Georgia

According to a friend of the pilot, the pilot was taking the airplane to have an annual inspection completed. The friend assisted the pilot before departure and watched as the airplane departed. He did not notice any anomalies with the airplane during the takeoff or the climbout. According to a witness in the vicinity of the accident site, he heard the airplane coming toward him, and it was flying very low. He looked up and saw the airplane approximately 200 feet over his house and descending toward the trees. As he watched the airplane, he noticed that the right propeller was not turning, and the right engine was not running. He stated that the left engine sounded as if it was running at full power. The airplane pitched up to avoid a power line and rolled to the right, descending below the tree line. A plume of smoke and an explosion followed. Examination of the right propeller assembly revealed evidence of significant frontal impact. The blades were bent but did not have indications of rotational scoring; thus they likely were not rotating at impact. One preload plate impact mark indicated that the blades were at an approximate 23-degree angle; blades that are feathered are about 86 degrees. Due to fire and impact damage of the right engine and related system components, the reason for the loss of power could not be determined. An examination of the airframe and left engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. A review of the airplane maintenance logbooks revealed that the annual inspection was 12 days overdue. According to Lycoming Service Instruction No. 1009AS, the recommended time between engine overhaul is 1,200 hours or 12 years, whichever occurs first. A review of the right engine maintenance logbook revealed that the engine had accumulated 1,435 hours since major overhaul and that neither engine had been overhauled within the preceding 12 years. Although the propeller manufacturer recommends that the propeller be feathered before the engine rpm drops below 1,000 rpm, a review of the latest revision of the pilot operating handbook (POH) revealed that the feathering procedure for engine failure did not specify this. It is likely that the pilot did not feather the right propeller before the engine reached the critical 1,000 rpm, which prevented the propeller from engaging in the feathered position

The second-in-command (SIC) was the pilot flying for most of the flight (takeoff, climb, cruise, and descent) and was in the left seat, while the pilot-in-command (PIC) was the pilot monitoring for most of the flight and was in the right seat. Before takeoff, the PIC calculated reference speed (Vref) for the estimated landing weight and flaps 30-degree extension was 120 knots, with a calculated landing distance of 3,440 ft. Further, before takeoff, there were no known mechanical difficulties with the brakes, flaps, antiskid, or traffic alert and collision avoidance (TCAS) systems. After takeoff and for most of the flight, the PIC coached/instructed the SIC, including instructions on how to set the airspeed command cursor, a request to perform the after-takeoff checklist, and a comment to reduce thrust to silence an overspeed warning aural annunciation. When the flight was northwest of Dekalb Peachtree Airport (PDK), Atlanta, Georgia, on a right base leg for a visual approach to runway 20L with negligible wind, air traffic controllers repeatedly announced the location and distance of a Cessna airplane (which was ahead of the Beech 400A on a straight-in visual approach to runway 20R). Because the Beech 400A flight crew did not see the other airplane, the controllers appropriately instructed them to maintain their altitude (which was 2,300 ft mean sea level [msl]) for separation until they had the traffic in sight; radar data indicated the Beech 400A briefly descended to 2,200 ft msl then climbed back to 2,300 ft msl. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript, at 1004:42, which was about 12 seconds after the controller instructed the Beech 400A flight crew to maintain altitude, the on board TCAS alerted "traffic traffic." While the Beech 400A did climb back to 2,300 ft msl, this was likely a response to the air traffic control (ATC) instruction to maintain altitude and not a response to the TCAS "traffic traffic" warning. At 1004:47, the CVR recorded the SIC state, "first degree of," likely referring to flap extension, but the comment was not completed. The CVR recorded an immediate increase in background noise, which was likely due to the landing gear extension. The PIC then advised the local controller that the flight was turning onto final approach. The CVR did not record any approach briefing or discussion of runway length or Vref speed. After landing on runway 20L at Atlanta-DeKalb Peachtree Airport, aircraft did not stop as expected. It overrun the runway, went through a fence and came to rest near a road, broken in two. All four occupants were injured, both pilots seriously.

A technician was in charge to ferry the airplane to a hangar for a maintenance control. While taxiing, the Falcon went out of control, rolled down an embankment and collided with a utility pole. The nose was severely damaged and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. According to the technician, who escaped uninjured, the brakes failed while taxiing.

The pilot stated that after landing, the nose landing gear collapsed. Examination of the airplane nose strut down-lock installation revealed that the strut on the right side of the nose landing gear trunnion was installed incorrectly; the strut installed on the right was a left-sided strut. Incorrect installation of the strut could result in the bearing pulling loose from the pin on the right side of the trunnion, which could allow the nose landing gear to collapse. A review of maintenance records revealed recent maintenance activity on the nose gear involving the strut. The design of the strut is common for the left and right. Both struts have the same base part number, and a distinguishing numerical suffix is added for left side and right side strut determination. If correctly installed, the numbers should be oriented facing outboard. The original MU-2 Maintenance Manual did not address the installation or correct orientation of the strut. The manufacturer issued MU-2 Service Bulletin (SB) No. 200B, dated June 24, 1994, to address the orientation and adjustment. Service Bulletin 200B states on page 8 of 10 that the “Part Number may be visible in this (the) area from the out board sides (Inked P/N may be faded out).”

The airplane had not been flown for about 5 months and the purpose of the accident flight was a maintenance test flight after both engines had been replaced with higher horsepower models. Witnesses observed the airplane depart and complete two uneventful touch-and-go landings. The airplane was then observed to be struggling to gain altitude and airspeed while maneuvering in the traffic pattern. One witness, who was an aircraft mechanic, reported that he observed the airplane yawing to the left and heard noises associated with propeller pitch changes, which he believed were consistent with the "Beta" range. The airplane stalled and impacted trees in a wooded marsh area, about 1 mile from the airport. It came to rest about 80-degrees vertically. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any preimpact malfunctions; however, the lack of flight recorders and the condition of the wreckage precluded the gathering of additional relevant information. Damage observed to both engines and both propellers revealed they were likely operating at symmetrical power settings and blade angles at the time of the impact, with any differences in scoring signatures likely the result of impact damage. The reason for the yawing and the noise associated with propeller pitch changes that were reported prior to the stall could not be determined.

The crew departed Pensacola NAS, Florida, for a training flight. En route, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in unknown circumstances in a wooded area located 8 km northeast of Morganton. All four occupants were killed.

During the preflight inspection, some water was present in the fuel sample; it was drained until a clear sample was observed. Subsequently, the fuel tanks were topped off, and the remaining preflight inspection revealed no other anomalies. The pilot initiated a takeoff and upon reaching rotation speed, the airplane became airborne and the landing gear was retracted. The right engine immediately lost power, and the pilot feathered the engine and attempted to return to the airport. Shortly thereafter, the left engine lost power. The pilot informed the air traffic controller that the airplane had lost all power. The airplane subsequently collided with trees and terrain and a post crash fire ensued. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of fuel retrieved from the right main fuel tank, as well as fuel from the fixed base operator, revealed no anomalies. The left fuel selector valve was observed in the plugged port (no fluid flow) position, but it was most likely moved to that position during the accident sequence. The right fuel selector valve was partially aligned with the main fuel passageway and was unobstructed. The reason for the loss of engine power to both engines was not determined.

During approach to runway 9, the tower controller instructed the pilot to perform an “S” turn 3 miles from the runway. The pilot initiated the “S” turn to the left, and after turning back to the right towards the runway to complete the other half of the turn, the controller advised the pilot that he did not need to finish the maneuver, and could turn onto final approach. The last recorded ground speed was 89 knots when the pilot banked the airplane sharply to the left at this time, witnesses stated that the airplane seemed to do a wing over onto its back and go straight down. Flight simulation tests revealed that while making a steep turn and not adding power, as the bank angle increased the airspeed would decrease and the airplane would enter an aerodynamic stall. Toxicology testing indicated that the pilot had been using tramadol, a prescription painkiller with potentially impairing effects. The pilot had not reported its use on his most recent application for airman medical certificate approximately 20 months prior to the accident. It is unclear what role, if any, the medication or the condition for which it might have been used played in the accident.

The pilot-in-command (PIC) of the of the airplane was the flight department's chief pilot, who was in the right seat and monitoring the approach as the non-flying pilot. The second-in-command (SIC) was a captain for the flight department, who was in the left seat and the flying pilot. On arrival at their destination, they were vectored for an instrument-landing-system (ILS) approach to a 6,001-foot-long runway. Visibility was 1-1/4 miles in rain. The autopilot was on and a coupled approach was planned. After the autopilot captured the ILS, the airplane descended on the glideslope. The PIC announced that the approach lights were in sight and the SIC stated that he also saw the lights and disengaged the autopilot. The SIC turned on the windshield wipers and then lost visual contact with the runway. He announced that he lost visual contact, but the PIC stated that he still saw the runway. The SIC considered a missed approach, but continued because the PIC still had visual contact. The PIC stated, "I have the lights" and began to direct the SIC. He then "took over the controls." The airplane touched down, the speed brakes extended and, approximately 1,000 feet later, the airplane overran the runway. The PIC stated that he was confused as to who was the PIC, and that he and the SIC were "co-captains." When asked about standard operating procedures (SOPs), the PIC advised that they did not have any. They had started out with one pilot and one airplane, and they now had five pilots and two airplanes. The PIC later stated that they probably should have gone around when the flying pilot could not see out the window. The PIC added that the windshields had no coating and did not shed water. One year prior, while flying in rain, his vision through the windshield was blurred but he did not report it to their maintenance provider. Manufacturer's data revealed that the windshield was coated to enhance vision during rain conditions. The manufacturer advised that the coating might not last the life of the windshield and provided guidance to determine both acceptable and unacceptable rain repellent performance.

According to Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) personnel, the pilot was given the current weather information before attempting his first instrument approach into Gwinnett County Airport-Briscoe Field (LZU), Lawrenceville, Georgia, which included: winds calm, visibility 1/2-mile in fog, and ceiling 100 feet. The pilot acknowledged the current weather information and elected to continue for the instrument landing system (ILS) runway-25 approach. During the first landing attempt, the pilot reported that he was going to execute a missed approach, but that he saw the airport below and wanted to attempt another approach. The ARTCC controller provided the pilot with radar vectors back to the ILS runway-25 approach and again updated the pilot with current weather conditions. During the second approach the tower controller advised the pilot that he was left of the runway-25 centerline. Shortly after the pilot acknowledged that he was left of the centerline, the tower controller saw a bright "orange glow" off of the left side of the approach end of runway 25. Although the weather conditions were below approach minimums for the runway 25-approach, the pilot elected to attempt the landing. A flight inspection of the ILS was completed on December 26, 2006, and the results of the inspection revealed that the ILS runway-25 approach system was satisfactory. Examination of the airframe, flight control system components, engines and system components revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction.