Crash of a De Havilland DHC-8-106 in Nuuk

Date & Time: Mar 4, 2011 at 1609 LT
Operator:
Registration:
TF-JMB
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Reykjavik - Kulusuk - Nuuk
MSN:
337
YOM:
1992
Flight number:
FXI223
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
31
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8163
Captain / Total hours on type:
44.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4567
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1130
Aircraft flight hours:
32336
Aircraft flight cycles:
35300
Circumstances:
The flight crew got visual contact with the runway at BGGH and decided to deviate to the right (west) of the offset localizer (LLZ) to runway 23. The flight continued towards the runway from a position right of the extended runway centerline. As the aircraft approached runway 23, it was still in the final right turn over the landing threshold. The aircraft touched down on runway 23 between the runway threshold and the touchdown zone and to the left of the runway centerline. The right main landing gear (MLG) shock strut fuse pin sheared leading to a right MLG collapse. The aircraft skidded down the runway and departed the runway to the right. Neither passengers nor crew suffered any injuries. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The accident occurred in daylight under visual meteorological conditions (VMC).
Probable cause:
Findings:
- The licenses and qualifications held by the flight crew, flight and duty times, the documented technical status of the aircraft and the aircraft mass and balance had no influence on the sequence of events
- The flight crew planned the flight from BGKK to BGGH with the destination alternate BGSF
- The latest BGGH TAF before departure from BGKK indicated marginal weather conditions (strong winds, low visibility and low cloud base) for a successful approach and landing at BGGH
- The forecasted weather conditions at the expected approach time at BGGH were below preplanning minima (use of two destination alternate aerodromes)
- The actual weather conditions at BGGH and enroute weather briefings were equivalent to the forecasted weather conditions
- With reference to the operator’s aerodrome and procedure briefing and the latest reported wind conditions from Nuuk AFIS before landing, a landing was prohibited
- Strong winds and moderate to severe orographic turbulence from the surrounding mountainous terrain increased the flight crew load
- On approach, the flight crew had difficulties of maintaining stabilized approach parameters
- The flight crew most likely suffered from task saturation and information overload
- No flight crew call outs on divergence from the operator’s stabilized approach policy were made
- An optimum crew resource management was not present
- Important low altitude stabilized approach parameters like airspeed, bank angle and runway alignment were not sufficiently corrected
- The flight crew was solely focused on landing and task saturation mentally blocked a decision of going around
- A divergence from the operator’s stabilized approach policy caused an unstabilized approach and a hard landing leading to an excess load of the right MLG at touchdown
- The right MLG fuse pin sheared as a result of overload
Factors:
- A divergence from the operator’s stabilized approach policy caused an unstabilized approach and a hard landing leading to an excess load of the right MLG at touchdown
- The right MLG fuse pin sheared as a result of stress
Summary:
Adverse wind and turbulence conditions at BGGH led to flight crew task saturation on final approach and a breakdown of optimum cockpit resource management (CRM) resulting in a divergence from the operator’s stabilized approach policy.
The divergence from the operator’s stabilized approach policy caused an unstabilized approach and a hard landing leading to an excess load of the right MLG at touchdown. According to its design, the right MLG fuse pin sheared as a result of stress.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-8-102 in Moba

Date & Time: Jan 13, 2010
Operator:
Registration:
5Y-EMD
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Nairobi - Moba
MSN:
110
YOM:
1988
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
18
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Nairobi on a humanitarian mission to Moba, carrying 18 passengers and 4 crew members on behalf of the United Nations Organization. After touchdown, the left main gear collapsed. The aircraft veered off runway to the left and came to rest in a marsh field. All 22 occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It appears that the pilot-in-command was distracted during the last segment by pedestrians at the runway threshold and the aircraft landed hard.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-8-103 in Hammerfest

Date & Time: May 1, 2005 at 1436 LT
Operator:
Registration:
LN-WIK
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tromsø – Hammerfest
MSN:
394
YOM:
1995
Flight number:
WF921
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
27
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
12900
Captain / Total hours on type:
5500.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2100
Copilot / Total hours on type:
60
Aircraft flight hours:
20462
Aircraft flight cycles:
42997
Circumstances:
Widerøe flight WIF 921 took off from Tromsø airport (ENTC) at time 1401 with an estimated landing time at Hammerfest airport (ENHF) 1442. On board the aircraft, a DHC-8-103 with registration LN-WIK, were a crew of two pilots and one cabin attendant, 26 fare paying passengers and one passive cabin attendant. The crew had taken off from ENHF earlier in the day, when the weather and wind did not cause any problems. During the approach to ENHF the crew was informed about variable and occasional gusty wind from south-east. The wind direction favoured runway 23 and the crew planned the landing accordingly. The copilot was Pilot Flying (PF) and the commander was Pilot Not Flying (PNF). The copilot was newly hired and was flying under supervision. The crew was kept updated on the wind conditions by the AFIS operator, and at times the gusty wind conditions favoured runway 05. The copilot left the control to the commander who continued the approach to runway 05. Just before landing the wind direction veered to the right and increased in strength, resulting in a significant tail wind component. This resulted in a marked increase in the descent rate which the commander tried to stop by advancing to full power. However, the altitude was too low and the airplane touched down hard just inside the runway edge on runway 05. At touch down the right main landing gear leg failed. The airplane slid on the belly, right partly retracted main wheel and wing tip for some 650 m, and stopped just after the second (TWY B) turnoff to the apron. The fire and rescue vehicles were quickly at the scene and sprayed foam on the plane to prevent fire. The cabin attendant calmed the passengers who wanted to get out of the plane quickly due to smoke and burned smell in the cabin. It took 33 seconds from the commander ordered evacuation until this was initiated. The delay was mainly caused by the fact that the order did not get through the cabin’s Public Address (PA) system.
Probable cause:
The investigations show that Widerøe permitted landings in up to the maximum demonstrated crosswind component of 36 kt and in up to 10 kt tail wind during short field operations. AIBN recommends that Widerøe should review the wind limitations and prohibit tail wind component during landings on short runways in conditions with large variations in wind direction and strength. AIBN is issuing 7 safety recommendations.
Final Report: