Air Creebec

Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
1. During the extension of the landing gear, a wire bundle became entangled around the landing-gear rotating torque shaft, preventing full extension of the landing gear.
2. The entanglement by the wire bundle also prevented the alternate landing-gear extension system from working. The crew was required to conduct a landing with only the nose gear partially extended.
Other findings:
1. The wire bundle consisted of wiring for the generator control circuits, and when damaged, disabled both generators. The battery became the only source of electrical power until the aircraft landed.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The aircraft was configured late for the approach, resulting in an unstable approach condition.
2. The pilot flying carried out a steep turn at a low altitude, thereby increasing the load factor. Consequently, the aircraft stalled at an altitude that was too low to allow the pilot to carry out a stall recovery procedure.
Findings as to Risk:
1. The time spent programming the global positioning system reduced the time available to manage the flight. Consequently, the crew did not make the required radio communications on the mandatory frequency, did not activate the aircraft radio control of aerodrome lighting (ARCAL), did not make the verbal calls specified in the standard operating procedures (SOPs), and configured the aircraft for the approach and landing too late.
2. During the second approach, the aircraft did a race-track pattern and descended below the safe obstacle clearance altitude, thereby increasing the risk of a controlled flight into terrain. The crew’s limited instrument flight rules (IFR) experience could have contributed to poor interpretation of the IFR procedures.
3. Non-compliance with communications procedures in a mandatory frequency area created a situation in which the pilots of both aircraft had poor knowledge of their respective positions, thereby increasing the risk of collision.
4. The pilot-in-command monitored approach (PICMA) procedure requires calls by the pilot not flying when the aircraft deviates from pre-established acceptable tolerances. However, no call is required to warn the pilot flying of an approaching steep bank.
5. The transfer of controls was not carried out as required by the PICMA procedure described in the SOPs. The transfer of controls at the co-pilot’s request could have taken the pilot-in-command by surprise, leaving little time to choose the best option.
6. Despite their limited amount of IFR experience in a multiple crew working environment, the two pilots were paired. Nothing prohibited this. Although the crew had received crew resource management (CRM) training, it still had little multiple crew experience and consequently little experience in applying the basic principles of CRM.
Other Findings:
1. The emergency locator transmitter (ELT) had activated after the impact but due to circuit board damage its transmission power was severely limited. This situation could have had serious consequences had there been any survivors.
2. The Chibougamau/Chapais airport does not have an aircraft rescue and firefighting service. Because the fire station is 23 kilometres from the airport, the firefighters arrived at the scene 26 minutes after the accident.
3. Although this accident does not meet the criteria of a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), it nonetheless remains that a stabilized constant descent angle (SCDA) non-precision approach (NPA) would have provided an added defence tool to supplement the SOPs.
4. After the late call within the mandatory frequency (MF) area, the specialist at the Québec flight information centre asked the crew about its familiarity with the MF area while the aircraft was in a critical phase of the first approach, which was approaching the minimum descent altitude (MDA). This situation could have distracted the flight crew while they completed important tasks.
5. The standard checklist used by the flight crew made no reference to the enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS). Therefore, the crew was not prompted to check it to ensure that it was properly activated before departure.

It was determined that the aircraft's water/methanol system had been serviced from a drum containing contaminated fluid. The drum was not labelled in a properly manner.