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Crash of a Curtiss C-46F-1-CU Commando near Cedar Falls: 2 killed

Date & Time: Apr 23, 1953 at 0055 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N1693M
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Columbia – Cheyenne – Seattle
MSN:
22498
YOM:
1945
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
6790
Captain / Total hours on type:
2538.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
348
Copilot / Total hours on type:
88
Aircraft flight hours:
7477
Circumstances:
American Air Transport, Inc., an irregular air carrier, was operating this flight as a ferry operation from Columbia. South Carolina to Seattle, Washington for the purpose of later conducting a Civil Air Movement of military personnel from Seattle. Captain John W. Schroeder and First Officer James P. Gilbert flew the aircraft from Columbia to Cheyenne, Wyoming, departing Columbia at 1305 EST, April 22, 1953, and arriving at Cheyenne at 1835 MST of the same date. The flight from Columbia to Cheyenne was completed without incident. A second crew, Captain Maurice A. Booska, Chief Pilot of the company, and First Officer Donald F. Dwelley, rode as passengers to Cheyenne, at which point they relieved Schroeder and Gilbert, who continued with the flight as passengers. The aircraft was serviced at Cheyenne, making the total fuel load 1,200 gallons of 100-octane gasoline. Captain Booska received a weather briefing at the U. S. Weather Bureau Airport Station; following this, he filed a VFR flight plan to Boise, Idaho via Airways Green 3 and Red 1. Departing from Cheyenne at 2043 MST (delayed owing to repair of the left navigation light), the flight proceeded uneventfully. The pilot made position reports over Rawlins and Rock Springs. Wyoming; Malad City and Burley, Idaho; and three minutes east of Boise at 2252. In all position reports except Rock Springs and Malad City (where no altitude was given) the flight altitude was reported as 12,000 feet. Upon request from the flight, Boise radio furnished the Boeing Field-Seattle forecast and the 2228 en route weather between Boise and Seattle. The pilot then filed an IFR flight plan to destination, and the following clearance was transmitted by Boise radio at 2254: "ATC CLEARS N1693M TO THE SEATTLE RANGE VIA RED 1, BLUE 32 BLUE 12, GREEN 2. MAINTAIN 12,000 FEET." The clearance was acknowledged by the pilot. Later position reports indicated that the flight was at 12,000 feet when over Baker. Oregon at 2331 and Pendleton, Oregon at 2353. Near Yakima, Washington the flight was cleared for descent to 10,000 feet and upon reporting over Yakima at 0026, it was further cleared to descend to and maintain 8,000 feet. Ellensburg, Washington radio received a position report at 0037 that the flight passed over Ellensburg 2 at 0034, 8,000 feet. IFR. Ellensburg radio transmitted the Boeing Field 2330 weather to the flight at 0040; the pilot acknowledged and advised that he would contact Seattle Air Route Traffic Control Center on 120.3 megacycles when over Easton, Washington. The pilot contacted Seattle Center at 0047 and reported over Easton at 8,000 feet, inbound to Boeing Field. Seattle Center thereupon issued the following clearance: "NECTAR ONE SIX NINE THREE METRO YOU ARE CLEARED TO CROSS HOBART AT 8,000 SEATTLE AT OR ABOVE 4,000 MAINTAIN 4,000 NO DELAY EXPECTED CONTACT SEATTLE APPROACH CONTROL OVER HOBART FOR FURTHER CLEARANCE OVER." The controller in the Seattle Center who was handling this flight was at his control board, about four feet from a loud-speaker installed on top of the unit. The read-back of the clearance by the pilot of N1693M seemed to the controller to be as follows: "ROGER, CLEARED TO - - - -(distinct pause involving a lapse of three or four seconds) CROSS THERE FOUR THOUSAND OR ABOVE THE RANGE STATION, AH, FOUR THOUSAND, REPORT HOBART TO YOU." A correction. "NEGATIVE REPORT HOBART TO SEATTLE APPROACH CONTROL," was then immediately transmitted. The pilot replied, "HOBART TO SEATTLE APPROACH CONTROL ROGER." These contacts were made at approximately 0048. There was no record of further transmission from the aircraft. When the pilot failed to report over Hobart, and the flight became overdue at Seattle, controllers in the Seattle Center and Boeing Field tower attempted to contact the flight, but without success. Search and rescue activities were then instituted. The accident scene was found the next day and the two survivors were rescued.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot's misunderstanding of the clearance, failure to check en route altitude against available charts, and descent below prescribed minimum en route altitude. The fact that the controller did not detect the first of two errors made by the pilot was a contributing factor. The following findings were pointed out:
- The read-back of the clearance by the pilot was in error on two points - crossing altitude for Hobart, and the erroneous understanding that he was to report to the Seattle Center over Hobart; the controller detected only the latter error,
- The aircraft descended below the minimum altitude of 8,000 feet and crashed near the crest of a mountain at 4,000 feet MSL,
- Both pilots probably experienced impaired efficiency due to oxygen want and fatigue,
- There was no malfunction or failure of any component of the aircraft.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-3C near Cedar Falls: 7 killed

Date & Time: Apr 14, 1953 at 0222 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N65743
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Washington DC – Cleveland – Chicago – Minneapolis – Fargo – Billings – Spokane – Seattle
MSN:
20432
YOM:
1944
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
22
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Captain / Total flying hours:
5100
Captain / Total hours on type:
2061.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1840
Copilot / Total hours on type:
38
Aircraft flight hours:
12185
Circumstances:
The flight departed Washington National Airport, Washington, D. C., at 0007 EST, April 13, with 12 passengers and crew consisting of Captain L. T. Brannan, Copilot O. T. Thorson, and Stewardess A. Long. At Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, 10 additional passengers plus relief crew Captain A. J. Lerette and Copilot W. E. Harshman boarded the aircraft. These pilots were deadheading to Fargo, North Dakota, where they were to relieve the other pilots. The destination for all passengers was Seattle, Washington. The flight stopped at Cleveland, Ohio, for fuel and oil and arrived at Chicago at 0735 CST. Shortly after takeoff at Chicago, the flight returned owing to rough operation of the left engine. The left magneto of this engine was replaced by a spare carried on the aircraft and the flight again departed at 1215 CST for Minneapolis, made a fuel stop there, and arrived at Fargo, North Dakota, at 16140 CST. Captain Brannan and Copilot Thorson left the flight at this point. One of the relief pilots inquired about the availability of an engine mechanic, stating that one of the engines was spitting and coughing. When he was told it would take about 15 minutes to get a mechanic, he said to disregard it. The left engine started with some difficulty. The flight departed Fargo at 1748 CST and made fuel stops at Billings, Montana, and Felts Field, Spokane, Washington. The pilots did not report any mechanical difficulties over this segment. The flight departed Spokane at 0035, April 14, on an IFR flight plan via Green Airway 2,5,000 feet to Ephrata, Washington, 7,000 feet to Ellensburg, Washington, and 8,000 feet to Seattle. Routine position reports were made, the last being over Ellensburg at 0143 and climbing to 8,000 feet from 7,000. At approximately 0200 the Seattle ARTC Center heard a call on 120.3 mega-cycles from an unidentified aircraft which was believed to be N 657143, advising that estimated time of arrival at Seattle was 0227 and that the aircraft was standing by on Boeing Field Tower frequency (118.3 megacycles). At 0207 the pilot of N 65743 reported an engine failure and requested further clearance. Seattle Center advised the aircraft to contact Seattle Approach Control or Boeing Tower as soon as practicable and cleared at to cross Seattle at or above 4,000, no delay expected. Later transmissions from the aircraft were on Boeing Field Tower frequency, rather than the Approach Control frequency of 119.5 megacycles. Signals from the aircraft were weak and difficult to read by both Approach Control (located in the Seattle-Tacoma Tower) and by the Boeing Field Tower. However, Approach Control had less difficulty than Boeing Field Tower in hearing the aircraft on 118.3 megacycles, so the controller cooperated with Boeing Tower in furnishing them with the content of messages through interphone. The pilot could apparently hear Boeing Tower, but not Approach Control. At 0214, Approach Control heard the pilot of N 65743 report that he was icing up and losing altitude. The flight was cleared for an approach to Boeing Field by the Boeing Field controller upon instructions from Approach Control, and was given current Seattle weather conditions. The last transmission from the aircraft was received at 0222, reporting that the flight was at 4,800 feet. Search and rescue activities were instituted shortly thereafter. Two crew members and five passengers were killed while 18 others were rescued. The aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the progressive failure of both engines, due to the lack of compliance with proper maintenance standards. The following findings were pointed out:
- The flight returned to Chicago a few minutes after departure owing to malfunction of the left engine, and the left magneto was changed; this magneto was later found to be in a satisfactory condition,
- Although engine malfunctions were again experienced while en route west of Chicago, the pilots failed to have the difficulties corrected,
- First one engine, then the other, progressively failed while the flight was on its last route segment, resulting in a crash in the Cascade Mountains,
- There was evidence that detonation and preignition took place in both engines and that they ultimately failed as a result of master rod bearing failures,
- Spark plugs in both engines had been operated beyond their normal maintenance inspection period and exhibited evidence of a condition conducive to detonation and preignition.
Final Report: