Crash of an IAI-1124A Westwind II near Gouldsboro: 3 killed

Date & Time: Dec 12, 1999 at 1635 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N50PL
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Seattle - Teterboro
MSN:
338
YOM:
1981
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
10250
Captain / Total hours on type:
1500.00
Aircraft flight hours:
5035
Circumstances:
After a 5-hour flight, the Westwind jet began its descent to the airport. Air traffic control instructed the flight crew to cross a VOR at 18,000 feet. The flight crew was then instructed to cross an intersection at 6,000 feet. The flight crew needed to descend the airplane 12,000 feet, in 36 nautical miles, to make the crossing restriction. The flight crew acknowledged the clearance, and no further transmissions were received from the airplane. The airplane struck treetops and impacted the ground in a wooded area. The accident flight was the airplane's first flight after maintenance. Work that was accomplished during the maintenance included disassembly and reassembly of the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator. Examination of the actuator at the accident site revealed that components of the actuator were separated and that they displayed no damage where they would have been attached. Examination of the actuator by the Safety Board revealed that the actuator had not been properly assembled in the airplane. A similar actuator was improperly assembled and installed in a static airplane for a ground test. When the actuator was run, the jackscrews of the actuator were observed backing out of the rod end caps within the first few actuations of the pitch trim toward the nose-down position. As the pitch trim continued to be actuated toward the nose-down position, the jackscrews became disconnected from the rod end caps, and the horizontal stabilizer became disconnected from the actuator. The passenger was Peter Lahaye, founder and owner of the Lahaye Laboratories and the aircraft.
Probable cause:
The improper assembly of the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator unit by maintenance personnel.
Final Report:

Crash of an IAI-1124 Westwind II near Guatemala City: 5 killed

Date & Time: Feb 19, 1997 at 0306 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
YV-160CP
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Lima – Guatemala City
MSN:
211
YOM:
1977
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
While descending to Guatemala City-La Aurora Airport by night, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located 14,4 km short of runway. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all five occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain after the crew descended below the MDA for unknown reasons.

Crash of an IAI-1124 Westwind in Rosh Pina

Date & Time: Jul 23, 1996
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
4X-AIP
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Eilat - Rosh Pina
MSN:
243
YOM:
1979
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
After landing on runway 33 at Rosh Pina Airport, the captain thought the thrust reverser systems did not work properly so he instructed the copilot to activate them again. The aircraft failed to decelerate correctly so the captain decided to veer off runway when the aircraft struck a concrete block, lost its undercarriage and came to rest. All eight occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Runway 33 at Rosh Pina Airport is 1,100 metres long with a displaced threshold, giving a landing distance available of 975 metres. It was determined that the crew never land in the past at this airport and due to a poor flight preparation and planning, failed to identify that the runway length was insufficient for such type of aircraft in such flight configuration. No malfunction was found on the thrust reversers.

Crash of an IAI-1124 Westwind in Alice Springs: 3 killed

Date & Time: Apr 27, 1995 at 1957 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-AJS
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Darwin – Katherine – Alice Springs – Adélaïde – Sydney
MSN:
221
YOM:
1978
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
10108
Captain / Total hours on type:
2530.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3747
Copilot / Total hours on type:
85
Aircraft flight hours:
11508
Circumstances:
The aircraft was on a scheduled freight service from Darwin via Tindal, Alice Springs, and Adelaide to Sydney under the IFR. The flight from Darwin to Tindal was apparently normal, and the aircraft departed Tindal slightly ahead of schedule at 1834 CST. The pilot in command occupied the left cockpit seat. At 1925, the aircraft reported at position DOLPI (200 miles north of Alice Springs) Flight Level 330, to Melbourne Control. Another Westwind aircraft was en route Darwin–Alice Springs and was more than 40 miles ahead of VH-AJS. Information from the aircraft cockpit voice recording confirmed that the pilot in command was flying the aircraft. At about 1929, he began issuing instructions to the co-pilot to program the aircraft navigation system in preparation for a locator/NDB approach to Alice Springs. The pilot in command asked the co-pilot to enter an offset position into the area navigation (RNAV) system for an 11-mile final for runway 12. The co-pilot entered the bearing as 292 degrees Alice Springs. (This was the outbound bearing from Alice Springs NDB to Simpson’s Gap locator indicated on the locator/NDB approach chart.) The pilot in command stated that he had wanted the bearing with respect to the runway, 296 degrees, entered but said that the setting could be left as 292 degrees. He then instructed the co-pilot to set Alice Springs NDB frequency on ADF 1, Simpson’s Gap locator on ADF 2, and to preset the Temple Bar locator frequency on ADF 2 so that it could be selected as soon as the aircraft passed overhead Simpson’s Gap. He indicated his intention to descend to 4,300 feet until overhead Simpson’s Gap, and said that the co-pilot should then set 3,450 feet on the altitude alert selector. On passing Temple Bar, the co-pilot was to set 2,780 feet on the altitude alert selector which the pilot in command said would be used as the minimum for the approach. At 1940, the co-pilot contacted Adelaide Flight Service (FIS) and was given the Alice Springs weather, including the local QNH. At 1945, he advised Adelaide FIS that the aircraft was leaving Flight Level 330 on descent. At about 30 miles from Alice Springs, the pilot in command turned the aircraft right to track for the offset RNAV position 292 degrees/11 miles Alice Springs. The crew set local QNH passing 16,000 feet and then completed the remaining transition altitude checks. These included selecting landing and taxi lights on. At 1949, the co-pilot advised Adelaide FIS that the aircraft was transferring frequency to the Alice Springs MTAF. At 1953, the aircraft passed Simpson’s Gap at about 4,300 feet and the copilot set 3,500 feet in the altitude alert selector. About 15 seconds later, the pilot in command told the co-pilot that, after the aircraft passed overhead the next locator, he was to set the ‘minima’ in the altitude alert selector. At 1954 , the pilot in command called that the aircraft was at 3,500 feet. A few seconds later, the co-pilot indicated that the aircraft was over the Temple Bar locator and that they could descend to 2,300 feet. The pilot in command repeated the 2,300 feet called by the co-pilot and asked him to select the landing gear down. The crew then completed the pre-landing checks. Eleven seconds later, the co-pilot reported that the aircraft was 300 feet above the minimum descent altitude. This was confirmed by the pilot in command. About 10 seconds later, there were two calls by the co-pilot to pull up. Immediately after the second call, the aircraft struck the top of the Ilparpa Range (approximately 9 kilometres north-west of Alice Springs Airport), while heading about 105 degrees at an altitude of about 2,250 feet in a very shallow climb. At approximately 1950, witnesses in a housing estate on the north-western side of the Ilparpa Range observed aircraft lights approaching from the north-west. They described the lights as appearing significantly lower than those of other aircraft they had observed approaching Alice Springs from the same direction. The lights illuminated buildings as the aircraft passed overhead and then they illuminated the northern escarpment of the range. This was followed almost immediately by fire/explosion at the top of the range.
Probable cause:
The following factors were considered significant in the accident sequence:
1. There were difficulties in the cockpit relationship between the pilot in command and the co-pilot.
2. The level of crew resource management demonstrated by both crew members during the flight was low.
3. The Alice Springs locator/NDB approach was unique.
4. The briefing for the approach conducted by the pilot in command was not adequate.
5. When asked for the ‘minima’ by the pilot in command, the co-pilot called, and the pilot in command accepted, an incorrect minimum altitude for the aircraft category and for the segment of the approach.
6. The technique employed by the pilot in command in flying the approach involved a high cockpit workload.
7. The crew did not use the radio altimeter during the approach.
Final Report:

Crash of an IAI-1124A Westwind in Meadow Lake: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 27, 1994 at 0855 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FMWW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Edmonton - Meadow Lake
MSN:
380
YOM:
1982
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
15600
Captain / Total hours on type:
1000.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3200
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1500
Aircraft flight hours:
4810
Circumstances:
The privately owned Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) Westwind II aircraft was en route from the Edmonton Municipal Airport, Alberta, to the Meadow Lake aerodrome, Saskatchewan. Low ceilings and reduced visibility were reported in the vicinity of the destination aerodrome. The crew completed a straight-in instrument approach to runway 08 at Meadow Lake, and began a circling procedure to the south of the aerodrome in order to set up to land on runway 26. The aircraft passed overhead the aerodrome at an altitude of approximately 400 feet above ground level (agl). It then turned and proceeded in level flight towards the southeast. Approximately two and one-half miles from the aerodrome, the aircraft entered a number of steep-banked rolling manoeuvres. Immediately following these manoeuvres, the aircraft descended and struck the ground in a nose-high, slightly right-wing-low attitude. The ground-strike produced very high deceleration forces. The aircraft broke into several sections, internal fuel tanks ruptured, and fuel was sprayed forward and outward from the initial impact point. A severe post-crash fire erupted and engulfed the entire wreckage trail. Emergency medical service and firefighting crews responded from the town of Meadow Lake and were on the scene within minutes of the accident. Both pilots died in the crash.
Probable cause:
While circling to land on runway 26, the aircraft performed a non-typical circling procedure at a lower than published circling altitude, leading to loss of control consistent with an accelerated stall, and descended into terrain before recovery could be completed. Whiteout conditions may have contributed to this occurrence.
Final Report:

Crash of an IAI-1124 Westwind II in Santa Ana: 5 killed

Date & Time: Dec 15, 1993 at 1733 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N309CK
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
La Verne - Santa Ana
MSN:
350
YOM:
1991
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
8228
Captain / Total hours on type:
756.00
Aircraft flight hours:
3027
Circumstances:
A Beech liner, Boeing 757 and Israel Westwind (WW) were vectored for landings on runway 19R. The 757 and WW were sequenced for visual approaches behind the Beech. Before being cleared for visual approach, the WW was closing 3.5 miles from the 757 on a converging course. The 757 and WW crews were told to slow to 150 knots. The 757 slowed below 150 knots and was high on final approach with a 5.6° descent. The WW continued to converge to about 2.1 miles behind the 757 on a 3° approach. ATC did not specifically advise, and was not required by ATC handbook to advise, the WW pilots that they were behind a Boeing 757. Captain discussed possible wake turbulence, flew ILS 1 dot high, noted closeness to the 757 and indicated there should be no problem. While descending thru approximately 1,100 feet msl, the WW encountered wake turbulence from the 757, rolled into a steep descent and crashed. The crew lacked specific wake turbulence training. Chlorpheniramine (common over-the-counter anti-histamine; not approved for flying) detected in pilot's lung tissue (0.094 ug/ml).
Probable cause:
The pilot-in-command's failure to maintain adequate separation behind the Boeing 757 and/or remain above its flight path during the approach, which resulted in an encounter with wake vortices from the 757. Factors related to the accident were: an inadequacy in the ATC procedure related to visual approaches and VFR operations behind heavier airplanes, and the resultant lack of information to the Westwind pilots for them to determine the relative flight path of their airplane with respect to the boeing 757's flight path.
Final Report:

Crash of an IAI-1124 Westwind I in Umeå

Date & Time: Sep 21, 1992 at 1433 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
SE-DLK
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Umeå – Arvidsjaur
MSN:
197
YOM:
1976
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
12945
Captain / Total hours on type:
4925.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
700
Copilot / Total hours on type:
300
Circumstances:
During the takeoff roll at Umeå Airport, at a speed of 50 knots, the crew heard a noise when the tower controller informed the crew that the aircraft was on fire. The crew aborted the takeoff and initiated an emergency braking procedure. The aircraft was stopped on runway and all seven occupants were able to evacuate within 15 seconds. The fire was extinguished but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the low pressure compressor in the right engine disintegrated during the takeoff roll. Debris scattered in the engine, damaging fuel and hydraulic line. The engine caught fire and was destroyed. Investigation determined that the low pressure compressor failure was the consequence of fatigue cracks.
Final Report:

Crash of an IAI-1124A Westwind I in Oxford

Date & Time: May 1, 1991 at 0920 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N445BL
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Saint Augustine – Oxford
MSN:
382
YOM:
1982
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
10990
Captain / Total hours on type:
2290.00
Circumstances:
The aircraft completed an instrument approach and landed hard on the runway surface first with the left gear then the right gear. The tires burst and the lower fuselage came into contact with the runway surface. After the nose gear touched down, the right main landing gear collapsed and the pilot lost control of the aircraft. It veered to the left and departed the runway, coming to rest approximately 150 to 200 yards from the point of departure. Initial touch down occurred about 12 feet from the threshold, ten feet left of centerline.
Probable cause:
The failure of the pilot to maintain the proper landing descent rate and the resultant right main landing gear assembly collapse.
Final Report: