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Crash of a Socata TBM-900 in Fairoaks

Date & Time: Oct 15, 2016 at 0732 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
M-VNTR
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Douglas - Fairoaks
MSN:
1097
YOM:
2016
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5272
Captain / Total hours on type:
1585.00
Circumstances:
The accident occurred as the aircraft was preparing to land at Fairoaks Airport at the end of a private flight from Ronaldsway Airport on the Isle of Man. On board were the aircraft commander and a passenger who occupied the front right seat. As the aircraft neared Fairoaks, the pilot listened to the Farnborough ATIS broadcast, which reported a visibility of 4,000 m in mist. He and the passenger discussed the visibility, and agreed that they would proceed to Fairoaks while retaining the option to divert to Farnborough Airport (9 nm to the south-west) if a landing was not possible. The visibility at Fairoaks was recorded as 4,500 m, with ‘few’ clouds at 4,000 ft and a surface wind of 3 kt from 240°. Runway 24 was in use with a left-hand circuit. The circuit height, based on the Fairoaks QNH was 1,100 ft (the elevation of Fairoaks Airport is 80 ft amsl). Runway 24 is a hard runway, 813 m long and 27 m wide. The pilot identified the airfield visually, although there was low lying mist in the area. In order to maintain visual contact with the landing area he joined the circuit and flew a downwind leg that was closer to the runway than usual. He recalled carrying out the pre-landing checks while downwind, including lowering the landing gear and extending the flaps to the takeoff position2 . Based on a final approach with flaps at the landing setting, the pilot planned for an initial approach speed of 90 kt, reducing to a final approach speed of 80 kt. The pilot recalled the aircraft being slightly low as it turned from the downwind leg onto its final approach track. He believed he had selected flaps to the landing position, and recalled seeing the airspeed just below 90 kt, which prompted him to increase power slightly. The aircraft flew through the extended runway centreline and the pilot increased the bank angle to regain it. The pilot’s next recollection was of being in a right bank and seeing only sky ahead. He pushed forward on the control column and attempted to correct the bank with aileron. The aircraft then rolled quickly in the opposite direction and he again applied a correction. He became aware of being in an approximately wings-level attitude and seeing the ground approaching rapidly. He responded by pulling back hard on the control column, but was unable to prevent the aircraft striking the ground. He did not recall hearing a stall warning, or any other audio warning, before the loss of control occurred. The aircraft struck flat ground and slid for about 85 m before coming to rest against a treeline, about 500 m from Runway 24 and approximately on the extended centreline. The propeller was destroyed in the accident sequence and the landing gear legs detached, causing damage to the wings which included a ruptured fuel tank. In the latter stages of the slide the aircraft yawed right, coming to rest heading approximately in the direction from which it had come. The pilot and passenger remained conscious but had both suffered injury. The passenger saw flames from the region of the engine and warned the pilot that they needed to evacuate. He went to the rear of the cabin, opened the main door and left the aircraft. The pilot initially attempted to open his side door, but his right arm was injured and he was unable to open the door with only his left. He therefore followed the passenger out of the rear door.
Probable cause:
There were no indications that the aircraft had been subject to any defects or malfunctions that may have contributed to the accident. Reports from the two occupants, eye witness accounts and radar data all confirm that the aircraft commenced its final turn from a position closer to the runway than usual. This would have required a sustained moderate angle of bank through about 180° of turn. The radar data indicates that the turn onto the final approach was initially flown with less angle of bank than required. The pilot therefore either lost visual contact with the runway or did not fully appreciate the turn requirements. An explanation for the latter might be that the low height on the downwind leg combined with the relatively poor visibility to produce a runway visual aspect that gave a false impression that the aircraft spacing was not abnormal. As the finals turn progressed, there was a need to increase the angle of bank to a relatively high value. With the flaps remaining at the takeoff setting, and maintaining level flight, this placed the aircraft close to its stalling speed. Any increase in angle of bank or ‘g’ loading (as may have occurred when it became evident that the aircraft would fly through the extended centreline) risked a stall. The available evidence indicates that the aircraft stalled during the turn onto the final approach. Recovery actions taken by the occupants appear to have been partially successful, but there was evidently insufficient height in which to effect a full recovery.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-46-350P Malibu Mirage in Buttles Farm: 4 killed

Date & Time: Nov 14, 2015 at 1134 LT
Registration:
N186CB
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Fairoaks – Dunkeswell
MSN:
46-22085
YOM:
1989
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
600
Captain / Total hours on type:
260.00
Circumstances:
The aircraft was approaching Dunkeswell Airfield, Devon after an uneventful flight from Fairoaks, Surrey. The weather at Dunkeswell was overcast, with rain. The pilot held an IMC rating but there is no published instrument approach procedure at Dunkeswell. As the aircraft turned onto the final approach, it commenced a descent on what appeared to be a normal approach path but then climbed rapidly, probably entering cloud. The aircraft then seems to have stalled, turned left and descended to “just below the clouds”, before it climbed steeply again and “disappeared into cloud”. Shortly after, the aircraft was observed descending out of the cloud in a steep nose-down attitude, in what appears to have been a spin, before striking the ground. All four occupants were fatally injured.
Probable cause:
Whilst positioning for an approach to Dunkeswell Airfield, the aircraft suddenly pitched nose-up and entered cloud. This rapid change in attitude would have been disorientating for the pilot, especially in IMC, and, whilst the aircraft was probably still controllable, recovery from this unusual attitude may have been beyond his capabilities. The aircraft appears to have stalled, turned left and descended steeply out of cloud, before climbing rapidly back into cloud. It probably then stalled again and entered a spin from which it did not recover. All four occupants were fatally injured when the aircraft struck the ground. The investigation was unable to determine with certainty the reason for the initial rapid climb. However, it was considered possible that the pilot had initiated the preceding descent by overriding the autopilot. This would have caused the autopilot to trim nose-up, increasing the force against the pilot’s manual input. Such an out-of-trim condition combined with entry into cloud could have contributed to an unintentional and disorientating pitch-up manoeuvre.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-464-310P Malibu in Abbeville

Date & Time: May 26, 2006 at 0835 LT
Operator:
Registration:
F-GOSD
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Toussus-le-Noble – Fairoaks
MSN:
46-8508099
YOM:
1985
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
737
Captain / Total hours on type:
230.00
Circumstances:
The single engine aircraft departed Toussus-le-Noble Airport in the early morning on a private flight to Fairoaks with two people on board. About 40 minutes into the flight, at an altitude of 18,000 feet, the manifold pressure dropped from 30 to 28 inches of mercury. The pilot increased the engine power when the manifold pressure boosted to 33 inches of mercury then dropped again. Suddenly, a burning smell pervades the cabin. The pilot declared an emergency and elected to divert to Abbeville Airport which was at a distance of 15 NM from his position. While descending, he lowered the landing gear and reduced the engine power. Shortly before reaching FL100, the oil pressure warning light came on, the engine started to vibrate then stopped. At this time, the aircraft was 10 NM from Abbeville Airport, descending in IMC conditions. On short final, at a height of 300 feet, the pilot established a visual contact with the runway but his trajectory was too short. The aircraft crash landed in a field and came to rest 200 metres short of runway 20. Both occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Examination of the engine revealed a tightening defect in the connecting rod heads. The rupture of one of them caused a loss of oil pressure and damage to the movable coupling of the engine, which had been subject to repairs in March 2000 following a belly landing.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 560 Citation V Ultra in Fairoaks

Date & Time: Sep 26, 1998 at 0703 LT
Registration:
VP-CKM
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sheffield - Fairoaks
MSN:
560-0413
YOM:
1997
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
14500
Captain / Total hours on type:
400.00
Circumstances:
The crew left Sheffield in VP-CKM at 0622 hrs for their flight planned destination of Fairoaks with London Heathrow Airport as an alternate. By 0650 hrs they were in contact with the Aerodrome Flight Information Service Officer (AFISO) at Fairoaks but the AFISO advised the crew not to land until the normal operating time at 0700 hrs when the airfield would have fire cover available. The current weather was reported to the crew by the AFISO as follows: Sky clear; mist with a visibility of 1,200 metres; surface wind 060° less than 5 kt; QNH 1002 mb and QFE 1005 mb. The commander, who was the handling pilot, approached the airfield on a track of 060° using the Fairoaks Non-directional Radio Beacon (NDB) and the aircraft's Flight Management System (FMS), and descended to 1,000 feet agl with the intention of landing on Runway 06. However, neither pilot saw the airfield until they were overhead and, in agreement with the AFISO, decided to make an approach to Runway 24 because of better visibility in that direction. The AFISO switched on the Abbreviated Precision Approach Path Indicators (APAPIs) for Runway 24 and the commander flew a tear drop pattern to the east of the airfield and then established the aircraft on a track of 240° towards the airfield. During the pattern, the gear had been selected down and the flaps set to an intermediate position. At 1.8 nm DME range, the co-pilot saw the APAPIs slightly left of the aircraft nose and pointed them out to the commander; at the time, the co-pilot recalled that the APAPIs were showing 'two whites', the aircraft was at 1,000 feet agl and at 124 kt IAS. By now, the crew had been advised to land at their discretion with the wind calm. Subsequently, full flap was selected and the commander noted his speed on short finals as 104 kt. As VP-CKM approached the threshold, the commander called for the deployment of speedbrakes; as the co-pilot deployed the speedbrakes, he noted the DME range as 0.5 nm and that the FMS indicated a tailwind of 5 kt. The commander considered that touchdown was positive and just beyond the threshold; the co-pilot considered that touchdown was just past the APAPIs. Immediately after touchdown, the commander selected full thrust reverse on both engines and applied moderate wheel braking. Initially, he considered that the retardation seemed adequate but then seemed to reduce. The co-pilot was not aware of retardation and remembered applying maximum brake pedal pressure while noticing that the runway was damp and seemed "shiny". When he realised that he could not stop the aircraft before the end of the runway, the commander stowed the thrust reversers and attempted to close down the engines. During the later part of the landing run, the co-pilot heard a call of "going round" and saw the commander stow the thrust reversers. After leaving the runway, the aircraft travelled for 250 metres before coming to rest. The passenger evacuated through the cabin escape hatch and the co-pilot followed him after an unsuccessful attempt to open the normal cabin door. The co-pilot was then able to open the cabin door from the outside and assist the commander to leave. The commander had sustained back injuries and the copilot had received some cuts and bruises.
Probable cause:
Investigation indicated that there was no technical reason for the aircraft to overrun the runway. One factor outside the crew's control was that the APAPIs were not set at the glideslope angle described in the Jeppesen approach charts. However, the error was one quarter of one degree and should not have affected the touchdown point of the aircraft. Additionally, the crew stated that the APAPIs showed 'two whites' when first acquired and made no mention of them during the approach; it seems likely that the commander was flying his approach to land close to the threshold. Prior to departure, the commander checked the landing distance required for the expected weight of VP-CKM at Fairoaks and calculated that he had 30 to 40 metres longer than required based on zero surface wind. This calculation was subsequently confirmed as reasonable for a landing on Runway 24. However, the initial approach into Fairoaks was for Runway 06 which has a landing distance some 53 metres less than Runway 24. Therefore, the landing distance available on Runway 06 was less than that required by the Flight Manual by at least 13 metres. The commander was unable to land on Runway 06 because of the into sun visibility and so landed on Runway 24. For the approach to Runway 06, the surface wind was reported as 060° less than 5 kt and, for the subsequent approach to Runway 24 the surface wind was reported as calm. The landing distance available on Runway 24 was more than that required by the Flight Manual on a dry runway with no wind. However, the reported surface winds indicated a possibility that the aircraft could experience some tail wind component during the landing and the co-pilot also noted that the FMS displayed a tailwind of 5 kt as he deployed the speedbrakes. The presence of mist could indicate a runway surface other than dry and the co-pilot also noted that the runway was damp and seemed "shiny". Against these factors, the commander would have considered the added advantage of using thrust reversers. Nevertheless, since the commander was not applying any recommended safety factors, it would have been prudent for him to ensure that his approach and touchdown were accurate. He considered that his speed was close to that required as he approached the threshold and that the landing was just beyond the threshold. However, the co-pilot considered that the touchdown was just past the APAPIs positioned 142 metres from the threshold. Outside observers noted the touchdown as between 1/3 and 1/2 way down the runway and this view was corroborated by calculations from the CVR and radar information. The speed on touchdown, as assessed from the recorded information, was close to that required. From touchdown to leaving the paved runway surface, took a period of 11.5 seconds. Thrust reverse was used for three seconds and deselected some 6 seconds before the aircraft left the runway. As thrust reverse was deselected, the commander called "we're going round". This would indicate that the commander became concerned during his landing roll that he would not be able to stop in the distance available and deselected thrust reverse in preparation for a Go-Around. However, the Flight Manual warns that a Go-Around should not be attempted once thrust reverse has been selected. Since there was no evidence from the CVR that power was subsequently advanced, it seems likely that the commander immediately decided against this option. However, the action of deselecting thrust reverse reduced the aircraft rate of deceleration as the runway end approached and resulted in a longer overrun. The commander subsequently stated that he cancelled reverse thrust to enable him to shut down the engines and reduce the risk of fire in what was, by then, obviously going to be an overrun.
Final Report:

Crash of an Airspeed AS.10 Oxford II in Fairoaks

Date & Time: Oct 11, 1960
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
G-AHGU
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jersey – Fairoaks
MSN:
3277
YOM:
1946
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The pilot was advised that the western part of the aerodrome was waterlogged and so landed the aircraft close to the eastern boundary. On touchdown the starboard main wheel sank into soft ground and the undercarriage leg collapsed. All three occupants were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Landing on a unsuitable terrain.

Ground accident of an Avro 652 Anson XI at RAF Fairoaks

Date & Time: Apr 28, 1955
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PH717
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft suffered an undercarriage failure while taxiing at RAF Fairoaks. There were no casualties but the aircraft was not repaired.
Probable cause:
Undercarriage collapsed while taxiing.