Oakland

About 13 minutes after takeoff for a medical transport flight, while climbing through about 14,900 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilot reported to air traffic control (ATC) that he was smelling smoke in the cockpit and would be returning to the originating airport. The flight was cleared to return with a descent at pilot's discretion to 9,000 ft msl. The pilot replied, "okay," and said that it looked like he was going to lose some power shortly. The pilot then stated that he had smoke in the cockpit, declared an emergency, and requested that ATC contact the fire department. About 1 minute 15 seconds after the initial report of smelling smoke, the pilot made the last radio transmission of the flight stating that he had three people on board. The wreckage was located about 9 hours later in an area of brush and heavily forested terrain. Portions of the burned and fragmented wreckage were scattered along a debris path that measured about 2,400 ft in length, which is consistent with an inflight breakup. The center fuselage and cockpit areas were largely intact and displayed no evidence of fire; however, there was an area of thermal damage to the forward fuselage consistent with an inflight fire. The thermal damage was primarily limited to the floor area between the two forward seats near the main bus tie circuit breaker panel and extended to the forward edge of the wing spar. All exposed surfaces were heavily sooted. Some localized melting and thermal-related tearing of the aluminum structure was present. The primer paint on the floor panels under the right aft corner of the pilot seat and the left aft corner of the co-pilot seat was discolored dark brown. An aluminum stringer in this location exhibited broomstrawing indicating that the stringer material was heated to near its melting point prior to impact. A single wire located in the area exhibited notching consistent with mechanical rubbing. The main bus tie circuit breakers were partially missing. The remaining breakers were heavily sooted on their aft ends, and one breaker was thermally discolored. Areas of charring were on the backside of the panel. Examination of the wiring in this area showed evidence of electrical arcing damage. Four hydraulic lines servicing the landing gear system were located in this area, and all the lines exhibited signs of thermal exposure with melting and missing sections of material. Six exemplar airplanes of the same make and model as the accident airplane were examined, and instances of unsafe conditions in which electrical lines and hydraulic lines in the area of the main bus tie circuit breaker panel were in direct contact were found on all six airplanes. Some of the wires in the exemplar airplanes showed chafing between hydraulic lines and the electrical wires, which, if left uncorrected, could have led to electrical arcing and subsequent fire. Based on the unsafe conditions found during examination of the exemplar airplanes and the thermal damage to the area near the main bus tie circuit breaker panel on the accident airplane, including broomstrawing of the aluminum structure, electrical arcing damage to the wiring, and melting of the hydraulic lines, it is likely that an electrical wire near the tie bus circuit breakers chafed on a hydraulic line and/or airplane structure, which resulted in arcing and a subsequent in-flight fire that was fed by the hydraulic fluid.

The airplane collided with terrain 200 yards short of the runway during an emergency landing following a loss of engine power. The pilot was on an intermediate leg of a ferry trip. Approximately 300 miles from land, the fuel flow and boost pump lights illuminated. Then, the right engine failed. The pilot flew back to the nearest airport; however, approximately 200 yards from the runway, the airplane stalled and the right wing dropped and collided with the ground. The fuel system had been modified a few months prior to the accident to allow for a ferry fuel tank installation. Post accident examination of the airplane could not find a reason for the power loss.

The pilot was ferrying the aircraft from Hamilton, New Zealand to Davis, California, via Pago Pago, American Samoa; Christmas Island, Kiribati; and Hilo, Hawaii. On the final leg, following a position report 858 nm from San Francisco, he reported a problem with his fuel system, indicating a probable ditching. Under the observation of a US Coast Guard HC-130 crew, the pilot ditched the aircraft at 1701 UTC, 341 nm from San Francisco, the aircraft nosing over on to its back as it touched down. The pilot did not emerge as expected and was later found by rescue swimmers, deceased, still in the cockpit. His body could not be recovered and was lost with the aircraft.

On December 18, 2003, about 1226 central standard time, Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) flight 647, a Boeing MD-10-10F (MD-10), N364FE, crashed while landing at Memphis International Airport (MEM), Memphis, Tennessee. The right main landing gear collapsed after touchdown on runway 36R, and the airplane veered off the right side of the runway. After the gear collapsed, a fire developed on the right side of the airplane. Of the two flight crewmembers and five non revenue FedEx pilots on board the airplane, the first officer and one non revenue pilot received minor injuries during the evacuation. The post crash fire destroyed the airplaneís right wing and portions of the right side of the fuselage. Flight 647 departed from Metropolitan Oakland International Airport (OAK), Oakland, California, about 0832 (0632 Pacific standard time) and was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

The pilot entered the left-hand traffic pattern at an uncontrolled airport on a dark moonless night. Witnesses reported observing the airplane in a left descending turn. As the airplane turned onto the base leg, its left bank angle suddenly became steep. The airplane rapidly descended until colliding with level desert terrain 1.63 nm from runway 30's threshold. There were no ground reference lights in the accident site area. An examination of the airplane structure, control systems, engines, and propellers did not reveal any evidence of preimpact malfunctions or failures. Signatures consistent with engine power were found in both the engines and the propellers. The wreckage examination revealed that the airplane descended into the terrain in a left wing and nose low attitude. Fragmentation evidence, consisting of the left navigation light lens and left propeller spinner, was found near the initial point of impact. The wreckage was found principally distributed along a 307- to 310-degree bearing, over a 617- foot-long path. The bearing between the initial point of impact and the runway threshold was 319 degrees. The pilot's total logged experience in the accident airplane was 52 hours, of which only 1.6 hours were at night. The pilot was familiar with the area, but he had made only two nighttime landings within the preceding 90 days. Review of the recorded ATC communications tapes did not reveal any evidence of pilot impairment during voice communications with the pilot.

The airplane was on a VFR dusk cross-country flight when it collided with the 1,500-foot level of a hill. Radar data showed the aircraft in a descent from 2,000 feet until radar contact was lost about 1,500 feet msl, with a final ground speed of 194 knots. The route taken by the pilot was about 5 miles west of the route that the company pilots routinely flew, but while crossing higher terrain, it was a more direct route to the destination. A company pilot flying a few minutes ahead of the accident flight reported it was necessary to descend to between 1,200 and 1,500 feet msl in order to maintain VFR. A low-pressure system approaching the area from the west had resulted in low stratus, rain, and fog. At the time of the accident, a nearby weather reporting facility reported a 1,300-foot broken ceiling with 5- to 6-mile visibility in light rain and mist. On the evening of the accident, the pilot was scheduled to give a speech as her final examination in an evening college course. She had informed the instructor that she might be late, but had been told that he could not hold the class past its scheduled dismissal time to accommodate her late arrival.

On a ferry flight from Oakland, California, to Honolulu, Hawaii, the pilot declared a low fuel emergency and diverted toward Hilo, Hawaii. Approximately 2.5 hours later, the aircraft was ditched in the Pacific ocean. The pilot evacuated the aircraft before it sank and was rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard. He stated that, under flight planned conditions, the aircraft departed Oakland with sufficient fuel onboard to reach the intended destination with a 2-hour fuel reserve. However, the winds at flight altitude, which were reported as light and variable at the preflight weather briefing, developed into a significant headwind during the flight. At a point 7 hours and 10 minutes into the flight, the pilot determined that his fuel remaining was 8 hours and 40 minutes, with 7 hours and 40 minutes remaining to destination. Three hours later, the pilot determined that his 2-hour reserve was gone. He declared an emergency and diverted toward the closest airport, which was Hilo. Prior to fuel system exhaustion, the pilot elected to ditch the aircraft with power.

The aircraft impacted mountainous terrain in controlled flight during hours of darkness and marginal VFR conditions. The flight was being vectored for an instrument approach during the pilot's 14 CFR Part 135 instrument competency check flight. The flight was instructed by approach control to maintain VFR conditions, and was assigned a heading and altitude to fly which caused the aircraft to fly into another airspace sector below the minimum vectoring altitude (MVA). FAA Order 7110.65, Section 5-6-1, requires that if a VFR aircraft is assigned both a heading and altitude simultaneously, the altitude must be at or above the MVA. The controller did not issue a safety alert, and in an interview, said he was not concerned when the flight approached an area of higher minimum vectoring altitudes (MVA's) because the flight was VFR and 'pilots fly VFR below the MVA every day.' At the time of the accident, the controller was working six arrival sectors and experienced a surge of arriving aircraft. The approach control facility supervisor was monitoring the controller and did not detect and correct the vector below the MVA.

The aircraft departed overweight for a 17-hour ferry flight. Early in the flight the crew experienced some fuel problems and decided to continue when they resolved the problem. The crew indicated the en route winds were close to forecast. The ferry fuel system is a simple 5- tank gravity fuel feed into the fore and aft main tanks. About 6 hours from destination, they realized the ferry tanks were not flowing into the main tanks as planned. They began manually transferring fuel from the rear ferry tank to the forward ferry tank, and shut down the right engine to reduce fuel consumption. This did not stop the negative fuel flow from the main tanks. At the time of ditching, the crew estimated the fuel remaining in the ferry tanks was about 170 gallons, most of which was in the 3 aft ferry tanks. An aero engineer calculated that the aircraft was at least 10 inches behind the maximum aft cg at the time of ditching, and suggested that the ferry fuel system was not managed to maintain the cg within the allowable limits, a task made more difficult with the rear fuselage cargo.

A Cessna 208B struck a ridge line about 14 miles from the destination airport. The pilot reported to atc he had the airport in sight from 7,000 feet msl more than 30 miles away. A weather reporting station located 5 miles east of the accident site was reporting two cloud layers; a scattered layer at 1,500 feet agl, and a broken layer at 5,000 feet agl. The airplane was descending after the pilot was cleared for a visual approach. The airplane collided with a tree and the ground in a wings level attitude at an elevation of 1,500 feet msl. There was no evidence of mechanical failure or malfunction found with the airplane.