Moscow-Zhukovsky

The accident occurred during takeoff, in daytime (06:15 local time), under visual meteorological conditions, as a result of the aircraft striking a flock of seagulls immediately after liftoff, at an altitude of 0.6–1.2 m (2–4 ft). Some of the birds had an individual mass exceeding 1.13 kg (2.5 lbs), which corresponds to the certification category of a “large bird.” The bird strike caused mechanical damage to both engines, reducing their combined available thrust to a level below that of a single functioning engine operating at FLEX 49 (the takeoff setting used). This made it impossible to continue the flight in the aircraft’s actual configuration (landing gear not yet retracted), resulting in a forced landing outside the airport. In terms of available engine thrust, the situation exceeded the operational conditions anticipated during the aircraft type certification. Given the extent of the engine damage, even maintaining the limited available thrust could not be guaranteed had the crew attempted to continue the flight. Taking into account that the situation exceeded expected operational conditions—meaning there were no standard operating procedures for such circumstances—and considering the aircraft manufacturer’s position during the investigation that the ability to safely continue the flight would have depended critically on extremely precise pilot handling (control inputs during maneuvering, turns, etc.) and external factors (wind gusts, turbulence), it is not possible to unambiguously classify the hazards identified in the investigation as contributing factors. However, because these hazards pose clear risks to flight safety and require risk-reduction measures, they are listed below:
- Non-compliance of the main regulatory document in force at the time of the accident (ROOP GA-89, governing wildlife hazard management at civil aerodromes of the Russian Federation) with ICAO documentation, best international practice, and modern ornithological knowledge. This document was declared invalid by the Russian Ministry of Transport on 04.12.2020 (Order No. 541). No replacement document defining the procedure for airport wildlife hazard management has been issued, creating unacceptable risks given the complex bird-strike environment at many Russian aerodromes.
- The presence of a significant number of bird-attracting features (bodies of water, landfills, agricultural fields, etc.) in close proximity to the aerodrome, and landfills located in violation of the requirements of the Ramenskoye Airport Wildlife Hazard Management Instruction.
- Deficiencies in the organization of wildlife hazard management at Ramenskoye Airport, including ecological-ornithological assessment, implementation of bird-scaring measures, and runway inspections.
- A widespread practice (not only at Ramenskoye) of routinely informing crews about “bird movements” regardless of the actual threat level, which caused the warnings to lose their alerting value and become mere background noise.
- Lack of regulatory provisions and/or standard operating procedures describing required crew actions when the presence of birds on or near the runway is suspected (but cannot be visually confirmed) that could pose a risk to flight safety.
- Limited ability of airlines to assess avian-hazard risks due to the lack of reliable data sources on the bird environment at the aerodrome, resulting in insufficient information provided to flight crews about ornithological hazards at Ramenskoye.
- A discrepancy between the actual in-flight situation and scenarios practiced in simulators, caused by a false momentary indication of an “open thrust-reverser door” on the left engine triggered by the bird strike. This contributed to a psychophysiological surge (stress spike) and temporary disorganization of the crew’s actions during the continued takeoff procedure, including the omission of landing gear retraction.

It was determined that the captain decided to seat on the right front seat, letting the command to the copilot seating in the left front seat, which was against the published procedures because the copilot was not authorized and did not have sufficient experience. The copilot forgot to extend the flaps in an appropriate angle for the takeoff procedure, which caused the aircraft to adopt a critical angle of attack after liftoff and to stall. Successives errors and poor crew coordination were considered as contributing factors as well as the fact that the crew failed to follow the pre-takeoff checklist and failed to identify that the aircraft was not properly configured for the takeoff procedure.

It was determined that the right engine autofeathered immediately after lift-off due to an electronic malfunction.

The captain failed to follow the approach procedures and ignored ATC instructions as well as GPWS and other crew member warnings. In such conditions, he led the aircraft deviating from the approach path and descending below the minimum safe altitude until impact.