Bankair

During the takeoff roll, after the pilot disengaged the nose gear steering, the airplane began to turn to the right. The copilot noticed fluctuations with the engine indications, and called for an abort. Power was reduced to idle, and the pilot corrected to the left using left rudder pedal and braking. The airplane turned to the right again, and the pilot corrected to the left. The airplane continued to turn left, and departed the left side of the runway, tail first, and was substantially damaged. The airplane had accrued 18,040.3 total hours of operation. It was powered by two turbofan engines, each equipped with an electronic fuel computer. Examination of the left engine's wiring harness revealed that the outer shielding on the fuel computer harness assembly was loose, deteriorated, and an approximate 3-inch section was missing. Multiple areas of the outer shielding were also chaffed, the ground wire for the shielding was worn through, and the wiring was exposed. Testing of the wiring to the fuel computer connector, revealed an intermittent connection. After disassembly of the connector, it was discovered that the connector pin's wire was broken off at its crimp location. Examination under a microscope of the interior of the pin, revealed broken wire fragments that displayed evidence of corrosion. Simulation of an intermittent electrical connection resulted in N1 spool fluctuations of 2,000 rpm during engine test cell runs. According to the airplane's wiring maintenance manual, a visual inspection of all electrical wiring in the nacelle to check for security, clamping, routing, clearance, and general condition was to be conducted every 300 hours or 12 calendar months. Additionally, all wire harness shield overbraids and shield terminations were required to be inspected for security and general condition every 300 hours or 12 calendar months, and at every 600 hours or 24 calendar months. According to company maintenance records, the wiring had been inspected 6 days prior to the accident.

The airplane was on final approach to land at Hilton Head Airport, when according to witnesses, it suddenly rolled to the right, and descended, initially impacting trees at about the 70-foot level, and then impacting the ground. A fire then ensued upon ground impact, and the debris field spanned about 370 feet along an azimuth of about 082 degrees. Examination of the airplane wreckage revealed that left wing flap actuator and jack nut measurements were consistent with the wing flaps being extended to 40 degrees, and on the right wing the flap jack nut and actuator measurements were consistent with the right flap being extended to about a 20-degrees. In addition, the right flap torque tube assembly between the flap motor and the flap stop assembly had disconnected, and the flap torque tube assembly's female coupler which attaches to the male spline end of the flap motor and flap stop assembly was found with a cotter pin installed through the female coupler of the flap stop assembly. The cotter pin, had not been placed through the spline and the coupler consistent with normal installation as per Mitsubishi's maintenance manual, or as specified in Airworthiness Directive 88-23-01. Instead, the cotter pin had missed the male spline on the flap motor. In addition, the flap coupler on the opposite side of the flap motor was found to also found to not have a cotter pin installed. Company maintenance records showed that on April 3, 2001, about 87 flight hours before the accident, the airplane was inspected per Airworthiness Directive (AD) 88-23-01, which required the disassembly, inspection, and reassembly of the flap torque tube joints. In addition, on July 9, 2001, the airplane was given a phase 1 inspection, and Bankair records showed that a company authorized maintenance person performed the applicable maintenance items, and certified the airplane for return to service.

The pilot canceled the IFR flight plan as the aircraft crossed the VOR and reported the airport in site. The last radio contact with Air Traffic Control was at 0935:16. The crew did not report any problems before or during the accident flight. The distance from the VOR to the airport was 4 nautical miles. Witnesses saw the airplane enter right traffic at a low altitude, for a landing on runway 36, then turn right from base leg to final, less than a 1/2-mile from the approach end of the runway. Witnesses saw the airplane pitch up nose high, and the right wing dropped. The airplane than struck trees west of the runway, struck wires, caught fire, and impacted on a hard surface road. This was a training flight for the left seat pilot to retake a Learjet type rating check ride he had failed on March 24, 2000. He failed the check ride, because while performing an ILS approach in which he was given a simulated engine failure, and he was transitioning from instruments to VFR, he allowed the airspeed to decrease to a point below Vref [landing approach speed]. According to the company's training manual, "...if a crewmember fails to meet any of the qualification requirements because of a lack in flight proficiency, the crewmember must be returned to training status. After additional or retraining, an instructor recommendation is required for reaccomplishing the unsatisfactory qualification requirements." The accident flight was dispatched by the company as a training flight. On the accident flight a company check airman was in the right seat, and the check ride was set up for 0800, April 5,2000. The flight arrived an hour and a half late. The left seat pilot's, and the company's flight records did not indicate any training flights, or any other type of flights, for the pilot from March 24, 2000, the date of the failed check flight, and the accident flight on April 5, 2000. The accident flight was the first flight that the left seat pilot was to receive retraining, and was the only opportunity for him to demonstrate the phase of flight that he was unsuccessful at during the check flight on March 24th. Examination of the
airframe and engine did not reveal any discrepancies.

The flight departed on a maintenance test flight with known wind gusts to 27 knots. Before takeoff the pilot performed an NTS check to each engine with no discrepancies noted. During flight the pilot performed an NTS check to the left engine. Two attempts to restart the left engine were unsuccessful. Each time the propeller came out of the feathered position and started to rotate but there was no fuel flow or ignition. The flight returned to land and while on short final to runway 29 with the wind from 250 degrees at 20 knots, a witness observed the airplane pitch nose up then down then heard the sound of power applied to the right engine. The airplane than rolled to the left, pitched nose down, impacted the ground coming to rest nearly inverted with the wing section separated. Postaccident examination of the left engine and accessories revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The left engine fuel shutoff valve was found in the 'closed' position and no fuel was found aft of the fuel shutoff valve. The pilot stated that he has no recollection of the accident. The left and right engines had just been installed following 'hot section' work to both, and both were then started the day after installation with no discrepancies noted by company maintenance personnel.

The pilot had just returned from vacation in the Bahamas before starting a flight from Little Rock to Atlanta with an intermediate stop at Memphis. This itinerary was followed by a return flight to Little Rock via a reverse routing. Witnesses reported the pilot said he had only 2 hours of sleep before departing Little Rock and that he was really tired. Also, company personnel noted the pilot looked 'extremely tired' and was 'really dragging' prior to the last leg of the flight from Memphis to Little Rock. According to ATC personnel, the flight was routine until the aircraft was arriving at Little Rock. During arrival, the pilot was cleared to descend from 7,000 feet to 2,000 feet at his discretion for a visual approach to runway 22. At 0522 cdt, the pilot reported the airport in sight and was cleared for a visual approach. About 4 minutes later, he again reported the airport in sight and was cleared to land. At 1031, radar contact was lost and the aircraft crashed about 4 miles west of the airport. Initial impact was in an open field while descending in a relatively level attitude. The aircraft became airborne for about 3/4 mile, then crashed out of control in the Arkansas River. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Radar data indicated the aircraft climbed normally to 9,200 feet at which time some maneuver was performed with the aircraft. The aircraft then entered a near vertical dive and the last radar hit was at 6,900 feet. Examination of the aircraft revealed it experienced an inflight structural breakup and there was no evidence to indicate prebreakup failure or malfunction of the aircraft structure, flight controls, engines, engine mounts, autopilot, or systems. The operator reported one employee overheard the pilot and passenger talk about rolling the aircraft prior to departure, and two company employees reported being onboard when the pilot had rolled it on prior occasions. One of these was at night. Both occupants were killed.

After takeoff, while in initial climb, the right engine lost power. The pilot attempted an emergency landing and turned back when the airplane struck a power line and crashed in flames near the airport. The pilot and four passengers were killed while two other passengers were seriously injured.