Central Air Southwest

The pilot departed Tampa Executive Airport at 1550LT on a cargo flight to Birmingham, Alabama. About two hours and a half into the flight, while approaching Birmingham-Shuttlesworth Airport from the southeast at an altitude of 5,800 feet, the pilot initiated a 180 turn in an apparent attempt to divert to Sylacauga Airport. Shortly later, the twin engine airplane impacted the ground and crashed into trees some 5 km north of Sylacauga Airport which is located 60 km southeast of Birmingham-Shuttlesworth Airport. The pilot was transported to local hospital but seems to be uninjured.

The commercial pilot was conducting an on-demand cargo charter flight. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot informed the tower controller that he wanted to "come back and land" because he was "having trouble with the left engine." The pilot chose to fly a left traffic pattern and return for landing. No further transmissions were received from the pilot. The accident site was located about 0.50 mile southeast of the runway's displaced threshold. GPS data revealed that, after takeoff, the airplane entered a left turn to a southeasterly course and reached a maximum GPS altitude of 959 ft (about 342 ft above ground level [agl]). The airplane then entered another left turn that appeared to continue until the final data point. The altitude associated with the final data point was 890 ft (about 273 ft agl). The final GPS data point was located about 135 ft northeast of the accident site. Based on GPS data and the prevailing surface winds, the airspeed was about 45 knots during the turn. According to the airplane flight manual, the stall speed in level flight with the wing flaps extended was 59 knots. Postaccident examination and testing of the airframe, engines, and related components did not reveal any preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation; therefore, the nature of any issue related to the left engine could not be determined. Based on the evidence, the pilot failed to maintain adequate airspeed while turning the airplane back toward the airport, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall/spin.

The pilot was en route on a positioning flight when the airplane’s right engine surged and experienced a partial loss of power. He adjusted the power and fuel mixture controls; however, a few seconds later, the engine surged again. The pilot noted that the fuel flow gauge was below 90 pounds, so he turned the right fuel pump on. The pilot then felt a surge on the left engine, so he performed the same actions he as did for the right engine. He believed that he had some sort of fuel starvation problem. The pilot then turned to an alternate airport, at which time both engines lost total power. The airplane impacted trees and terrain about 1.5 miles from the airport. The left side fuel tank was breached during the accident; however, there was no indication of a fuel leak, and about a gallon of fuel was recovered from the airplane during the wreckage retrieval. The company’s route coordinator reported that prior to the accident flight, the pilot checked the fuel gauge and said the airplane had 120 gallons of fuel. A review of the airplane’s flight history revealed that, following the flight immediately before the accident flight, the airplane was left with approximately 50 gallons of fuel on board; there was no record of the airplane having been refueled after that flight. Another company pilot reported the airplane fuel gauge had a unique trait in that, after the airplane’s electrical power has been turned off, the gauge will rise 40 to 60 gallons before returning to zero. When the master switch was turned to the battery position during an examination of another airplane belonging to the operator, the fuel gauge indicated approximately 100 gallons of fuel; however, when the master switch was turned to the off position, the fuel quantity on the gauge rose to 120 gallons, before dropping off scale, past empty. Additionally, the fuel cap was removed and fuel could be seen in the tank, but there was no way to visually verify the quantity of fuel in the tank.

Prior to the flight, the pilot preflighted the airplane and recalled observing the fuel gauge indicating full; however, he did not visually check the fuel tanks. The airplane departed and the en route portion of the flight was uneventful. During the downwind leg of the circling approach, the engines began to surge and the pilot added full power and turned on the fuel boost pumps. While abeam the approach end of the runway on the downwind leg, the engines again started to surge and subsequently lost power. He executed a forced landing and the airplane impacted terrain short of the runway. A postaccident examination by Federal Aviation Administration inspectors revealed the fuselage was buckled in several areas, and the left wing was crushed and bent upward. The fuel tanks were intact and approximately one cup of fuel was drained from the single fuel sump. Fueling records indicated the airplane was fueled 3 days prior to the accident with 135 gallons of fuel or approximately 4 hours of operational time. Flight records indicated the airplane had flown approximately 4 hours since refueling when the engines lost power.

The airline's chief pilot was giving a newly-hired pilot a required competency/proficiency check. Memory data from the airplane's global positioning system showed the airplane made
steep 360-degree turns to the left and right before continuing towards a practice area at gradually decreasing airspeed and altitude. A low cloud ceiling prevailed. Witnesses said they
heard both engines "sputter, then quit," and saw the airplane clear a grove of trees, stall, and strike the ground. The landing gear was down and the flaps were in the approach setting. Both propellers were in the low pitch/high rpm setting, and bore little rotational signatures. Both engine fuel supply lines contained only residual fuel. Those familiar with the chief pilot's flying practices stated that he always followed a certain routine when giving a check ride. The routine consisted of the following: After performing steep 360-degree turns, he would ask the trainee to configure the airplane for landing and demonstrate minimum control maneuvers. Prior to executing steep turns, he would turn the boost pumps on. At the completion of the maneuver, the pumps would be turned off. The investigation revealed that there are unguarded fuel shutoff switches next to the boost pumps, and the circumstances of the accident are consistent with the these fuel shutoff switches being inadvertently placed in the off position, instead of the fuel boost pumps.

The commercial pilot departed on a night instrument flight rules flight in actual instrument meteorological in-flight conditions. Less than 2 minutes after the airplane departed the airport, the controller observed the airplane in a right turn and instructed the pilot to report his altitude. The pilot responded he thought he was at 3,500 feet and he thought he had lost the gyros. The pilot said he was trying to level out, and when the controller informed the pilot he observed the airplane on radar making a 360-degree right turn , the pilot said "roger." Three minutes and 23 seconds after departure the pilot said "yeah, I'm having some trouble right now" and there were no further radio communications from the flight. The on scene investigation disclosed that both wings and the tail section had separated from the airframe. All fractures of the wing and wing skin were typical of ductile overload with no evidence of preexisting failures such as fatigue or stress-corrosion. The deformation of the wings indicated an upward failure due to positive loading. No anomalies were noted with the gyro instruments, engine assembly or accessories

The airplane was operated as an on-demand cargo flight that impacted trees and terrain about one mile from the destination airport during a non-precision approach. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The airplane was equipped with an "icing protection system" and a report by another airplane that flew the approach and landed without incident indicated that light rime icing was encountered during the approach. Radar data shows that the accident airplane flew the localizer course inbound and began a descent past the final approach fix. No mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation were noted with the airplane.

Both aircraft departed Wichita on IFR flight plan in VFR weather conditions. They flew northwest toward their respective destinations, and cancelled IFR about 20 minutes before the accident. ATC observed the airplanes on radar, and stated they were 'dogfighting back and forth' prior to the collision. One pilot's roommate reported the two pilots, who were close friends as well as co-workers, often cancelled IFR and flew in formation if the weather was VFR. He reported the pilots often videotaped each other, and he had watched some of the tapes. He stated 'it was hard to tell from the videotape how close they were because they could use the zoom feature, etc. You could read the N numbers.' Investigation revealed brown paint transfer on the bottom of the right wing of the blue and white airplane, which had separated and was located 1.5 miles from the main wreckage. There were light colored scuff marks on the top of the left engine nacelle of the brown and white airplane. Both aircraft and both pilots were killed.