Lakeland

The purpose of the flight was for the commercial pilot/owner to pick up passengers at the destination airport and return to the departure airport. The airplane was 33 miles from its destination in cruise flight at 3,300 ft mean sea level (msl) and above a solid cloud layer when the pilot declared to air traffic control (ATC) that he had the destination airport "in sight" and cancelled his instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance. During the 13 minutes after cancellation of the IFR clearance, the airplane's radar track made an erratic sequence of left, right, and 360° turns that moved the airplane away from the destination airport in a westerly direction. The altitudes varied between about 4,000 and 900 ft msl. Later, the pilot reestablished communication with ATC, reported he had lost visual contact with the airport, and requested an instrument approach to the destination airport. The controller then provided a sequence of heading and altitude assignments to vector the airplane onto the approach, but the pilot did not maintain these assignments, and the controller provided several corrections. The pilot expressed his inability to identify the initial approach fix (IAF) and asked the controller for the correct spelling. The radar target then climbed and subsequently entered a descending right turn at 2,500 ft msl and 180 knots ground speed near the IAF, before radar contact with the airplane was lost. Although a review of airplane maintenance records revealed that the airplane was overdue for several required inspections, examination of the wreckage revealed signatures consistent with both engines being at high power at impact, and no evidence of any preimpact mechanical anomalies were found that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the airplane's panel-mounted GPS, which the pilot was using to navigate the flight, revealed that the navigation and obstruction databases were expired. During a weather briefing before the flight, the pilot was warned of low ceilings and visibility. The weather conditions reported near the destination airport about the time of the accident also included low ceilings and visibilities. The restricted visibility conditions and the high likelihood of inadvertent entry into instrument meteorological conditions were conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. The flight's erratic track, which included altitude and directional changes inconsistent with progress toward the airport, were likely the result of spatial disorientation. After reestablishing contact with ATC and being cleared to conduct an instrument approach to the destination, the airplane's flight track indicated that the pilot was not adequately prepared to execute the controller's instructions. The pilot's subsequent loss of control was likely the result of spatial disorientation due to his increased workload and operational distractions associated with his attempts to configure his navigation radios or reference charts. Postaccident toxicological testing of samples obtained from the pilot revealed the presence of ethanol; however, it could not be determined what percentage was ingested or produced postmortem. The testing also revealed the presence of amphetamine, an opioid painkiller, two sedating antihistamines, and marijuana. Although blood level quantification of these medications and drugs could not be made from the samples provided, their combined effects would have directly impacted the pilot's decision-making and ability to fly the airplane, even if each individual substance was only present in small amounts. Based in the reported weather conditions at the time the pilot reported the airport in sight and canceled his IFR clearance, he likely was not in a position to have seen the destination airport even though he may have been flying between cloud layers or may have momentarily observed the ground. His decision to cancel his IFR clearance so far from the destination, in an area characterized by widespread low ceilings and reduced visibility, increased the pilot's exposure to the hazards those conditions posed to the successful completion of his flight. The pilot showed other lapses in judgment associated with conducting this flight at the operational, aircraft, and the personal level. For example, 1) the pilot did not appear to recognize the significance of widespread low ceilings and visibility along his route of flight and at his destination (nor did he file an alternate airport even though conditions warranted); 2) the accident airplane was being operated beyond mandatory inspection intervals; and 3) toxicological testing showed the pilot had taken a combination of multiple medications and drugs that would have likely been impairing and contraindicated for the safe operation of an airplane. The pilot's decision-making was likely affected by the medications and drugs.

The pilot fueled the airplane prior to departure and flew uneventfully for approximately 30 minutes. The airplane then descended to 2,000 feet on approach to the destination airport, during night visual meteorological conditions. About 30 seconds after being cleared for a visual approach, the pilot declared an emergency to air traffic control and requested assistance to the nearest airport. The controller provided a vector to divert and distance to the nearest suitable airport. The pilot subsequently reported "engine out, engine out" and the airplane impacted wooded terrain about 4 miles northeast of runway 22 at the alternate airport. A post crash fire consumed a majority of the wreckage. Examination of the wreckage, including teardown examination of the engine, did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions; however, the fuel system and ignition system were consumed by post crash fire and could not be tested.

Witnesses saw the airplane depart the airport to the south, turn left at an altitude of about 200 feet above the ground (agl), fly downwind to the departure runway, climb to an altitude of about 800 to 1,000 feet, and then turn right. A witness, who was operating a crane near the crash site said, he saw the airplane approaching from the south heading towards the north, turn to the right (east), and flew directly over him. He told police officers that he could see both propellers 'spinning,' and could 'actually see the pilot flying the plane.' The witness said, '...[the] motor sounded fine...[and the airplane] took a sharp downward fall, hit the road and bounced in the air, then fire started....' Other witnesses said they saw the angle of bank increase, the airplane descend rapidly, impact on a four-lane hard surface road right wing first, strike a wooden power pole, burst into flames, and come to rest in marshy area on the eastside of the road. Examination of the airframe, engine and propeller revealed no discrepancies.

During the takeoff roll the pilot stated the right engine had an over torque condition and he was unable to control the aircraft. The aircraft went off the runway to the left and crashed coming to rest upright. A post crash fire erupted and destroyed the aircraft. The mechanic rated passenger stated he was observing the right engine gauges during this maintenance test flight and did not observe any over torque indications. When he looked up from the instruments at about the time the aircraft should lift off, the aircraft was drifting to the left. The pilot, who was looking at the engine instruments, looked up, saw the aircraft was about to drift off the runway, and retarded both power levers. The passenger/mechanic (who was also a pilot) reported that the pilot placed the propellers in reverse. Six thousand feet of runway remained at the abort point. The aircraft pitched up and then crashed on the left wing and nose. Cessna Service Newsletter SLN99-15 and AlliedSignal Operating Information Letter OI 331-17 report an abnormality that may affect the model engine in which an uncommanded engine fuel flow increase or fluctuation may occur, resulting in an unexpected high torque and asymmetric thrust. The condition is associated with an open torque motor circuit within the engine fuel control. A system malfunction resulting in engine acceleration to maximum power would produce an overtorque of about 2,288 foot-pounds (ft-lb). This power output is restricted by a fuel flow stop in the engine fuel control. Normal takeoff power is 1,669 ft-lbs; therefore, one engine accelerating to the stop limit while one engine continued to operate normally would cause a torque differential of 619 ft-lbs. The total loss of power in one engine during takeoff while one engine continued to operate normally would result in a torque differential of 1,669 ft-lbs. The Cessna 441 Flight Manual states that at 91 knots indicated airspeed, the airplane is controllable with one engine inoperative (that is, with a torque differential between engines of up to 1,669 ft-lbs). However, if an electronic engine control failure occurs on one engine and the other engine is retarded to idle, the fuel flow to the failed engine will not be reduced, and a torque differential of about 2,288 ft-lbs will occur, at which point the airplane is uncontrollable by the pilot.

After takeoff, the pilot transmitted to ATC controllers that he had lost power in an engine. He made a steep turn to the left back toward the airport, then a right turn toward the runway. The aircraft's nose dropped in the right turn, and the aircraft crashed nose first on a taxiway. Post crash examination of the aircraft structure and flight control systems revealed no preimpact failure or malfunction. The left propeller was found in the feathered position, and the right propeller was found in a high blade angle. The right propeller had damage consistent with the engine operating. Teardown examination of the engines and propellers showed no findings that would have resulted in engine or propeller malfunction or failure. At the time the aircraft was purchased by the pilot in March 1996, he had not flown for about 10 years. Since purchasing the aircraft, he had logged 2.5 hours of transition/checkout in the airplane and had flown it for a total of about 22 hours, mostly on 'sightseeing flights.'

During the preflight briefing, the pilot was informed of reduced visibility and low ceiling in the vicinity of the destination airport, at the approximate time of the planned arrival. Upon arriving in the Atlanta area, the pilot was issued radar vectors to a final for the localizer runway 31 approach. The pilot was also given the current Atlanta altimeter setting, and was cleared for the localizer runway 31 approach. The airplane collided with a 60-foot tall light pole at a nearby baseball complex 2 miles short of the runway. The weather observation from the Hartsfield International Airport indicated that visual weather conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. However, according to a witness at the accident site, the weather conditions were foggy with reduced visibility. The wreckage distribution path was 2,467 feet right of the localizer course. The minimum descent altitude for this approach, using Atlanta's altimeter setting, was 1260 feet. The ground check of the localizer and DME facility was within normal operating range. Examination of the aircraft navigational radios also tested within normal ranges. The average field elevation in the vicinity of the accident site is 800 feet. The pilot's toxicological examinations detected pseudoephedrine (decongestant), phenylpropanolamine (decongestant), and chlorpheniramine (antihistamine). No samples were available to quantify the blood levels of these medications.

The pilot departed VFR and flew to his destination and found it fogged in. He then requested and was given an IFR clearance for an ILS approach to another airport. He was observed to break out of the clouds at about 100 feet agl in a left bank and yaw. He then crashed short of the runway and to the left of the centerline. Examination of the airplane, engines and propellers revealed no preexisting failures. After the crash a fire partially consumed the wreckage. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft was on its first production flight test. Shortly after lift-off it was observed to enter an abrupt right bank, followed by a steep left bank before crashing. Examination of the left wing revealed that its aileron cables were connected to their respective bellcrank attach points backwards. Both pilots were killed.

The flight was conducting single-engine flight tests with the inboard gear doors removed and was being photographed by a chase aircraft. At the end of the tests the pilot was unable to restart the left engine and returned for a single-engine landing. The pilot overshot the landing attempt and executed a single-engine go-around. The pilot then reported he had a gear problem. An occupant of the chase aircraft reported that the main gear were hanging 75 to 80 degrees from the horizontal. A company employee at the airport reported that the nose gear was about 10° aft of the normal down and locked position. The aircraft continued on a wsw heading away from the airport, passing over several suitable emergency landing sites while in a slow descent until colliding with the guy/grounding wire atop a powerline pole located 4 miles wsw of the arpt. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were killed.

On approach to George Town Airport, following an uneventful flight from Lakeland, FL, both engines failed. The crew made a forced landing off airport on water approximately 7 miles from the destination. Both occupants were rescued while the airplane was lost.