguish the fire, the crew feathered the propeller and reduced his altitude when the right wing, on fire, detached. Out of control, the airplane entered a dive and crashed into the Guanabara Bay. The aircraft was destroyed and all three crew members were killed.

The crew was engaged in a local training flight at Rio de Janeiro-Galeão Airport. During the takeoff roll, just after V1 speed, the nose gear retracted. The aircraft sank on its belly, lost its both engines number two and three and slid for several yards before coming to rest in flames. All seven crew members were slightly injured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was on a scheduled international flight from Buenos Aires to Rio de Janeiro (Galeao Airport) and Lisbon. It arrived at Galeao Airport following an uneventful flight. Another crew took over for the last segment of the flight. The takeoff run began at 2303 hours GMT from runway 14. The aircraft's acceleration appeared to be normal. The pilot-in-command declared that, at a speed between 100 and 135 kt (V1), he noted that the control column was too far back and pushed it forward. At this point the co-pilot released the controls, which is normally done when the aircraft reaches V1. It is believed that in fact an attempt to rotate the aircraft was made around 132 kt. The aircraft continued to accelerate normally. The co-pilot announced 148 kt, the rotation speed (VR), and the pilot pulled back on the control column. However, the aircraft did not respond, so he pushed it forward again. No indication of this rotation attempt was revealed by the flight recorder reading. He and the co-pilot then pulled back on the control column, however, the nose of the aircraft did not rotate since the pilot had already reduced power 14 seconds after reaching VR. Also, the tape reading indicated that the brakes were used for 5 seconds prior to any power reduction. The first marks of braking were found approximately 2300 m from the threshold. The pilot realized that the aircraft could not be stopped on the remaining portion of the runway so he turned the aircraft off the runway to the right and fully reduced power. The brakes were applied but not reverse thrust. Heavy and steady braking marks started 2600 m from the threshold. Of his own accord, the co-pilot applied full power for reversion and tried to operate the spoilers but could not do so because of the bumps The right wing lowered, dragging engines No. 3 and 4. The left wheels of the landing gear sank into the sand, and engines No. 1 and 2 also began to drag. All four engines lost their ejectors and reversion cones, causing the aircraft to accelerate. It continued moving at a high speed, hit the airport wall, crossed the adjoining highway, lost engines No. 1 and 2 and the left landing gear and finally came to rest in the sea. 50 m from shore. It drifted 100 m while floating and then sank to a depth of 8 m. There were no lights on board the aircraft when it came to a stop as the automatic emergency lighting system did not function. One cabin attendant used one of the two flashlights available. The darkness increased the panic and confusion. The passengers could not use the main door as an exit because it would open into the sea. They did not know where the emergency exits were. However, the exits were then opened and most of the passengers left the aircraft on the starboard side. The fact that the lour exits were all in the central part of the fuselage hampered the evacuation as the number of passengers (94) was considerable. The crew left the aircraft via the cockpit windows. No instructions had been given on emergency procedures and therefore the passengers and most of the crew did not take their life jackets with them when leaving the aircraft. Although the aircraft was equipped with six life rafts no crew member tried to use them. The aircraft drifted 330 feet downstream and submerged in 25 minutes. A crew member and 14 passengers were killed, 46 occupants were wounded and 44 were uninjured.

The crew encountered technical problems while approaching Rio de Janeiro-Galeão Airport and was unable to lower the nose gear. The landing procedure was completed with the nose gear retracted and the airplane slid on its nose for dozen yards before coming to rest. There were no injuries but the aircraft was written off.

On approach to Galeão Airport in Rio, weather conditions worsened and the crew was instructed by ATC to follow a holding pattern. Heavy rain falls and foggy conditions prevailed at this time. Few minutes later, the crew attempted a second approach to Galeão Airport when the airplane went out of control and crashed into the Guanabara Bay. The aircraft was totally destroyed upon impact and all 54 occupants were killed. Up to date, this was the worst air tragedy in Brazil.

The R4D-6 left Buenos Aires at 0825LT on a flight to Rio de Janeiro, carrying a delegation of musicians who would take part to a ceremony dedicated to the official visit in Rio de Janeiro of the US President Eisenhower. At 12:56 the crew reported over the BAGRE fix, entering the Rio Approach Control zone. The plane then descended to 1500 m reaching the Ilha Rasa (IH) NDB at 13:05. The crew were then instructed to arrive over the RJ NDB at 1800 m altitude and continue to the KX NDB descending to 1500 m. At the KX NDB the plane could enter the approach path for Galeao Airport. At 13:07 the flight reported passing over RJ at 1800 m, but the plane was in fact still approaching the NDB! False radio compass indications in the area are not uncommon; they are influenced by a steel cable car in the area. REAL DC-3 PP-AXD had left Campos at 12:10 for a flight to Rio de Janeiro. The flight reported at the Porto das Caixas fix at 12:58. at 1650 m. He was told to head for the RJ NDB at 1800 m and was later cleared for 1500 m to carry out the Victor Procedure for an approach to Santos Dumont Airport. The DC-3 overflew the RJ NDB at 13:06 at 1700 m. While carrying out the standard 180° turn to the left, the DC-3 was hit on its right side in an upward direction by the US Navy DC-6. The collision occurred at about 1600 m; the DC-3 crashed into the bay just southeast of Sugar Loaf Mountain; the DC-6 crashed into the bay just north of the mountain.

While taxiing at Rio de Janeiro-Galeão Airport, the Packet went out of control and collided with a parked Consolidated P4Y-2 Privateer registered ZP-CAD and owned by Alas Guaranies. There were no casualties but both aircraft were written off.